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Abstract
This research investigated whether the absence of pretend play typically shown by children
with autism is the result of a global inability to pretend, or reflects a failure to utilise intact pretend
play abilities. A first experiment found that children with autism were impaired in their ability to
produce spontaneous pretend play, relative to a matched group of children with moderate learning
difficulties. They were also impaired in their production of pretence in elicited play conditions, in
which direct encouragement to play was provided by the experimenter. However. a second
experiment revealed that these children were not impaired in their ability to carry out pretend
instructions. Further, a third experiment showed that they were unimpaired in their ability to
comprehend pretend acts which the experimenter demonstrated before them.
These findings suggest that pretend play is something that children with autism can engage
in, at a basic level at least. Consequently, two final experiments aimed to determine why children
with autism do not utilise this capacity spontaneously. The firs~ of these tested an 'executive
deficit' hypothesis, which suggests that a failure to pretend is caused by a failure to disengage from
the functional salience of objects. The results of the experiment disconfumed this prediction. The
second test examined whether children with autism have problems in generating pretend acts, and
found that this was the case.
It is therefore hypothesised that children with autism suffer from some form of generativity
impairment, which impinges on their apparently intact ability for pretence. This suggestion fits in
with the pattern of results obtained from all the studies, as children were only impaired when the
idea for pretence was not provided. Possible cause of such an impairment are discussed. as are the
implications of these findings for our understanding of the psychology of pretend play.
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Preface
A literal translation of the Greek word 'thesis' is a place or a position. The purpose of this,
my thesis, is to describe the place or position that I have reached after three years of research into
pretend play in autism. The theoretical 'position' which I hold having completed this research will
only be spelled out fully in the final chapter (chapter 7). What the earlier chapters will describe is
exactly how I have come to arrive at this position, in a sense they will tell the story of my journey
to the final 'thesis' or theoretical resting point
The subject of my research is one that marries two distinct areas of developmental
psychology. Both pretend play and autism are areas which have a vast literature and a great deal of
previous research associated with them. However it could be argued that they are both aspects of
psychology which, though well described, are not fully understood at a fundamental level. The
manifestations of pretend play in young children and of autism are well documented and detailed,
however the psychological mechanisms which underpin these two separate topics are less well
formulated. Certainly there have been incisive and well-regarded attempts to describe exactly what
is going on in pretend play (e.g. Leslie, 1987) and important theories advanced to explain autism
on a psychological level, but I would claim that these theories are at present still at the stage of
being tested and verified. Research into the meeting point of these two areas, into pretend play in
autism, is therefore valuable, not only for what it tells us about children with autism's ability to
pretend, but also for what it reveals about autism and for what it has to say about pretend play
specifically. In a sense pretend play and autism come together like two continents; where they meet
they push up a series of less well explored research questions. Once these questions have been
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addressed one has an exciting vantage point to look down, perhaps from a new and informative
perspective, on the two land-masses below.
Given the hope that this research will have something significant to say about autism and
about pretend playas areas of interest in their own right, two initial chapters will be devoted to
them. The subject of pretend play will be discussed first (chapter 1), not because it is seen as a
more important area than that of autism, but because certain issues which are best discussed with
reference to pretend play (e.g. metarepresentations) are of subsequent relevance to a discussion of
autism. Aspects of autism will therefore be covered in chapter 2. This chapter will not give an
exhaustive account of the disorder, but rather concentrate on issues that are relevant to the current
thesis only. Once these areas have been adequately reviewed, and outstanding theoretical questions
highlighted, we can then proceed to consider the issues involved in pretend play in autism (chapter
3). This third chapter will provide an exhaustive review of previous research into pretend play in
autism, and also describe a list of potential explanations for the pattern of results that emerge from
these studies. Deciding between these potential explanations was the aim of the research reported
here. The remaining chapters will outline the path this research took en route to the final thesis.
Chapters 4 and 5 will describe work carried out to determine whether the characteristic absence of
pretend play seen in autism reflects a global inabilty to pretend, or rather a failure to produce
pretence. Chapter 6 will describe further studies designed to make explicit the exact nature of the
pretend play deficit seen in autism, in the light of these initial findings.
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\Chapter 1
Pretend Play
1.1 Introduction & Traditional Analyses.
The purpose of this chapter is to provide an introduction into the general area of pretend
play in young children. This is necessary before the evidence for, and the implications of, a
pretend play deficit in autism can be fully evaluated (chapter 3). The chapter will discuss
pretend play in three sections, beginning, in this section, with an outline of traditional and
influential approaches to the subject, such as those of Piaget and Vygotsky. Subsequent
sections will examine the phenomena of pretend play on two separate levels. Section 1.2 will
provide a descriptive analysis. covering important developmental and definitional issues, while
section 1.3 will attempt an analysis of theories and explanations of the psychological
mechanisms involved in pretence. In both cases integrated summaries of these analyses will be
presented.
1.11 Piaget
In his book, 'Play, dreams and imitation in childhood' (1962), Piaget charted the gradual
development of pretend play, as he saw it, in young children. He suggested that pretend play
has its roots in early sensorimotor adaptive reactions, which come to be acted out for
'functional' pleasure. In other words, rather than being a means for the child to find out about
the world, these actions become purely assimilative, they are practised for the sake of being
practised. From these early sensorimotor 'practice games', the child moves on to producing
pretend play, and then to more formal rule-based games. Piaget used the term 'symbolic play'
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to refer to pretence, arguing that a child who pretends uses a present object or action (signifier)
to stand in for, or to symbolise, an absent object or action (signified).
However as Piaget himself notes, ''The question as to where to draw the line between
symbolic and practice games is more than a mere matter of classification, and involves the main
problems of interpreting play in general". The problem faced by Piaget, which is one that still
persists as we shall see below, was how to impose a dichotomy between non-symbolic and
symbolic play on a gradually developing and evolving 'ludic symbol'. The distinction between
'signifier' and 'signified' grows steadily as a child begins to acquire the ability to pretend, but
at what point is it sufficiently large or distinct for the play to be termed symbolic?
According to Piaget, children engage in practice games during sensorimotor stages I to V
(up to an age of around 12 monthsl). However the separation of signifier and signified first
emerges in stages II and ill (2-8 months) and continues to develop in stages IV and V. In
sensorimotor stage VI signifier and signified do become dissociated, and the child produces
'symbolic schemas', This represents the beginnings of symbolic play, but it is symbolic play
of a primitive form; the child's schemas remain tied to their own repertoire of behaviour (Piaget
reports the example of Jacqueline who, at 15months, pretended to sleep by putting her head on
objects that reminded her of her pillow). Piaget therefore sees these symbolic schemas as a
transitional form of play between practice games and symbolic play proper, which can only
emerge once the child has developed beyond the sensorimotor stages.
Piaget divides the further development of symbolic play into two (post-sensorimotor)
stages. In stage 1 (from around 18 months) the child begins to project symbolic schemas and
imitative schemas onto new objects, objects not conventionally associated with these schemas.
In stage 2 (from around 24 months) children come to identify one object with another (object
substitution) and begin to engage in role-play and sociodramatic play. Once again Piaget argues
lAges assigned to Piaget's stages of development are approximate, and are taken from his own examples
of when children show pretend play corresponding to each stage.
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that the separation of signifier and signified is not complete in the first of these two stages, and
would argue that only in stage 2 does 'symbolic play proper' occur.
1.12 Vygotsky
Vygotsky's theories of pretend play do not differ greatly from those of Piaget, though his
perspective on its development is an alternative and relevant one. Vygotsky (1966)
concentrates less on the roots of pretend play, claiming that 'imaginative play' is something
new that the child acquires around the age of three, but in common with Piaget he sees younger
children's inability to pretend as a consequence of their being tied to the physical world.
Pretence appears only when the child can distance themselves from the real world, thought
becomes separated from objects, and actions arise from ideas rather than from things. This is
illustrated in two developments in children's thinking. Firstly meaning becomes emancipated
from objects, therefore rather than an object dictating meaning to the child, the child can dictate
meaning to the object. This, Vygotsky notes, occurs in object substitution when a child
pretends that a stick is a horse. Similarly, meaning is freed from action, so the child can
impose their own, novel, imaginative meaning on familiar actions. This occurs, for example,
when a child stamps their foot upon the ground when pretending to ride a horse. The notion of
these two developments (shown diagrammatically in figure 1.1) is present in Piaget's account,
but is made explicit by Vygotsky.
Whereas Piaget saw pretend playas having a purely assimilative function, the child gains
pleasure from simply exercising their mastery over their own behaviour, Vygotsky gave it a
much more causal role in the child's cognitive development. He claimed that it represented a
transitional phase between the 'purely situational constraints of early childhood' and 'thought
which is totally free of real situations'. This is probably because in pretending the child comes
to learn that meaning can float free of objects and so comes to appreciate the abstract nature of
thought; they also learn that meaning can be separated from action, and hence begin to realise
that thought is voluntary and intentional.
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Figure 1.1. Vygotsky's analysis of cognitive shifts associated with pretence
Object
Meaning
Meaning
Object
Action
Meaning
Meaning
Action
1.13 McCune-Nicolich
Drawing heavily on Piaget's initial proposals McCune-Nicolich (Nicolich, 1977;
McCune-Nicolich, 1981) put forward a five stage model of the development of pretend play in
young children. Other sources for this model were post-Piagetian empirical research, aspects
of which will be outlined below. and her own longitudinal observation of the free-play of five
children (Nicolich, 1977). McCune-Nicolich argued that her model represented an ordinal
sequence of development, that children must progress through each stage sequentially. She did
not assign a fixed age to each stage. and would I believe, argue that children develop at
differing rates. However (very) rough ages have been assigned based on her comparisons to
Piaget's stages of symbolic development, see table 1.1. The importance of this model was not
just that it elaborated, and in cenain cases made explicit, Piaget's ideas, but it also served as a
framework for a great deal of subsequent research, and raised issues which will recur in the
following section.
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Table 1.1. McCune Nicolich's Levels of Pretend play Development.
Level Approx. Title Description (example)
Age (m)
1 To 12 Presymbolic Understanding of object use (using a toothbrush
Schemes appropriatety)
2 12-18 Auto-Symbolic Self-directed pretence (eating from an empty
Schemes spoon)
3 18-24 Decentered Other-directed pretence (feeding a doll)
Symbolic Games
4 18-24 Combinatorial 4.1 Single-scheme combinations, one scheme
Symbolic Games related to several actions or recipients
4.2 Multi-scheme combinations, several schemes
related in sequence
5 24+ Planned Symbolic Active other-directed pretend (pretending that a doll
Games feeds themselves)
Object Substitution (perceptually and functionally
dissimilar)
5.1 Planned single-scheme acts
5.2. Combinations with planned elements
1.2 Descriptive Analyses
1.21 Developmental Trends
Piaget noted how the development of the distinction between signifier and signified in
pretence was a gradual one. A large amount of subsequent research into pretend play has
concentrated on elaborating the pattern of this development. In particular three developmental
trends have been investigated. These are decentration; a move from self as agent of pretence to
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attributing agency to others, decontextualization, a move away from using realistic objects in
pretend substitution, and finally integration, the ability to combine individual pretend actions
into more complex sequences. The majority of studies into these areas have been
comprehensively reviewed elsewhere (Bretherton, 1984; Fein, 1981; Rubin, Fein &
Vandenberg, 1983), but there are good reasons for a selective review and reappraisal of this
work here. Earlier reviews do not include a handful of more recent studies which deserve
consideration. It is also vitally important to have a finn understanding of the manifestation of
the development of pretend play in normal children before we go on to discuss the
psychological mechanisms which might underlie this development. Finally there are novel
interpretations to be drawn from these studies, and implications regarding the synthesis of
separate developmental trends which arise from them and need to be outlined.
Decenmuion
The suggestion of the trend of decentration is not only implicit in Piaget's writings, but
,
can be seen in Vygotsky's analysis of the changes involved in a child's thinking when they
develop the ability to pretend. Decentration, moving away from self-agency to other-agency,
reflects Vygotsky's suggestion that meaning becomes freed from action. A child who produces
self-directed acts has not accomplished this separation, pretend play is still subservient to the
child's repertoire of behaviour.
Experimental investigations of decentration can be characterised on the basis of the
number of levels of agency which they ascribe to the child's pretend play. For example Lowe
(1975) and Belsky and Most (1981) examined two levels of agency, self as agent and other as
agent. Lowe observed the free play of seven groups of young children (ages 12, 15, 18,21,
24, 30 and 36 months, around 30 children per group), presenting them with four toy sets, each
containing a doll and miniature accessories. She found that in the youngest children the
majority of play was self-directed, for example children would 'feed' themselves with a toy
spoon. Levels of self-directed behaviour increased to a maximum amongst 18 month-olds,
before decreasing. 21 month olds were seen as being 'transitional' in that they showed equal
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amounts of self-directed and doll-directed behaviour, while by 24 months doll-directed
behaviour, feeding the doll rather than feeding oneself. was well established.
Belsky and Most (1981), on the basis of previous research, put forward a 12 stage
sequential model of children's play behaviour. The early stages of the sequence are not of
interest here, as they cannot be said to reflect pretend play of any description (e.g. mouthing
and manipulation of toys). More relevant are stages 7- pretend self (self-directed acts), and 8-
pretend other (other-directed acts). The authors examined the free-play of 40 children divided
into ten groups aged between 7.S and 21 months, and found general support for their model as
a whole (as tested by a Guttman Scalar analysis), and hence for the decentration effects found
previously. The first evidence of self-directed pretence occurred at 12 months while other-
directed pretence first emerged at 13.5 months (though neither behaviour was consistently
observed in the majority of children until 16.S months).
Other studies of decentration have drawn a distinction between passive other-directed acts
(for example the child feeds a doll) and active other-directed acts (where the child might pretend
that the doll feeds themselves). Fenson and Ramsay (1980) report two such studies; study 1
examined the free-play of three groups of young children, aged 13.5, 19.5 and 24.5 months
(24 children per group), while study 2 employed the same procedure longitudinally, testing a
group of 19 children at these three ages. Examples of self-directed, passive other-directed and
active other-directed pretend play were noted. It was found that the proportion of children
showing other-directed acts increased with age. Though the number of self-directed play acts
remained constant, the relative frequency of these acts decreased with age. The majority of
children showed other-directed pretend play by 19 months, but passive acts were consistently
more common than active acts, 17 of the 19 children observed longitudinally showed passive
other-directed acts earlier than they showed active other-directed acts.
Lyytinen (1991) investigated decentration effects in a broader examination of all three
developmental trends amongst five groups of children, aged from 2 to 6 years (18 children per
group). The free-play of the children with a variety of 'Duple' lego toys was observed for
eight minutes. Play was divided into a number of possible categories, including (similarly to
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Fenson and Ramsay) self-directed acts and passive other- and active other-directed acts. It was
found that the number of examples of the two forms of decentered play increased linearly with
age, even up to six years. Two year olds showed examples of both forms of decentered
pretend play, though passive other-directed acts were consistently more common than active
other-directed acts. The results also suggest that self-directed acts are no longer performed after
about 3 years of age.
Watson and Fisher (1977) predicted that children would progress through a four stage
developmental decentration sequence. Their hypothesised stages were: I-self as agent (child
pretends to sleep), 2-passive other as agent (child puts a doll to sleep), 3-active substitute as
agent (child puts a block to sleep) and 4-active other as agent (child pretends that· a doll puts
themselves to sleep). They observed the free-play of three groups of children aged 14, 19 and
24 months (12 children per group) after some initial modelling, and found that the age at which
duration of each type of agent use peaked, increased sequentially. The time spent engaged in
self- and passive other-agent play appeared to drop off after 19 months. Further, individual
patterns of behaviours shown by the children fitted the original predictions, children showed a
step-wise progression through the hypothesized levels of agency (as shown by a Green's
scalogram analysis). Watson and Fisher suggest that a fifth step in the sequence would be the
use of an active substitute as agent (child pretends that a block puts themselves to sleep). .
These experiments suggest that self-directed acts begin relatively early, at around
approximately one year of age. It appears that these acts reach a peak at around 18 or 19
months of age (Lowe, 1975; Watson & Fisher, 1977), and thereafter decline with age. Other-
directed play seems to emerge at around 20 months (Lowe, 1975; Fenson & Ramsay, 1980),
and be well established by two years, though Belsky and Most (1981) found other-directed acts
at earlier ages. There is evidence to suggest that active other-directed acts occur at a later stage
than passive other-directed acts, and Watson and Fisher's results indicate that using a passive
substitute occurs at a point intermediate between these two behaviours.
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Deconiextualizaiion
Decontextualization is the developmental trend to move from object substitution with
realistic prototypical items to the use of inappropriate dissimilar items. Whereas an analogy
could be drawn between decentration and Vygotsky's notion of the emancipation of meaning
from actions, decontextualization within children's pretend play, can be compared to his idea of
the separation of meaning from objects. In early pretend play it is the objects that impose
meaning on the child's play, but as the child develops they come to impose meaning on objects
themselves through play, relying less on the cues which the objects provide, and more on their
own ideas.
The ability to use objects as substitutes in pretence appears to emerge at around 18
months of age, though using realistic objects in early 'pre-symbolic' play may occur as early as
13 months (Belsky & Most, 1981; Corrigan, 1987; Jackowitz & Watson, 1980). The use of
non-realistic substitutes could be interpreted as coinciding with a move from sensorimotor stage
V to VI, and in terms of Piaget's theory, from practice games to symbolic schemas. A number
of studies have looked at the subsequent development of the ability to substitute objects of
varying similarity. Golomb (1977) found that young children followed a well defined order of
'appropriateness' in sequentially selecting props to fill a single defined role in a pretend
situation. Lyytinen (1991) found that the proportion of decontextualized acts produced by
children increased with age. She also noted that 'Children in the older age range may not be as
eager as the younger children to accept imaginary non-real meanings for real objects'.
This last point raises the important question of the role of object function in
decontextualization. While it is accepted that perceptual decontextualization occurs, the part
played by object function in aiding or hindering substitutability is less well documented.
However, interestingly, this aspect of decontextualization is the one that most closely parallels
Vygotsky's emancipation of meaning; it is presumably predominately the function of an object,
rather than its form, which gives it its meaning. It is also worth noting that while objects can
essentially be viewed as perceptually similar or dissimilar (though clearly this admits of
degrees), functional similarity appears to have three levels. Objects can be functionally similar,
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non-functional (e.g. block of wood) or counter-functional (having a function of their own that
differs from that of the object to be signified).
That functionality plays a part in object substitution was shown by Copple, Cocking and
Matthews (1984). They engaged two groups of children, each aged between 4 to 5.5 years, in
one of two pretend scripts. In each case the experimenter provided the target for substitution,
for example asking the child to find a 'spoon' from amongst a set of possible props, however
the functional role that the spoon played differed between scripts. In script 1 the spoon was
required for scooping out some ice-cream, in script 2 it was needed for stirring. The authors
found that in the majority of cases children selected a prop which was able to fill this functional
role, for example an egg shell for a scooping spoon and a stick for a stirring spoon.
Ungerer, Zelazo, Kearsley and O'leary (1981) investigated the free play of four groups
of young children (18, 22, 26, 34 months) and found that the number of substitutions using
props providing low physical support (perceptually dissimilar) increased with age. They also
noted that while the youngest children preferred to use non-functional as opposed to functional
objects in substitutions, this difference was less marked in older groups. While these results
appear to provide some support for the notion of two forms of decontextualization, perceptual
and functional, it cannot be assumed that the children's choice of props ensures that perceptual
similarity is held constant as functional similarity varies and visa versa.
While Lyytinen and Ungerer et al. examined free play with a variety of toys, and were
therefore unable to hold either perceptual or functional similarity constant, there have been
investigations which have looked at children's ability to substitute single objects presented to
them. Elder and Pederson (1978) investigated the ability of 2.5,3 and 3.5 year-olds to engage
in' object substitution with props that were similar or dissimilar to the target object. The
'similar' props resembled the realistic object in terms of size and shape, and had no defined
meaning (perceptually similar, non-functional), while the 'dissimilar' props were both different
in shape to the target object and had their own distinct function (perceptually dissimilar,
counter-functional). The authors found that while no groups had difficulty in using the non-
functional objects in substitutions, the 2.5 year olds were significantly impaired in their ability
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to utilise the counter-functional props. They note that in these cases the children often used
these objects appropriately rather than in pretence, and suggest that the fact that these props
each had their own distinct function played a part in making this condition more difficult for the
youngest subjects. Though Elder and Pederson paid attention to both perceptual and functional
similarity they themselves note that these two variables are confounded in their study.
Jacowitz and Watson (1980) identified the following sequential steps in object
substitutability: 1- similar form and function, 2- similar form dissimilar function or similar
function dissimilar form, 3- dissimilar form and ambiguous (non-functional) function, 4-
dissimilar form and function. They found that two groups of children of mean ages 16 and 23
months both progressed sequentially through the proposed levels of substitutability, with age
determining the highest level obtained. Their results also suggested no difference in difficulty
between the two conditions identified in level 2. Though the authors themselves do not
separate out the effects of each variable, this can be done from their data. Such an analysis
appears to confirm that both form and function playa part in determining an object's
substitutability. It also suggests that the effects of form and function are of a similar
magnitude, and that they interact. Having said this, there appears to be little effect of function
on the ability of the younger group to substitute perceptually dissimilar objects. It may be that
perceptual similarity carries greater weight for younger subjects, and that they find object
substitution with perceptually dissimilar objects particularly difficult.
The few studies reviewed here therefore provide good evidence for perceptual
decontextualization, and some evidence for independent functional decontextualization. Two
tentative suggestions also arise; firstly that younger children may give more weight to
perceptual similarity than functional similarity, and secondly (and probably relatedly) that older
children are affected more by functional dissimilarity than younger children. It therefore seems
that though object substitution becomes generally less difficult with age, the relative salience of
functionality increases. This could be due to an increase in the absolute magnitude of a
functionality effect amongst older children, or alternatively, to a decrease in the relative effect of
perceptual cues.
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Integration
The trend of integration, combining a number of pretend acts into a sequence, has been
examined less than decentration and decontextualization, perhaps because of the difficulties
inherent in defining where one act ends and a second one begins. However a number of
experimenters have specifically looked at integration effects, usually alongside an examination
of decentration and/or decontextualization. This is true of Belsky and Most's (1981)
experiment. One of the final stages in their proposed developmental sequence, elements of
which have been described above, was 'sequenced pretend'. This referred to where a child
produced a number of related acts such as putting a doll to bed then kissing them goodnight.
They found evidence of this behaviour in one child aged 13.5 months, and in the majority of
children in each age group from 16.5months.
In addition to investigating decentration in their cross-sectional and longitudinal studies,
Fenson and Ramsay (1980) also recorded instances of integration. They found that the
proportions of children showing both 'single scheme combinations' (two consecutive acts
where the same action is directed to two different objects) and 'ordered multischeme
combinations' (two logically ordered acts directed towards the same recipient) increased with
age. All of the children showed examples of single scheme combinations by 19 months, but it
was only at 24 months that the majority showed evidence of ordered multi scheme
combinations.
Four of Lyytinen's (1991) play categories were designed to examine integration effects.
These were single- and multi-scheme combinations, 'events' where four or five acts were
combined and 'episodes' consisting of six or more play acts. The number of integrated acts
produced by children increased linearly with age, though in fact increases were only seen in the
number of events and episodes, the number of single- and multi-scheme combinations remained
relatively constant. The two year old children produced examples of each kind of integrated
behaviour, though events and episodes were uncommon in this group.
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From these three studies only tentative conclusions can be drawn. It does seem that by
two years of age children are able to combine pretend acts into sensible sequences. It is also
clear that the length and complexity of these combinations increases with age.
Amalgamating The Three Developmental Trends
For the most part the experiments described above have investigated trends of
decentration, decontextualization and integration, but have kept these trends separate, and have
not attempted to combine them in a more coherent framework. However there are a few studies
that have tried to draw these threads together. Inparticular the combined effects of decentration
and decontextualization have been examined. This has been done by suggesting that the effects
of agency (decentration) and of object similarity (decontextualization) might be in some way
additive, and that weightings could be applied to particular combinations of these two aspects of
any particular pretend play act, in order to predict its developmental degree of difficulty. Both
Corrigan (1982) and Watson and lackowitz (1984) investigated the combined effect of three
levels of agency, 'self', 'other' and 'substitute' and two levels of object similarity: 'realistic'
prop or 'substitute' prop. The weightings given to each level as a result of their observations of
children's play differed slightly, but their models were essentially similar, and both gave similar
strengths of weighting to decentration and decontextualization effects.
These two models were drawn together in a subsequent study by Corrigan (1987), which
also took into account the difference between passive other- and active-other directed acts
highlighted by a number of the studies of decentration described above (Fenson & Ramsay,
1980; Lyytinen, 1991; Watson & Fisher, 1977). Corrigan tested 16 children longitudinally at
ages of 14, 20 and 26 months, observing their free play after modelling play acts of a variety of
combinations of levels of agency and object similarity. The ages at which children first showed
particular combinations, for example passive other-directed with a substitute object, were
noted, and it was found that children progressed sequentially through a series of stages
depending on these levels. Table 1.2 shows the final five step sequence (consisting of eight
different combinations) along with the ages at which children first showed each step, and the
weightings subsequently applied to each level by Corrigan.
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Table 1.2. Corrigan's (1987) model, and results.
Step Agency Object Similarity Total Mean Age
Weighting shown (m)
1 Self (0) Realistic (0) 0 14
2 Other (passive) (1) Realistic (0) 1 16.6
3a Self (0) Substitute (2)
3b Other (passive) (0) Substitute (2) 2 18.6
3c Substitute (passive) (2) Realistic (0)
4a Substitute (passive) (1) Substitute (2) 3 25.3
4b Other (active) (3) Realistic (0)
5 Other (active) (2) Substitute (2) 4 26
The weightings given by Corrigan depend on the number of 'symbolic substitutions'
. required to perform a certain act, for example using a substitute object requires the setting aside
of both form and function, and hence receives a score of 2. The table shows that once a child
has produced a certain level of agency, the weighting for that level drops by 1 in subsequent
steps. The rationale for this adjustment seems particularly ad-hoc, especially as a similar
habituation effect is not applied to the object weightings. The model also takes no account of
degrees of object similarity or dissimilarity, nor of differential effects of object form and
function. However Its strengths are that it combines two developmental trends, decentration
and decontextualization, and that it is consistent with the results of previous studies into these
two areas.
Corrigan's analysis also serves to further emphasise that the development of pretend play
reflects a gradual growth of the distinction between signifier and signified. This is similarly
seen in the other studies described above, especially in relation to decentration and
decontextualization. The seeds of pretence are sown as early as 12 or 13 months, and the
character of a child's pretend play continues to develop and change over a number of years.
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The extent and range of this development raises again the problem that was highlighted at the
start of the chapter, namely how can one impose a dichotomous distinction between non-
pretend and pretend play on such a gradually evolving behaviour. When is it fair to say that
children really engage in pretend play? This troublesome problem will be returned to, and
discussed in subsection 1.24.
1.22 Parallels With Language Development - The Semiotic Function
As noted initially, Piaget (1962) argued that pretence was symbolic because it involved
the use of a 'signifier' to represent an absent or imaginary 'signified'. In the same way
language is often thought to be symbolic, as words are used to designate certain concepts or
referents which mayor may not be present. Consequently Piaget (see also Werner & Kaplan,
1963) considered language and pretend play to be separate manifestations of a common,
developing symbolic ability, or 'semiotic function'.
There isa large body of empirical evidence in favour of some form of underlying link:
between these two domains. Children with advanced levels of language typically show
corresponding levels of play, and vice versa (Cas by & Della Corte, 1987; Iurkowitz, 1988;
Rosenblatt, 1977). More formal correlations between measures of symbolic play and language
abilities have also been demonstrated in young children (Ungerer & Sigman, 1984; Tamis-
LeMonda & Bomstein, 1989, 1990; Vibbert & Bomstein, 1989) and amongst developmentally
delayed children (Casby & Ruder, 1983; Hulme & Lunzer, 1966; Kennedy, Sheridan,
Radlinski & Beeghly, 1991; Sigman & Ungerer, 1984a). An important point about these
correlational studies, noted by Fein (1981), is that they typically take no account of the common
effect of age on the two variables, hence the presence of a significant relationship may only
indicate that play and language develop at a similar rate with age. However, in some cases a
significant relationship between pretend play and language measures remains even when age
has been partialled out (Lowe & Costello, 1976; Lyytinen, 1991).
Clearly correlations do not prove the presence of an underlying semiotic function,
language development might lead directly to increased pretend play skills, or visa versa.
Further evidence for the notion of a general symbolic ability comes from parallels in the
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developmental patterns, and from co-occurrences of important developmental landmarks in the
two domains. In her analysis of the development of pretend play (discussed earlier), McCune-
Nicolich (1981) also drew parallels between the five levels of play which she identified, and
corresponding levels of language acquisition In common with others (Sinclair, 1970) she
highlighted the fact that a child's first referential words emerge at the same time as the onset of
pretend play, and also suggested that combinatorial behaviours emerge simultaneously in
pretend play and language. Similar parallels have been reported by Ogura (1991), who
suggests that the two domains develop together until the level of combinatorial behaviour, and
inter-dependently thereafter, and by Volterra, Bates, Benigni and Bretherton (1979), who also
noted an overlap in the content of the 'vocabulary' of language and play in the second year.
While the studies reviewed briefly above provide reasonable evidence for the existence of
a common semiotic function, the form of this function is still unclear. In particular it is not
obvious whether it subserves the development of pretend play and language alone, or rather
represents some more global abstract reasoning ability which plays an important role in the
development of cognition as a whole. What is clear is that language and pretend play abilities
are closely related. This has important implications for studies which attempt to compare the
pretend play abilities of different population groups. These groups must be equated for levels
of language functioning, or any differences that may emerge in pretend play skills may simply
reflect differential language abilities.
1.23 Definitions - Functional And Symbolic Play
"Toys were symbols- of real things. That toy monkey stood for a real monkey, that toy
train for a real train, and so on: in miniature."
Martin Amis - London Fields (p. 220)
As was seen initially Piaget was hesitant when it came to deciding what was, and what
was not symbolic play. He proposed that transitional symbolic schemas emerged in
sensorimotor stage VI, but was only confident that play was properly symbolic in symbolic
stage II (18-24 months). Initially McCune-Nicolich's analysis was similarly, and
understandably, non-committal, though she did argue that a shift in the child's thinking occurs
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at Level 5 in her analysis, from linear sequential play to a hierarchical coordination of
representational structures (McCune-Nicolich, 1981). However, in a later paper (McCune-
Nicolich & Fenson, 1984) she suggests that the planning of pretend play indicated that signifier
and signified were clearly separate, and emphasised the parallel between her level5, at which
this planning occurs, and Piaget's symbolic stage II which he saw as being clearly symbolic.
It could, of course, be argued that it is quite wrong to attempt to impose a distinction on
this developing behaviour, and that doing so does not tell us more about pretend play, but
rather results in a loss of information. This is a valid argument, collapsing a continuous
variable to a dichotomy does result in a reduction of explanatory power and especially of
subtlety. However it is possible that we are not dealing with a continuous variable in this
instance, and that there is a point at which play moves from being non-symbolic to being
symbolic.
A version of this view was put forward by Huttenlocher and Higgins (1978), though they
draw on earlier work by EI'Konin (1966). Essentially their argument was that, before a certain
point, one cannot be sure that pretend play is symbolic. This is seen in cases when a child
plays with miniature, realistic toys, such as a toy tea set. In this instance it is not possible to be
certain that they are using the miniature tea cup as a symbol for a real cup, it may be that they
simply see it as a very small real cup, not as a substitute at all. Similarly when a child uses an
object appropriately, such as when they brush a doll's hair with a comb, itmay be that they are
only performing an activity which they know to be associated with that object, without
symbolising the comb as a real comb, or the doll as an real person. According to Huttenlocher
and Higgins therefore, Martin Amis would be incorrect to ascribe symbolic status to play with
miniature toy trains and monkeys.
This type of play has been termed 'functional play', because it consists of using toys in a
way which is appropriate to their obvious function (it should be noted that the use of the term in
this instance differs from that employed by Piaget to refer to early assimilative play). Ungerer
and Sigman (1981) provide a helpful definition, stating: "Functional play involves the
appropriate use of an object or the conventional association of two or more objects such as
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using a spoon to feed a doll or placing a teacup on a saucer." They go on to assert that
"Symbolic play is characterised by the complete differentiation of objects and actions. Children
are able to represent and transform objects internally in thought, fully independent of overt
action. As a result play is no longer constrained by the physical and functional properties of the
available objects"."
Even though Ungerer and Sigman provide a theoretical definition of what constitutes
symbolic play, there still remains the problem of deciding whether any particular piece of play
that a child produces is symbolic. What then are the practical criteria for making this inference?
Huttenlocher and Higgins note that speech often provides a means of identifying true
symbolism, and suggest that " ...play is only clearly symbolic when the child makes an advance
announcement of his intentions". This suggestion parallels McCune-Nicolich's assertion that
the fifth level of her pretend play scheme was certainly symbolic, but is only helpful in a limited
number of instances, since children do not always provide a commentary of their intentions.
Leslie (1987) noted that the non-literal nature of pretend play is evidenced by the fact that it can
entail abuse by deviant referent (pretending that a banana is a telephone), by deviant truth
(pretending that a dry table is wet) and by deviant existence (pretending that an empty cup is full
of water). He therefore proposed three corresponding, fundamental and necessarily symbolic
forms of pretence. These are object substitution (deviant referent); attribution of pretend
properties (deviant truth) ; and imagining absent objects (deviant existence)3 •. These three
forms of pretence have subsequently been generally accepted as necessary and sufficient
2With this quote we have come full circle and returned to notions raised at the very beginning of the
chapter. In common with Piaget, Ungerer and Sigman claim that pretend play is only truly symbolic when
signifier and signified are completely separate. They also echo Vygotsky in suggesting that this comes about
when thought is internalised and freed from objects and actions.
3Though these three criteria were proposed by Leslie it is worth noting that they are drawn from Ungerer
and Sigman's (1981) suggestion that three examples of symbolic play are object substitution, ascribing
animation and creating imaginary objects with no tangible referents.
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indicators of symbolism, and therefore provide the means for inferring whether a child is truly
engaged in symbolic play.
1.24 Further Developments In Pretence
Almost all the empirical research into the development of pretend play described so far,
has focused solely on the individual as a 'producer' of pretence. However, as will become
apparent, it is important to also consider children's ability to understand pretence, and
developments in cooperative pretending. These two aspects of pretence will therefore now be
reviewed briefly.
Comprehension Of Pretence
Flavell, Flavell and Green (1987) claim that by three years of age children are capable of
understanding the distinction between real and imaginary situations. In two tests an
experimenter acted out a pretend object substitution (for example, pretending that a sponge was
a truck), and children were asked whether the experimenter was imagining the object's pretend
or real identity. Three-year old children claimed that the experimenter was pretending that the
sponge was a truck rather than pretending that the sponge was a sponge. This is perhaps
unsurprising, by definition one cannot imagine an object's real identity. The tasks were also
simplified by the fact that children were told what the experimenter was pretending initially.
However Flavell et al. did employ a slightly more stringent test of ability to infer pretend
identities. Children were shown a candle that looked like an apple. An experimenter took the
candle and pretended that it was an apple, doing so by miming eating actions. 95% of children
claimed that the experimenter was pretending that the candle was an apple, rather than a candle,
and 75% stated that the candle was a pretend apple rather than a real apple.
Woolley and Wellman (1990) examined 7 young children's use of the terms 'real' and
'pretend' in spontaneous speech, and found that children first used 'real' or 'really' to
emphasise a contrast between real and non-real situations from around three years of age.
Woolley and Wellman also replicated Flavell et al. 's findings, showing that three-year-olds
could identify the pretend status of imaginary actions.
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However, it might be argued that Flavell et al. and Woolley and Wellman's results do not
show that three-year-olds fully understand pretence, rather that they are simply aware of the
non-reality of imaginary situations. Stronger evidence for an ability to understand pretence at
this age comes from a series of studies reported by Harris and Kavanaugh (1993) which show
that three-year-olds are able to infer the pretend consequences of imaginary actions. Inone case
(their experiment 5) an imaginary act, such as the pouring of pretend tea, was directed towards
one of two toy animals. Inover 75% of cases, 28 month-old children directed a 'remedial act',
for example wiping with a cloth, to the appropriate animal. This could represent a simple bias
towards responding to the animal who had been acted upon, rather than an appreciation of that
animal's pretend state. However in further studies, slightly older children were shown to be
able to describe the consequences of similar acts. In these experiments (their experiments 6 and
7) three-year-olds 'correctly' identified a pretend substance that had been poured from a
container onto a toy animal, or onto an animal's pretend food, in at least 73% of cases. When
asked about the results of the action three-year-olds answered in terms of a pretend outcome
(e.g. the animal was 'wet'), rather than in terms of the literal state of affairs (the animal being
'dry') in at least 86% of cases.
In contrast to these findings, Lillard (1993a) found that four-year-old children were
reluctant to deny that a character who was unaware of the existence of a certain entity could still
pretend to be that entity (for example children were asked whether a troll, who didn't know
about rabbits, was pretending to be a rabbit when they were hopping up and down like a
rabbit). Clearly this task is more complex that those employed by Harris and Kavanaugh, and
indeed it might be argued that it is more a test of linguistic logic rather than of pretence itself.
What Lillard seems to be assessing is children's understanding of the link between beliefs and
pretence, rather than the ability to understand a pretend act itself.
In general then, these results indicate that by three-years of age children are capable of
distinguishing between reality and non-literal situations, and more importantly, can 'make
pretend sense' of imaginary scenarios which are acted out before them.
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Social Pretend Play
The most comprehensive investigations into the development of cooperative social
pretend play have been carried out by Howes and colleagues (see Howes & Matheson, 1992;
Howes, Unger & Seidner, 1989; Howes, Unger & Matheson, 1992). Through this series of
experiments Howes has developed a sequential scale of social pretend play development. The
stages of this scale (as reported in Howes & Matheson, 1992) are i)parallel play - two children
playing in close proximity, but without any interaction; ii)parallel aware play - as parallel play,
but with eye contact; iii) simple social play - children engage in simple interaction, talking and
exchanging toys; iv) complementary and reciprocal play - action based reciprocating games
such as 'tagging' and peek-a-bo; v) cooperative social pretend play - children act out
complementary roles within social pretence, and vi) complex social pretend play -
complementary roles are acted out with metacommunication.
Of interest to the present discussion (and to later sections of the chapter) are the later two
stages, which will temporarily be termed Co-op SPP and Complex SPP for the sake of brevity.
The distinction which can be drawn between them rests on the nature of the social interaction
involved. In Co-op SPP the roles which children are acting out are 'understood' and implicit in
the pretend scenario. In Complex SPP they are actively communicated between partners.
Children at this stage are able to disengage from the pretend situation to comment on that
situation. Howes and Matheson (1992) looked for evidence of these levels of social pretend
play in a three-year longitudinal study of 72 children, initially aged between 13 and 24 months
(the sample size fell to 48 children over this time). They found that Co-op SPP first emerged
between 19 to 23 months, and was present in half the sample by 30 to 35 months. Complex
SPP was first seen in childI_'enat 30 to 35 months, but was not present in half the sample until
42 to 47 months. In an earlier cross-sectional study which looked at stages up to an including
Co-op SPP, but excluding Complex SPP, Howes et al. (1989) observed Co-op SPP in
children aged between 29 and 38 months.
Howes et a1. (1992) summarise and elaborate these findings with reference to both
mother-child and peer-child play. They claim that at 25 to 30 months children will offer pretend
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scripts to the mother and to peers, but integration of scripts does not occur. At 31 to 36 months
social pretence takes on the joint enactment of complementary roles (Co-op SPP). By 37 to 48
months children are established in their ability to communicate and instruct the cooperative
integration of roles (metacommunication, Complex SPP).
1.25 Summary And Synthesis
The aim of this subsection is to summarise the material that has been presented above
concerning the description of the phenomena of pretend play, and of its development, and to
integrate it into a coherent framework. This framework borrows directly from a number of
sources. The stages proposed by Piaget (1962), adopted and expanded slightly by McCune-
Nicolich (1981; Nicolich, 1977) do appear to be followed through successively by children as
they develop. Any model of this development must therefore draw heavily on these accounts.
A model must also capture the gradual nature of the development of pretend play, but at the
same time must also be able to answer important questions, these being 'when does pretend
play emerge', and 'when does it become symbolic'?
Combining the information presented in subsections 1.21 and 1.23 provides a means of
answering these questions. Pretend play is generally first found at around 13 months of age
(e.g. Bates, 1979; Fein. 1981). This can be seen in a number of the experimental studies
described above (Belsky & Most, 1981; Corrigan, 1987). The form of pretend play that does
emerge at this point is self-related (other-related play does not emerge until around 20 months
(Lowe, 1975; Penson & Ramsay, 1980) or involves the use of realistic objects (Corrigan,
1987; Iackowitz & Watson, 1980). In other words it is functional play that first emerges in
children.
One way of determining when symbolic play emerges, following Leslie (1987) and the
arguments outlined in subsection 1.23, is to look for evidence of attribution of absent
properties, object substitution and/or the imagination of absent objects. Of these three
behaviours it is the emergence of object substitution that is most clearly documented. This
occurs (with non-realistic props) at around 18 months (Corrigan, 1987). However, while one
must see this as 'symbolic play' if one accepts Leslie's criteria, it might be argued that the
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complete separation of signifier and signified in pretence does not occur until as late as 24
months. In terms of the trend of decentration, this would appear to occur when a child
attributes agency to an external figure, rather than being the agents of pretence themselves. As
noted above, other-directed acts emerge at around 20 months, but in the case of passive other-
directed acts the child is still the agent. Active-other directed acts emerge slightly later, and
appear to be in evidence by 24 or 25 months (Corrigan 1987; Fenson & Ramsay, 1980;
Lyytinen, 1991). Therefore, while one might wish to talk in terms of the onset of symbolic
play between 18 and 24 months (Doheny & Rosenfeld, 1984; Leslie, 1987; Ungerer &
Sigman, 1981), it could be argued that it is only after 24 months that one can be confident that
signifier and signified are entirely separate. Corrigan's (1987) analysis provides further
support for this suggestion (see table 1.2). It is only in the fourth and fifth steps of her model
that a substitute prop is combined with a 'decentered' (substitute or active other) agent; at
previous levels there is always some connection between signifier and signified, whether in
terms of agency (not fully decentered) or in terms of object identity (not fully decontextualized).
In the light of these points three levels of solitary or individual pretend play are proposed
here, these eaefunaional play, symbolic play onset, and solitary symbolic play proper. A clear
parallel can be seen between the later two symbolic levels and McCune-Nicolich' s levels 4 and
5. In the same way that McCune-Nicolich would only be confident that level 5 was symbolic,
it does seem that one can only be certain that symbolic play, which begins to appear after 18
months, is truly symbolic after 24 months. A further reason for proposing these two
'symbolic' levels is that it seems that the shift between McCune-Nicolich's levels 4 and 5
corresponds to some sort of landmark in the inter-dependent development of pretend play and
language. The onset of combinatorial behaviour in both domains appears to mark the point at
which the two diverge (Ogura, 1991; see subsection 1.22).
The proposal of three separate levels of individual pretence should not be taken to indicate
that children progress sequentially though a fixed sequence of stages as their pretend play
abilities develop, nor that their symbolic skills do not develop further after 24 months.
Children of 18 months and above certainly engage in functional play, and as noted in
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subsection 1.24, comprehension of pretence appears to develop at around three years of age.
The purpose of outlining the three levels considered here is to give a guideline as to onsets of
particular behaviours.
The fact that aspects of pretend play develop in parallel is emphasised by the final two
stages of the proposed model. These concern the development of social pretend play, which, it
is argued. develops alongside individual pretence (the question of whether there exist causal
developmental relationships between the two domains will not be considered here. though see
Howes, 1992). These two levels are taken directly from Howes' work (see subsection 1.24),
and are cooperative social symbolic play, and complex social symbolic play. Once again, the
use of these particular levels should not be seen to infer that pretend play cannot be social until
this point of development. Howes' other levels clearly indicate that social pretend play occurs
much earlier. Nor should they be taken to indicate that children move directly and sequentially
from solitary symbolic play proper to cooperative social symbolic play. In fact the model does
not explicitly differentiate between individual and social pretence until after 24 months To
reiterate, the proposed model is therefore not an exhaustive description of the development of
pretend play in normal children. but a selective (and approximate) guide to the onset of
particular stages of interest. It is shown in table 1.3, and interpreted diagrammatically in figure
1.2, which emphasises the gradual development of symbolic ability, and the two streams of the
model.
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Table 1.3. Proposed model of pretend play development
Age Level Type of Play
(mths)
to 12 Pre-Pretend Manipulation of objects, conventional use of
objects
13-18 Functional Appropriate use of realistic toys, Self-directed
acts
18-24 Symbolic Play Onset Some object substitution
24+ Solitary Symbolic Play Proper Other directed acts, object substitution with
perceptually and functionally dissimilar obiects
30-36 Cooperative Social Symbolic Play Complementary roles enacted in social
interaction
36+ Complex Social Symbolic Play Complementary roles enacted with
metacommunication
Figure 1.2. Diagrammatic interpretation of the model
12 24
Age
(mths)
18
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1.3 Psychological Analyses
1.31 Introduction And Notes On Terminology
"It is hazardous to enter the intellectual jungle that is known as semiotics"
Peter Hobson (in press)
This section of the chapter will outline recent and current theories of pretence. As seen in
the previous section, it has generally been assumed that (non-functional) pretence is symbolic
(e.g. Piaget, 1962). However, while for Piaget symbolisation involved 'standing in for
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something else', and was therefore in a sense representational, the term' symbolic play' is now
often accepted to refer to 'meta-representational' processes (Baron-Cohen, 1987; Leslie, 1987).
Baron-Cohen (1987) argues, in contrast to Piaget, that a symbol " ... is not just a representation
of an object ... That is a sign. A symbol ... is a representation of a concept (which itself refers
to an object). In other words, a symbol is a representation of a representation."
This distinction is potentially confusing, and indeed many would doubt its necessity. For
example Quine (1987) agrees with Piaget in saying "A symbol, broadly speaking, is something
that stands for something else". Therefore, rather than ask whether pretend play is symbolic, it
is better to ask whether pretend play is 'metarepresentational'. This section will describe
psychological analyses of pretend play, making specific reference to their position as regards
this important question.
In order to define 'metarepresentation', it is important to establish first what is meant by
term 'representation'. In his recent book Perner (1991) devotes a chapter to the nature of
representations. He draws a distinction between the representational medium and the
representational content, and notes that one and the same content can be represented by a
number of different media. Thus a particular scene can be represented either pictorially or by
description, and a particular situation can be represented by two distinct sentences. When we
talk of 'representations' in psychology we usually refer to the representational medium - to the
mental entity that does the referring - rather than to its content.
Perner, following Goodman (1976) and Frege (1892/1960), also notes that a distinction
must be drawn between representing (referring) and representing-as (sense). These correspond
to two distinct constraints on the accuracy of a description of a representation. In some
circumstances, and for some purposes, a representation may be described adequately by
specifying its worldly referent, whereas in others, an adequate description will also have to
convey the way in which it represents what it does. In passing on to someone a report of the
weather, it will generally make no difference whether I say that the forecaster has said that it
will be sunny tomorrow, or sunny on Tuesday, providing that tomorrow is Tuesday. Whereas
it makes all the difference, in reporting Oedipus' belief, whether I say that he takes himself to
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be married to Jocasta, or married to his mother. Perner argues that we need to concentrate on
sense rather than reference, and therefore offers the following definition: "A representation
represents something as something".
There is another distinction that Perner does not draw which is worth making at this
point, since it will be of importance later. This is between the content of a representation on the
one hand, and the type of mental attitude involved in that act of representation, on the other. I
can have a number of distinct mental attitudes that share the same content. For example I can
believe that ice cream is in the fridge, I can wish that ice cream were in the fridge, or I can
suppose that ice cream is in the fridge.
Ifmetalanguage is language used to describe language and metacognition is knowledge
about what I know, are metarepresentations therefore representations of representations
(second- or higher-order representations)? In a sense they are. However, if representation
properly defined is representing something as something, metarepresentation is therefore
representing a representation as a representation (or more long-windedly, representing a
representation as a representation of something as something) This is how Pylyshyn (1978)
originally used the term - "ability to represent the representational relation itself', and this is the
definition that will be referred to throughout this thesis.
1.32 Pretend Play is Metarepresentational: Leslie
Children who pretend are generally ascribed a 'double knowledge' about the situation
(McCune-Nicolich, 1981). That is to say, they are pretending that a banana is a telephone, for
example, but at the same time they know that it is a banana really. Leslie (1987) notices that
this poses a potentially disastrous problem for the child, namely that of 'representational
abuse'. How can a child who holds a primary representation (a literal, factual, representation
'defined by a direct semantic relation with the world') of a real object or situation, this is a
banana, at the same time juggle a second representation, this is a telephone, when
engaging in object substitution? How is it that the child's representational system is not totally
undermined by this - is this a banana or is it a telephone? Both representations cannot be
'primary' as they contradict each other semantically. To account for the child's ability to readily
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substitute a wide variety of objects without losing a grip on their literal meaning Leslie argues
that the pretend representations must be 'quarantined off from primary representations in some
way. This is done, he proposes, by the use of meta-, or second-order, representations.
Leslie argues that during an act of pretence the primary representation, this is a
banana, is copied into another context, "this is a banana". This secondary representation
is 'decoupled' from reality, and its reference, truth and existence relations are suspended; so
representational abuse is avoided. The opacity afforded by the decoupling of the secondary
representation's input-output relations is supposed to allow the decoupled expression to be
transformed without abusing the primary representation, as in "this banana is a
telephone". Leslie also suggests that the decoupled expression will be a second-order one,
maintaining that it will be a representationof the primary representation.
In his original paper, Leslie sometimes seems to suggest that the mere fact that the
mechanisms underlying pretence are supposed to involve copying a primary representation is
sufficient to make pretence metarepresentational. This is clearly not the case. It may be true that
sometimes, a copy of a representation is at the same time a representation of that representation,
but when, for example. an artist paints a portrait from a photograph of their subject. the result is
a representation of the person in question, not of the photograph. The resulting portrait is not a
metarepresentation, despite the fact that it was produced by copying a representation. The
status of the copied representation depends on the way in which it is used. So when we
consider Leslie's postulated mechanism of decoupling, the question to ask is whether the copy
of the primary representation, "this is a banana", is used as a representation of the earlier
representation. And there is not the slightest reason to believe that it is. On the contrary, it
continues to be used as a representation of the banana, only now in connection with some
unusual predicates, such as "is a telephone". or "is a source of sound" (see subsection
1.32).
Leslie in fact probably never intended to suggest that simply copying a primary
representation constitutes metarepresenting. This is clear from his argument that pretend play in
childhood emerges at the same time as the ability to understand pretence in others (Leslie,
Chapter 1 30
1987). In terms of his theory, to understand pretence a child must be able to 'compute the
relation PRETEND (a, "ei", ej)', where a is the agent and "ei" and ej are the secondary
and primary representations respectively. Rather than suggest that the decoupled secondary
representation is itself the metarepresentation, he proposes that metarepresentations take the
general form: Agent - Informational Relationship - "Expression". Here the
decoupled secondary representation is the "expression" and the informational relationship is
included to indicate the nature of the (non-automatic) relation between the decoupled expression
and its corresp~nding primary representation. For example: Mother - PRETENDS - "this
is a banana".
Though he makes minor reformulations to his approach in subsequent papers (Leslie,
1988; Leslie & Frith, 1990), this is generally how Leslie defines metarepresentations, and as he
is referring to a representation of a representational relation he is correct to do so. Put another
way, Leslie's metarepresentation is a representation of the secondary representation as a
representation of the primary representation. Leslie and Roth (1993) have suggested that
metarepresentations have a number of components: the agent, and the informational relationship
between an aspect of reality (primary representation) and an imaginary situation (decoupled
representation), see Figure 1.3. The secondary representation is therefore now seen as only
one component of the metarepresentation as a whole. Leslie and Roth introduce the term M-
representation to refer to this relational structure.
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Figure 13. The M-representation (Leslie & Roth, 1993)
The M-representation
Agent Informational Relationship
Primary
Representation
DecoupJed Secondary
Representation
mother PRETENDS (of) the banana (that) "it is a telephone"
There can be no doubt that Leslie's M-representation is indeed metarepresentational.
Were a child to have this sort of representation of another person representing something as
something else they would be employing a metarepresentation. This does not necessarily mean
that pretence is metarepresentational. Solitary pretending must be considered separately from
shared pretence, because even if a child begins to pretend at around the same time that they
understand pretence in others (this assumption will be discussed later), this does not imply that
the same cognitive processes are operating in each case. The only reason for supposing that
individual pretence is metarepresentational would be if it were assumed that children have some
self-awareness of their pretending, in other words if they themselves are the 'agent' in the M-
representation. It seems highly unlikely that a child necessarily needs to represent the fact that I
PRETEND (of) the banana (that) "it is a telephone". Clearly they may do this at times,
for example when asked what they are doing by an adult, but there is still no reason to suppose
that in general they need do anything other than employ a suppositional secondary
representation (see helow).
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1.33 Pretence is not Metarepresentational: Perner
A key point in Leslie's argument is that a child cannot simultaneously hold two primary
representations that contradict each other semantically. However, in defining 'representation'
we noted that the attitude associated with a mental act of representation may vary while the
content of the representation remains the same. Thinking in these terms we can see Leslie as
defining primary representations as having a 'know' or 'believe' attitude to a certain state of
affairs. We can then similarly suggest the existence of secondary representations, having a
non-literal 'suppose', 'what if', or counter-factual attitude. Under this analysis there is no
logical reason why non-literal, non-primary representations cannot be first-order (Le.
representational, as opposed to metarepresentational). This forms the basis of Pemer's account
(Pemer 1988, 1991).
Pemer argues that young children proceed through three levels of 'semantic awareness'.
At the initial level of semantic awareness infants have a 'mental model' of the world. This
model is said to be determined veridically by perception, and consists of primary
representations. It represents the world as it is, and makes up a non-manipulable knowledge
base. Around the beginning of the second year children develop the ability to use mental
models. They can copy elements from the knowledge base to create new models representing a
variety of not necessarily literal situations. These models can be used to represent the world as
it could be, to represent hypothetical situations. Because they do not share a direct causal
relationship with the world, and are therefore not primary representations, they are secondary
representations. The child can compare secondary representations with one another and with
their primary knowledge base. What they cannot do, however, is to create models of models.
This meta-representational ability reflects acquisition of the third level of semantic awareness
and occurs at around the age of four. This ability is necessary if a child is to compare a model
of another's mental model with their own knowledge of the world (as is required in a false
belief task, for example; see subsection 2.21).
Perner suggests that in pretence children create a counter-factual model of the pretend
situation. Within the scope of his theory this ability is available to children operating at the
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second level of semantic awareness. In other words, this can be done using hypothetical,
counter-factual secondary representations and does not require metarepresentations. It might be
argued that these hypothetical models, originating from the knowledge base, are representations
of the primary representations in the base, and are therefore metarepresentational after all.
Perner counters this objection by pointing out that, though drawn from and placed in
comparison to the knowledge base, the counter-factual pretend models are still models of the
external world (as it could be) and not of the base. This is analogous to the earlier example of a
photograph used as the basis of a portrait. Or, to return to the mental attitude/content
distinction, Perner is arguing that all that is needed inpretence is the ability to hold a 'suppose'
attitude rather than a belief attitude to a certain content.
Does Perner's theory solve the problem of representational abuse? There are clear
parallels between his theory and Leslie's. Because Perner's counter-factual mental models are
hypothetical they are detached from reality and are therefore 'decoupled'. Because they are
separate from the knowledge base they are 'quarantined' from it. Perner therefore circumvents
the problem of representational abuse in much the same way as Leslie; he agrees that a child
cannot concurrently hold two semantically conflicting (reality oriented) primary representations.
Where he differs from Leslie is in his use of secondary representations as opposed to
metarepresentations.
1.34 Simulation Theory'
A group of authors who would agree with Perner concerning the non-
metarepresentational nature of pretence are those that adopt a 'simulation theory' approach to
the area of young children's theory of mind. However, the line of argument leading to this
conclusion which would be advanced by proponents of simulation theory is different from that
adopted by Perner. It is also more tortuous and requires a digression into the relationship
between pretend play and 'theory of mind'.
4The reader is referred to the special edition of Mind and Language (1992) vol. 7. which is devoted to the
issue of Simulation Theory and which will be drawn on in this section.
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What constitutes a 'theory of mind' will be discussed fully in the following chapter
(section 2.21). However, it can basically be thought of as the ability to hold beliefs about
someone else's beliefs. I have a theory of mind when I am able to understand that other people
are 'minded' in their own right; that they have their own intentional states, beliefs and desires,
which mayor may not be different from my own. Representing another's belief (whether it be
false or true) is undoubtedly metarepresentational. For example, if I believe that my friend
Pete believes that his box of cornflakes is in the cupboard, then I represent Pete as having a
representation of the cornflakes as being in the cupboard. I therefore have a metarepresentation
(properly defined). Because a theory of mind requires the ability to have metarepresentations,
and because pretend play is thought by many to be metarepresentational, a functional link has
been drawn between the two, and pretend play is seen as a precursor to a fully fledged theory
of mind (Baron-Cohen, 1987, 1991a; Leslie, 1987, 1988).
Simulators do not argue that theory of mind is non-metarepresentational - it clearly is
metarepresentational- but they do contend that even older children (and adults) do not routinely
employ a theory of mind when predicting another's behaviour (Goldman, 1989, 1992; Gordon,
1986, 1992; Johnson, 1988). A theory of mind, or folk-psychology of behaviour, is one way
in which I can make explanatory predictions about others. I can predict that my friend Pete will
search for my cornflakes in the wrong cupboard because I believe that (he believes that (the
cornflakes are there». An alternative strategy would be for me to 'put myself in Pete's shoes'
as he comes down hungry for breakfast. What would I do if I were Pete? I would look in the
cupboard where the cornflakes are normally kept. In essence this is the 'simulation' view of
predicting behaviour. Note that, in contrast to the theory of mind approach, the simulation
view does not require me to theorise about Pete's mental state; I need only consider what I
would do in his place. Simulation is therefore first-person centred, and eliminates the need for
third-person rationalisation.
If, as suggested by simulation theory, I do not need to use metarepresentations to predict
what someone will do on the basis of a false belief, then I would not need to use them to follow
through my own counter-factual reasoning in pretence. Harris (1991) has used a simulation
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approach to argue directly for the non-metarepresentational nature of pretence. He highlights
the early acquisition of the ability to imaginatively entertain mental states in pretence (by two or
three) and notes that children are able to reason with pretend premises at this stage (Dias &
Harris, 1990). Simulation, involving imagining a hypothetical situation and then reasoning
from this pretend premise, should therefore be available to children at an early age.
Where Harris goes beyond previous accounts is in his appreciation that simulation will be
more difficult the more the child has to take into account the idiosyncratic status of the other
person (the other person might want something the child would not want, for examplej>,
Harris terms this 'setting aside default settings' and identifies two such types of setting; these
are the child's intentional stance towards reality and their specification of reality itself. By this
analysis understanding another person's desire calls for setting aside intentional default settings
(what one wants), while understanding pretence requires setting aside reality defaults (what
really is). Predicting behaviour requires both sets to be ignored (one must appreciate what
another wants, and what they believe to be the case) and is consequently a developmentally
harder task.
What Harris is saying about pretence, therefore, is that all a child need do in order to
produce pretend play themselves is to imagine what the world could be like, and to reason from
there. This does not require metarepresentations but the ability to simulate counter-factual.
hypothetical reality by setting aside what one knows about the world. Again this account
appears to differ little from what Perner proposes about pretence. Whether this form of
approach is more valid than Leslie's, and whether it is applicable to all cases of pretend play,
are questions which will be discussed in the following, concluding, subsection.
SGordon (1992) notes the possibility of total or partial projection, but says little more about these
processes.
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1.35 Summary And Synthesis
The purpose of this final subsection is to address the question of whether pretend play is
metarepresentational, taking account of the theoretical material outlined above, and of aspects of
the development of pretence described in section 1.2. Leslie's account raises two possible
reasons for supposing that pretence necessitates the use of metarepresentations. The first is the
need to circumvent representational abuse. Metarepresentational pretence does manage this
quite easily, by decoupling the metarepresentation from the primary representation. However,
Perner's account reflects the mental attitude/content distinction and makes use of secondary
representations which are effectively 'decoupled' from the knowledge base. These counter-
factual representations are not metarepresentational, yet representational abuse still appears to be
avoided. Similarly Harris argues that pretence can be carried out at the representational level by
engaging in suppositional reasoning. The fact that children can engage in simple counter factual
reasoning at the age at which pretend play begins to emerge, shows that the ability to
manipulate non-primary representations of the world is present at this stage (indeed it is a
developmentally simpler task than manipulating rnetarepresentations).
The second possible reason for adopting Leslie's approach, concentrating now on his
notion of the M-representation, is that it could be argued that pretence does indeed need to
capture the informational relationship between the primary and secondary representations. The
crucial question is therefore whether I need to represent the secondary representation (the
banana as a telephone) as being a representation of the primary representation (the banana), or
whether it is enough to hold that secondary representation alongside the primary representation
without having the relationship between the two made explicit.
It would certainly seem that having a decoupled secondary representation would be
sufficient for individual pretence. As noted above there is no reason to suppose that a child
who pretends alone 'represents themselves as representing one object as representing another'.
Leslie's suggestion that the.onset of individual pretend play at around two years marks the start
of metarepresentational understanding in young children can therefore be rejected on the
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grounds of parsimony, since it is quite, possible to argue alternative non-metarepresentational
theories of this form of pretence, which ascribe less competence to the pretender.
Having said this, would we want to argue that all pretend play is non-
metarepresentational? Not necessarily. If it is accepted that a child who computes a version of
Leslie's M-Representation is employing metarepresentations, then there is still an argument for
some cases of metarepresentational pretence, notably in joint pretence. This would be the case,
for example, if a child really did compute the representational relation 'mother PRETENDS (of)
the banana (that) "it is a telephone"'.
Crucial to Leslie's account is his claim that shared pretence co-occurs with the onset of
individual pretend play. Leslie therefore argues that 2-year-old children must be able to
compute the M-representation., Studies of comprehension of pretence (reviewed in subsection
1.24) show that by three years of age, and perhaps earlier, children are perfectly able to
understand or make sense of pretend play acts carried out by another person. However, just
because two people are involved in the pretend situation, one acting out the pretence, the other
understanding it, there is no need to assume that the 'understander' must necessarily represent
the 'actor' as pretending. In other words it is possible, and indeed likely, that young children
understand pretend acts of this kind by treating it as individual pretence, albeit pretence not
generated by themselves. In terms of Perner's notion of suppositional thinking (using
secondary representations), a child may pick up cues in the actor's intonation and facial
expression that indicate that 'as if behaviour is taking place, and prompt them into
'suppositional' rather than 'literally-receptive' mode. Similarly, Harris (1991; Harris &
Kavanaugh, 1993) argues that young children, faced with a potentially puzzling non-literal
behaviour, may simply search for a personal pretend scheme that could explain this. They
could then understand that the banana was being used as if it were a telephone while by-passing
the metarepresentational attribution of the actor's pretence. In doing so the child might rely
heavily on 'scripts', or quite generalised knowledge about behaviour sequences and scenarios,
in order to join in a mutual pretend play episode.
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It could be argued that evidence of understanding the representational relation comes
when a child moves from a simple, almost passive understanding of another's pretend actions,
to a point of being able to join in and interact with their pretence. At first sight joining in
pretence in this way would seem to imply an understanding of the play-partner as 'pretending'.
This would amount to Cooperative Social Symbolic Play in the analysis of pretend play
development presented in subsection 1.25, which appears at around 30 months. However
there are still reasons to believe that metarepresentational understanding is not necessary for this
form of pretence. Lillard (1993b) has argued that social pretend play at this age is still based
firmly upon a child's scripted knowledge of the world. This echoes work by Bretherton (1989)
who specifically proposed an 'event representation' theory of pretence. Bretherton argues that
complex and apparently novel pretend interactions can be built up with simpler scripted building
blocks, claiming that 'Even in the third and fourth years, when collaborative pretending
flourishes, many children still confine themselves to joint enactments ... for which both know
the basic 'script". Bretherton does not argue that this renders social pretend play non-
metarepresentational (she does not address this argument specifically, but vaguely ties her
theory in with Leslie's). However as Lillard (1993b) contends, the use of scripted knowledge
provides a way for a child to cooperate in apparently flexible and interactive social pretence,
without having to represent the other as pretending. The child is able to act out the pretence
based on their own knowledge of what goes on when mother cooks dinner, or when one visits
the doctor for example, without having to take into account the other's mental states at all.
Lillard argues that this form of scripted play continues until the fifth year, but this is not
the case. To return to Howes' work, complex social pretend play would appear to differ from
cooperative social pretend play in a way which cannot be explained purely by event
representation theories. In complex social pretend play, children engage in metacommunication
about the pretend situation. The use of metacommunication is good evidence that the children
involved in the pretence have metarepresentational understanding. This is because
communicating about the pretend situation necessarily implies an appreciation of the listener as
understanding that pretend situation. In other words if one metacommunicates about pretend
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play, one must represent the other as pretending. It would therefore seem that
metarepresentational understanding is only clearly implicated in complex social symbolic play.
Complex Social Symbolic Play emerges at around 36 months according to Howes. This
is close to the age at which metarepresentational understanding emerges in young children as
evidenced by their performance on theory of mind tasks. This is of course un surprising, given
that Leslie's M-representation is required for both behaviours, and is employed in an entirely
analogous way in each case. While there is a danger in reading too much into this co-
occurrence, this approach at least avoids a problem inherent in Leslie's account, namely the
need to explain why pretend play emerges at two years while the ability to pass standard theory
of mind tasks is not evident until at least three and a half years (see subsection 2.21). Leslie
explains this developmental lag between two behaviours which, according to his account, share
the same psychological mechanism, in terms of task complexity (Leslie & Thaiss, 1992).
While this is not, in essence, an invalid approach, Leslie's arguments are ad hoc and he has no
positive experimental support for them. In contrast, the position advanced here, namely that
individual pretence is non-metarepresentational when it first emerges at two, that 'individual'
comprehension of pretence is similarly non-metarepresentational, and that metarepresentational
pretence emerges in a social situation at around 36 months, is not only theoretically
parsimonious, but empirically justified.
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Autism
2.1 Introduction To Autism
The aim of this chapter is to give an outline of the features of autism which will be relevant to
a subsequent discussion of the area of pretend play in autism (chapter 3). Therefore the initial
section will only provide a brief introduction to the autistic syndrome in general. The majority of
the chapter will concentrate on descriptions and evidence for two potential underlying psychological
deficits in autism. theory of mind deficits (section 2.2). and deficits in executive functioning
(section 2.3). Both of these accounts make clear predictions as to the pattern of pretend play
deficits expected in autism (see next chapter). The prospects for finding a unifying and underlying
psychological explanation of autism will be discussed in conclusion (section 2.4).
2.11 Historical Background
Autism was not recognised as a distinct developmental disorder until the 1940s. Kanner
(1943) was the first to adopt the term (though the notion of autistic behaviour. isolation from the
social world. was present in psychology before this). Working independently from Kanner,
Asperger (1944) also described a similar syndrome, and coincidentally applied the same label to it
(see Frith. 1989a). Both Kanner and Asperger saw the disorder as being the result of a basic
failure to interact socially with others; Kanner arguing that this was due to emotional deficits,
claiming that children with autism suffer from an •...innate inability to form the usual biologically
provided affective contact with people'.
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The notion of autism as a disorder of affective or emotional understanding is one that still
persists, though a specifically psychoanalytic approach (e.g, Bettleheim, 1967) which laid the cause
of the disorder firmly at the feet of the 'refrigerator mother"! has long since been discredited.
Subsequent research has emphasised the fundamental importance of other aspects of the disorder.
In the 1960s autism was seen as a developmental language disorder (see Baron-Cohen, 1992a;
Rutter, 1978); while in the 1970s a series of findings emerged to suggest that there were particular
cognitive deficits associated with autism (e.g. Hermelin & O'Conner, 1970) and a purely cognitive
approach to autism is one that remains popular.
2.12 Epidemiology And Aetiology
Details of the prevalence and possible causes of autism will be discussed very briefly here, as
these issues are not relevant to a later discussion of pretend play in autism (for more detailed
coverage of these areas see excellent reviews by Frith, 1989a; Gillberg, 1990a, b, 1992).
Levels of reported incidences of Kanner-type or nuclear autism have been steadily rising over
the past few decades, from around 2 per 10,000 children in the 1970s to a current figure of around
8 per 10,000 (see Gillberg, 1992), though the prevalence of children with autistic symptoms may
be around 20 per 10,000 (Wing & Gould, 1979). This increase may be partly due to the use of
broader diagnostic criteria, and also to greater awareness of autism in those that diagnose
developmental disorders in children (Gillberg, 1992). One consistent finding in studies of
morbidity is that autism is more prevalent in boys than in girls, though the extent of this
discrepancy has varied from study to study (averaging out at about 3 or 4: 1, Gillberg, 1990a)
There appears to be good evidence for some genetic component to the aetiology of autism
(Folstein & Rutter, 1977; Gillberg, 1992), and most would also argue that autism is associated with
neurological dysfunction of some sort (Frith, 1989a; Gillberg, 1990a). However there is little
consensus as to the nature of these proposed brain abnormalities, and little evidence as yet for
1It should be noted that Kanner himself subscribed to this view at one point, see Gillberg (1992)
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consistent loci of impairment in all children with autism (see Coleman & Gillberg, 1985;Reichler&
Lee, 1987). The same is true for evidence of neurochemical abnormalities in autism (see Gillberg,
1992). There are suggestions that complications before and during birth increase the risk of autism
(see Konstantareas, 1986), and links between viral infections such as maternal rubella have been
made (Frith, 1989a). Gillberg (l990a) concludes that ' ...autism represents a syndrome of multiple
neurological injuries .•..with many underlying etiologies' •
2.13 Symptomatology - The Triad Of Impairments
In his original account of the disorder, Kanner noted what he saw as the two 'cardinal
features' of the disorder. These were 'autistic aloneness' and 'obsessive insistence on sameness'.
More recent definitional criteria have been based around three key areas of impairment which were
identified by Wing and Gould (1979) in their epidemiological study of autistic features in a broad
population of children. They found that children who might be seen to be autistic showed: a) a
failure to interact socially , b) impaired ability to communicate, and c) an absence of imaginative
activity. This 'triad' of features has since become accepted as a hallmark of the disorder, and often
forms the basis for a diagnosis of autism. The evidence for social and communicative impairments
is substantial, and will not be discussed in detail here. Social impairments include a failure to
interact with others, ignoring people or treating them as 'means to an end' rather than as people, a
tendency to make socially inappropriate remarks and an apparent lack of attachment with caregivers
(see Baron-Cohen, 1988; Volkmar, 1987). Communicative impairments take the form of a severe
delay in language acquisition (in many cases language is never acquired). If language is acquired it
is marked by repetitive and idiosyncratic use and other features such as pronoun reversal and
abnormal prosody (see Frith, 1989b; Paul, 1987). The support for imaginative deficits will be
discussed at length in the following chapter.
One disadvantage of focusing on Wing and Gould's proposed triad of impairments is that it
can lead to an over-simplification of the extent of the symptoms seen in autism. As well as
impairments in socialization, communication and imagination, children with autism exhibit a wide
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variety of other characteristic behaviours. Perhaps the most notable is Kanner's 'obsessive desire
for sameness', which is seen in a preference for routines and in preoccupation with very specific
interests or pursuits. It is also reflected in perseverative behaviour, children with autism will repeat
actions and segments of speech time and time again. Other characteristic behaviours include
echolalic language use (repeating words heard parrot-fashion), hand waving or flapping, and the
covering of the ears or eyes in the presence of loud noises or bright lights. Though the majority of
individuals with autism also show general learning difficulties, some have abilities which are
typically in advance of their level of general intellectual functioning. They may perform very well
on non-verbal spatial reasoning tasks for example, evidenced by their ability to do jigsaws. A
minority of children with autism (idiot-savants, as they are termed) have exceptional talents in a
particular area, for example in calendar calculating, drawing or in music.
2.14 An Explanatory Model
Most researchers in autism would agree that it is a developmental disorder, with a number of
possible biological causes, which in turn result in structural and/or neurochemical impairments
within the brain. The manifestations of these impairments take the fonn of deficits in the domains
of socialization, communication and imagination-, though some would argue that perseverative
impairments and stereotyped behaviour are key symptoms also. Where differences of opinion
occur is at a level that mediates between the (relatively unknown) biological basis of the disorder
and the (well documented) behavioural manifestations of these brain impairments. This mediating
level is the psychological level of impairment in autism, and researchers differ in their
interpretations of what the fundamental psychological causes of the disorder might be. Some have
argued for a single, underlying and fundamental mediating psychological impairment (e.g, Frith,
1992a), though several different fundamental psychological deficits have been proposed. The
2Tboughclearly the extent of any imaginative impairments is still an issue of key importance within the
scope of this thesis.
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function of the following sections of this chapter is to outline the theory behind, and the support
for, two of the more promising candidates for this elusive psychological cause of autism. These are
the 'theory of mind' and 'central executive dysfunction' hypotheses. There are many other
alternative explanations of the autistic syndrome, though they tend to be less global than those that
have been considered here (an exception being Hobson's socio-affective theory). Considerations
of space prevent a general discussion of these accounts, though a number of them will be discussed
with specific reference to the predictions they regarding pretend play in autism (sections 3.2, 3.3, &
3.4).
2.2 Potential Underlying Deficits I -Theory Of Mind
2.21 What Is Theory Of Mind?
"Doublethink means the power of holding two contradictory beliefs in one's mind
simultaneously, and accepting both of them"
George Orwell - Nineteen Eighty-Four (p. 223)
In recent years there has been a great amount written about how children develop what is
termed a 'theory of mind' (for example see Astington, Harris & Olson, 1988; British Journal of
Developmental Psychology, 1991; Frye &.Moore, 1991; Wellman, 1990; Whiten, 1991). A
potentially oversimplified explanation of what it means to have a theory of mind was offered in the
previous chapter (section 1.34), where it was defmed as the ability to hold beliefs about another's
beliefs. As was noted then, this implies an understanding of intentional states and their behavioural
consequences, and the realisation that these beliefs and desires may differ from one's own. It also
implies the ability to manipulate and process metarepresentations (properly defmed).
The best way of testing whether a child has fully acquired the ability to represent other
people's mental states is to see if they can predict another's behaviour, particularly when the child
knows that the other person has a false belief which will influence their actions. In this case the
other person will behave differently from the way in which the child would behave in the same
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situation, and the child must be able to take this into account in their prediction. In other words, the
child must be able to 'doublethink', to borrow George Orwell's terminology.
Consequently false belief tests of this form, used originally by Wimmer and Perner, (1983),
and variants of them, have been used extensively in this area of research (Gopnik & Astington,
1988; Hogrefe, Wimmer & Perner, 1986; Perner, Leekam & Wimmer, 1987). These studies
typically show that children are able to pass false belief tests at four years of age, but have severe
difficulty with them at three years. As tests have become more contextually relevant to children,
and as the language employed in them has been simplified, the age at which children pass has been
seen to drop to below four (perhaps around three and a half years) (Freeman, Lewis & Doherty,
1991; Lewis & Osborne, 1990; Sullivan & Winner, 1991). This does not imply that at three and a
half children suddenly 'see the light' and become totally sophisticated mind-readers. Children's
belief-desire psychology develops slowly over time, beginning long before four years (see
Wellman, 1990). Also four and even five year old children find second-order false belief tasks
(reasoning about X's beliefs about Y's false belief) very difficult (perner &Wimmer, 1985; Baron-
Cohen, 1989a). However the false belief task does serve as a landmark in theory of mind
development, and many would argue that it is at this point that a workable 'theory of mind' can be
said to have been acquired.
2.22 Why Might Theory of Mind Be Important In Autism?
As described above, the autistic syndrome is characterised by a triad of impairments in
socialization, communication and imagination. It would appear that a theory of mind is a necessary
precursor for development in these domains. This is most easily seen in the case of socialization.
If I lacked the ability to understand exactly how people's beliefs influence their actions, then the
social WOrld,would almost certainly appear as a bewildering environment. Others' actions might
seem unmotivated and certainly unpredictable, the world would be confusing and arbitrary. Faced
with such an environment one solution would be to withdraw, and to avoid potentially confusing
social interaction (Baron-Cohen, 1992a). Another possible coping strategy would be to surround
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oneself with a reassuringly rigid environment. By constructing a world centred around routines
and sameness one would be able to impose order and a degree of predictability on life. The notion
of a lack of a theory of mind can therefore quite readily account for social withdrawal and the
characteristic preference for the routine seen in autism.
It is also able to account for problems seen in communication, especially if one accepts a
Gricean interpretation of the processes involved in successful communication. According to Grice
(1975), and to Speech Act Theory (Austin, 1962; Searle 1965) one must intend to influence the
listener's intentions for successful communication. This appears to presuppose an understanding
of the listener as having intentions which can be influenced. It is therefore argued (Baron-Cohen,
1988; Frith, 1989b) that effective communication requires both speaker and listener to represent the
other's representational state. A further argument is that an appreciation of the 'other's' mental state
is necessary in order to be 'relevant' in communication (Sperber & Wilson, 1986; see Frith,
1989b). If one is aware of what a listener does and does not know, one can tailor communication
accordingly.
Exactly how the lack of a theory of mind would lead to deficits in imaginative ability will be
described in detail in the following chapter (subsection 3.21). However, put simply, it follows
from arguing that pretend play is metarepresentational, and that a failure to acquire a theory of mind
implies an inability to process metarepresentations. Where a theory of mind account has the
greatest difficulty is in explaining bizarre behaviours in autism, such as hand-flapping. It could be
argued that these features follow from a failure to appreciate what is socially acceptable behaviour,
but very young infants, who presumably have little grasp of social expectancies, do not show
similar stereotypies.
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2.23 Direct Evidence Of A Theory of Mind Deficit
Traditional Tests of False Belief
The first study to directly investigate whether children with autism suffer from some form of
'theory of mind' impairment was performed by Baron-Cohen, Leslie and Frith (1985). They found
that only 4 of 20 children with autism (20%) passed a typical false belief task (as used by Wimmer
& Perner, 1983), despite their having a mean verbal mental age of five years five months, well
above that at which non-autistic children pass the test (indeed the test was passed by 86% of Downs
syndrome controls, with a lower verbal mental age, and 85% of normal control children, with a
mean age of less than five).
Similar results emerged from an extension of this study, performed by Leslie and Frith
(1988), who used real protagonists in their false belief task, and who employed a control group of
children with language impairments, matched for language abilities (to counter criticisms of Baron-
Cohen et al.ts original study made by De Gelder, 1987; see also Leslie & Frith, 1987). They tested
18 children with autism. all with a verbal mental age of above four and a half years, and found that
only 5 of them (28%) were able to predict where an experimenter would search for an object on the
basis of a false belief. In contrast all of the controls passed this test satisfactorily. They also found
that the children with autism performed poorly on a test of limited knowledge. only 8 of them were
able to say that an uninformed experimenter would not know about the presence of a hidden object
Subsequent studies have employed this form of traditional task, often alongside other tests of
mental state attribution ability, and have found a similar degree of impairment amongst children
with autism. Pass rates which have been reported are 15% (Reed & Peterson, 1990), 32%
(Leekam & Perner, 1991),27% (Russell, Mauthner, Sharpe & Tidswell, 1991), approximately
25% (Leslie & Thaiss, 1992), and 29% (Sodian & Frith, 1992). In all of these cases these levels
of successful performance were notably lower than those of controls (though matching of controls
was not strict in the Reed and Peterson and Russell et al. studies), and significantly poorer than
would be expected on the basis of the children's verbal mental ages.
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However a discrepant pattern of results has emerged from two studies. Oswald and
Ollendick (1989) found that their group of children with autism were not impaired relative to
matched control children with moderate learning difficulties on a traditional false belief test. Two
possible reasons for this anomalous finding have been suggested (Baron-Cohen, 1992b). Firstly,
no minimum mental age inclusion criteria were used (matching was on the basis of non-verbal IQ),
it is therefore possible that both groups included children with mental ages of below four years,
who would not be expected to pass such a test, regardless of diagnosis. Secondly, the sample sizes
employed were very small (10children in each group).
The second set of 'inconsistent' results emerged from a study performed by Prior, Dahlstrom
and Squires (1990). They found that 11 of their sample of 20 children with autism were able to
pass a traditional false belief task. Prior et al. suggest that this higher level of performance (55%) is
explained by the fact that the children had a higher verbal mental age than the populations described
above (mean of 7 years 2 months). Of a subgroup of 12 children with autism with a verbal mental
age of below seven and a half years, only 4 passed this test (33%), and even when considered as a
whole, the performance of the group with autism is still significantly poorer than a control group of
children with learning disorders matched for verbal mental age.
Another possible explanation of the high-levels of performance observed by Prior et al. is that
they used a slightly different procedure to that employed by Baron-Cohen et al.. Rather than asking
children where Sally would look for her marble, they asked where she would look first. In a
subsequent experiment, Eisenmajer and Prior (1991) found that this manipulation improved
performance amongst a group of children with autism. Nine of 18 children who failed a
traditionally-phrased task were able to pass a subsequent modified test (,where will Sally look
first'). Of course children with autism's difficulties on the false belief task cannot be wholly
ascribed to a failure to understand what is intended by a traditional question (Le. interpreting it as
asking where Sally would ultimately look, or where she must look in order to be successful), as
Prior et al.'s results show that they are still significantly impaired when the 'look first' modification
Chapter2 49
is included. It is also likely that young normal children would similarly benefit from this
manipulation (see Lewis & Osborne, 1990),
Other Tests of Belief Attribution
Perner, Frith, Leslie and Leekam (1989) extended this series of studies by investigating
children with autism's ability to understand mistaken beliefs. They used a deceptive-appearance
paradigm (Perner, Leekam & Wimmer, 1987) in which children were shown a tube of smarties
which in fact contained pencils. When initially asked about the contents of the tube, children
confidently assert that it contains smarties. They are then show that the tube in fact contains
pencils, and are asked to report their previous false belief and to predict what an uninformed child
will say is in the tube. Perner et al. found that only 4 of 23 children with autism (17%) were able to
predict that an uninformed child would think that the tube contained smarties (compared to a 92%
pass rate amongst controls). The children with autism also performed poorly (though less poorly)
on a test of knowledge attribution inwhich they were asked whether they or an experimenter knew
the contents of a box depending on who had seen inside it. One further, intriguing result of Perner
et al.'s study was the finding that, despite being impaired on attributing another's misinformed
belief, 14 of the children with autism were able to report their own previous false belief on the
smartie tube task (61%). Similar results on this task were obtained by Leslie and Thaiss (1992).
They found that of 15 children with autism with a mean verbal mental age of six years three
months, 10 passed a self-belief test, but only 4 passed an other-belief test. These children were
impaired relative to mental age matched controls on the later test, but not on the former.
The ability to reason about the consequences of false beliefs was further tested by Baron-
Cohen (1991b). He found that children with autism were not impaired relative to normal and
handicapped controls in their ability to say that a protagonist would be happy if they opened a box
containing something they desired, or conversely that they would be sad if they opened an
alternative, empty box (desire tasks). However these children were impaired when asked to say
how the protagonist would feel upon opening a box which contained something unexpected (belief
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task) (only 33% passed this task compared to 100% of children with moderate learning difficulties,
and 77% of normal controls). Baron-Cohen (1991b) argues that these findings show that children
with autism understand desires, but not beliefs, as causes of emotions. This conclusion is not
entirely warranted, as a failure to understand beliefs as causes of emotion may simply result from a
failure to understand beliefs per se.
The fact that some of the children with autism assessed by Perner et al. (1989) were able to
pass the knowledge attribution task, but not the developmentally more difficult false belief task,
coupled with the relative improvements noted by Prior et al. (1990) amongst developmentally more
able children with autism, suggests that theory of mind does develop in autism, albeit very slowly.
This is similarly shown by the fact that all the studies described above indicate that a proportion of
children with autism (at least 20%, though the figure rises with verbal mental age) are able to pass a
false belief test. It is therefore not the case that a child with autism will never acquire a theory of
mind. To investigate the possibility of a severe developmental delay in autism Baron-Cohen
(1989a) selected 10 children with autism who had previously passed a false belief test, and gave
them a second-order false belief test (the child has to understand X's false belief about Y's belief).
All of the children with autism failed this task, despite having a mean verbal mental age of over
seven years (normal children pass this form of test at around six years, Perner & Wimmer, 1985)
and despite pass rates of 60% amongst Downs syndrome and 90% amongst normal controls of a
similar developmental level. On the basis of these findings Baron-Cohen concluded that children
with autism suffered from a specific developmental delay in their acquisition of a theory of mind.
Acquisition is delayed rather than being totally impaired because it is clear that some children with
autism do reach a level at which they can pass first order false belief tests, however even these
children are still delayed in acquiring higher-order theory of mind skills. This delay is specific
because it is not related to general developmental delay, children with autism fail these tasks despite
having a verbal mental age which would normally be sufficient for success.
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The notion of a developmental delay was further investigated in a subsequent study carried
out by Baron-Cohen (1991a). Children were given five tasks. being initially made to, Believe,
Pretend. Perceive, Desire or Imagine a particular state of affairs. That state was then changed and
children were asked to report their previous Belief, Pretence. Perception, Desire or Imagination.
Control groups of children with mental handicap and normal children found the Pretend, Perception
and Imagination tasks equally easy, the Desire task harder and the Belief task harder still. This
pattern of performance was also found in normal children by Gopnik and Slaughter (1991).
However the 15 children with autism produced a different pattern. They found the Imagination and
Pretend tasks harder than the Perception task. and their performance on these two tasks, as well as
on the Belief task was significantly poorer than that of controls.
One aspect of this study is of particular interest. As noted above Perner et a1. (1989) and
Leslie and Thaiss (1992) surprisingly found that children with autism, though impaired at
attributing false beliefs to others. were not impaired when asked what their previous false belief had
been. In contrast Baron-Cohen (1991a) found that children with autism were significantly impaired
on this task (the tasks used were similar. all employing Perner et a1.'s, 1987 'smartie tube'
paradigm). Though he did not note the conflict of findings at the time, Baron-Cohen later provided
a possible explanation for the discrepancy (Baron-Cohen, 1992b). In his test Baron-Cohen asked
children what they had originally thought was in the tube, while Perner et a1.and Leslie and Thaiss
asked them what they had originally said was in the tube. Baron-Cohen (1992b) convincingly
argues that the phrasing of Perner et al.ts question may have led children with autism to report their
previous utterance. rather than their previous false belief. This proposal is echoed by Leslie and
Thaiss, who suggest that while three-year-olds interpret a 'what will X say?' question as meaning
'what does X think?', children with autism do not infer a causal relationship between beliefs and
utterances (see Roth & Leslie, 1991).
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Deception
Consistent with the view that children with autism have severe difficulties in making
inferences about other people's mental states, is evidence that they are impaired on tests of
deception. Being able to deceive presupposes that one appreciates that successfully planting a false
belief in another's mind, will influence that person's actions accordingly. True deception, therefore,
clearly requires metarepresentational understanding. Sodian and Frith (1992) tested children with
autism on both a 'Deception' and a 'Sabotage' task. Children were introduced to a 'nice smartie
friend' who gave the child a smartie whenever they found one, and a 'nasty smartie eater' who
devoured whatever smarties he came across. Sodian and Frith found that the children with autism
were not impaired relative to controls on the Sabotage test - they locked a box containing smarties
when the nasty smartie eater approached, but opened it for the friend. However, they were
impaired in their ability to carry out the deception task which required them to lie to the nasty
smartie eater about the contents of the box. Interestingly they also found that this differential
pattern of performance was not maintained when two boxes were included in the experiment, one
containing a Smartie, one empty. In this case the children with autism were not significantly better
at sabotage than at deception.
Baron-Cohen (1992b) noted two potential problems with Sodian and Frith's procedure,
suggesting that the language employed was relatively complex, and that the deceptive game used
lacked ecological validity. Consequently he employed a more simple and familiar task in an
assessment of deceptive ability in children with autism, building on a task used previously by
Oswald and Ollendick (1989). In their study (described in part above) Oswald and Ollendick (1989)
found that children with autism were impaired relative to controls in deceiving an experimenter
about the location of a penny hidden in one of their hands. The children with autism were less
likely to adopt a random hiding strategy, but rather repeatedly hid the penny in one hand, or
alternated the hiding place rigidly (see Baron-Cohen, 1992b). However it is not clear that this
represents true deception, it does not necessarily involve the implanting of a false belief into
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another's mind, and children with autism's failure on this task may be due to behavioural
inflexibility rather than to an inability to mentalize.
However, in his subsequent experiment, Baron-Cohen found that only 3 of 15 children with
autism demonstrated 'information occlusion' when hiding the penny (i.e. actively prevented the
competitor from fmding out its location). In contrast information occlusion was shown by 10 of 15
children with mental handicap and 11 of 13 normal children (both groups having a lower verbal
mental age than the children with autism). Again it could be argued that these results do not really
show a failure to actively deceive in autism, as they do not indicate a failure to implant a false-
belief, rather they appear to reflect a more passive failure to take into account another's mental state.
Other Areas Of Mentalistic Understanding
The body of research reviewed so far almost exclusively suggests that children with autism
have severe difficulties in attributing mental states to others, and that these difficulties take the fonn
of a severe delay in acquiring a 'theory of mind'. Consistent with this view is other evidence which
implies that children with autism's difficulties persist beyond attribution of mental states, and are
seen in other, more general areas of 'mentalistic' understanding. Baron-Cohen, Leslie and Frith
(1986) found that children with autism were able to correctly order sequences of pictures which
combined to tell mechanical (a rock rolls down a hill) or behavioural (a boy dresses himself)
stories, but were impaired relative to control groups of Down's syndrome and normal children
when asked to sequence mentalistic stories (a boy is surprised to find that his bag of sweets is
empty, being unaware that the bag has a hole in it). Baron-Cohen has also shown that children
with autism are impaired in their ability to distinguish between mental and physical phenomena, and
to ascribe a 'mental' function to the brain (Baron-Cohen, 1989b), have impaired appreciation of
Appearance Reality Distinctions (Le. saying that a stone that looked like an egg, really was a stone;
. Baron-Cohen, 1989b), and are impaired in their ability to both produce and to comprehend
protodec1arative pointing (pointing designed to elicit shared reference to an object or an event;
Baron-Cohen, 1989c).
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Unimpaired Non-Mentalistic Social Cognition
While children with autism have difficulties with protodeclarative pointing, they appear to be
unimpaired in producing and in understanding protoimperative pointing (pointing designed to elicit
a simple response, such as signalling desires for objects; Baron-Cohen, 1989c). This dissociation.
of impairment highlights a third line of support of the theory of mind deficit theory. It appears that
'social cognition' which requires or rests upon an appreciation of or an ability to influence another
person's intentional state is impaired in autism, whilst social tasks which do not presuppose these
mind-reading skills are not. It is not the case that children with autism simply perform poorly on
any test that requires social understanding. Baron-Cohen has also shown that children with autism
are perfectly able to appreciate social relationships (e.g. mother-child pairings) and to engage in
interpersonal reciprocity (joining in a collaborative ball-rolling game) (Baron-Cohen, 1991c).
Children with autism can also appreciate another's perceptual perspective (Baron-Cohen, 1989c;
Hobson, 1984; Leslie & Frith 1988)
False Photographs
However one study, Leekam and Perner (1991), stands in stark contrast to the rest of the
body of this research, in that it shows that children with autism are significantly better than young
normal children on a test which could be considered to require 'theory of mind' abilities. This is a
false photograph test, used initially by Zaitchik (1990), in which children watch as the experimenter
takes a picture of a certain situation with a Polaroid camera (in this case, of the doll wearing a red
dress). While the photograph is developing the situation changes (the doll changes into a green
dress), and children are asked what colour dress the doll would be wearing in the picture. Zaitchik
found that 3 year olds have difficulties with this task that mirror their problems with traditional tests
of false belief. However, despite finding an impairment in their children with autism on a false
belief task, Leekam and Perner found that these children were significantly better than four-year-
olds on the false-photograph test; 95% of children with autism passed this test, compared to 58% of
normal children.
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These surprising results have been replicated. Leslie and Thaiss (1992) found that their
group of children with autism (described above) performed significantly better on t~o false
photograph tasks (one in which an object changed location, one in which it changed identity) than
they did on two tests of false belief attribution (the analogous traditional task and smartie tube task).
In fact all 15 of the children with autism passed the photograph version of the identity change task.
Summary
These studies show that children with autism have clear difficulties on tasks that appear to
require them to attribute mental states to others. They perform consistently poorly on traditional
false belief tasks. Only a small minority of children with autism pass such tasks, even though they
have verbal mental ages well above the level required for success in normal children and controls
with learning difficulties. These findings are well replicated, and the failure to find this degree of
impairment in two cases (Oswald & Ollendick, 1989; Prior et al., 1990) is easily explained.
Children with autism are similarly impaired on other tests of mental state attribution such as
predicting mistaken beliefs and inferring limited knowledge in others (e.g. Perner et al., 1989).
Interestingly they do seem to be able to report their past false utterances, but it is not clear that this
necessarily implies the ability to report past false beliefs. They have difficulties in deceiving others,
which is generally seen to reflect a failure to appreciate the value of planting a false-belief in the
mind of a competitor (though see section 2.42 for an alternative explanation). Other areas of
mentalistic understanding, such as understanding appearance-reality distinctions, protodeclarative
pointing, and intentional sequences of pictures, are similarly impaired. In contrast aspects of social
cognition which do not require mentalistic understanding, such as perspective taking, appreciating
social relationships and understanding protoimperative pointing, appear to be unimpaired.
Inmany ways children with autism's performance on these tasks parallels that of three-year-
old children. However, their problems persist well beyond a verbal mental age of three. Even
those children who are able to pass a first-order false belief task are impaired on a second-order task
(Baron-Cohen, 1989a), again failing when their verbal mental age should be sufficient for success.
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It is clear therefore that children with autism are impaired in their acquisition of a theory of mind (if,
I
for the time being, one accepts that failure on these tasks reflects the absence of such a theory).
What is also clear is that this delayed development is deviant. Children with autism do not perform
exactly like three-year-olds; they are able to report previous false utterances, the pattern of their
development of a 'theory of mind' is non-normal (Baron-Cohen, 1991a), and they pass the false
photograph test.
2.24 Summary - Explicit Explanations Of Theory Of Mind Difficulties
The notion of deviance and delay in the acquisition of the ability to attribute mental states to
others in autism appears to be clearly supported by the experimental evidence described above
(though see section 2.42). This is the level of analysis at which Baron-Cohen generally makes his
claims about autism, and it is a level which has both explanatory and predictive power. However at
the start of this section (subsection 2.21), and in the previous chapter (subsection 1.31) we noted
that attributing beliefs to others requires the ability to process metarepresentations. Other authors
have been more explicit in claiming that poor performance on theory of mind tasks shows that
children with autism therefore have a deficit in processing metarepresentations (Frith, Morton &
Leslie. 1991; Leslie. 1987. 1988. 1991; Leslie & Frith 1990; Leslie & Roth, 1993; Leslie &
Thaiss, 1992). In addition the strong claim is made that delayed and deviant acquisition of the
ability to form and process metarepresentations is the fundamental psychological cause of the
autistic syndrome.
One clear problem for this metarepresentational deficit account however, is in explaining why
'.
children with autism have no difficulties on a false photograph task. While the photograph itself is
only a representation of a doll as wearing a red dress (for example), the child must represent the
photograph as representing the doll as wearing a red dress (Perner, 1991). On this analysis
metarepresentations are required in this task.
If this is the case then children with autism cannot have problems in understanding all forms
of metarepresentations. Recently Leslie and colleagues have argued that the metarepresentational
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deficit in autism is domain specific, and applies only to mentalistic metarepresentations (Leslie &
Thaiss, 1992; Leslie & Roth, 1993). They argue that the difference between understanding mental
representations and photographic representations is that photographic representations lack agency,
they cannot hold any particular attitude to a proposition. It is this distinction, coupled with the
argument that attitudes such as 'believe' are sui generis and so demarcate a domain of mentalistic
understanding, which are used to justify Leslie's rather post-hoc analysis.
In contrast, Perner (1993) argues that there are two ways of understanding photographs (and
representations in general). These are as a 'Situation Theorist' or as a 'Representation Theorist'.
Within his model (outlined in subsection 1.33) a situation theorist functions at the second level of
semantic awareness, and is therefore able to use and compare secondary representations or models
of the world. In contrast a representation theorist is able to model models, or use
metarepresentations (the use of the term 'representational theorist' is therefore somewhat
confusing). Perner argues that photographs can be 'understood' on either of these levels, by
representing them as representations (representation theorist using metarepresentations), or by
representing them as a non-literal view of the world (situation theorist using secondary
representations). He claims that children with autism are situation theorists, and as false beliefs
cannot be understood by situation theorists, but only by representation theorists, this account ties in
with the experimental evidence described above. It is also consistent with the fact that children with
autism are able to report their previous false utterances (representing what was said) but not their
previous false beliefs (representing what was thought).
However, while Perner roundly criticises Leslie's explanation of children with autism's
ability to pass the false photograph task, his views are more similar to Leslie's than one might
think. Leslie notes that photographs cannot hold attitudes to propositions, but fails to see the
implications of this point. In subsection 1.32 it was noted that a fundamental property of
propositional attitudes is opacity. Photographic 'representation' does therefore not necessarily
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entail opacity+, If this is the case then there is no real need to represent photographs as
representations, a child can simply represent the 'state of affairs' as they perceived it at the time the
photograph was taken. As Perner's line of argument suggest, a child with autism might therefore
simply represent: a picture of the doll in a red dress. This conclusion can be derived from an
alternative line of thought. IfLeslie's M-representation properly defines a metarepresentation, then
anything without an informational relationship (or propositional attitude), which is the crux of this
structure, cannot be metarepresentational. There therefore appears to be no need to propose a
failure to understand domain specific metarepresentations in autism, as by this analysis the false
photograph task is not metarepresentational in nature.
There remain two other possible arguments against the assumption that failure on theory of
mind tasks implicates a metarepresentational deficit in autism. Firstly, as simulationists would
argue (see subsection 1.34), it is possible that one need not 'metarepresentationally' attribute beliefs
to others in order to predict their behaviour. Theory of mind tasks may therefore not tap
metarepresentational understanding. Harris (1991) takes this line and argues that false belief tasks
could instead be passed by setting aside 'intentional' and 'reality' default settings, and by then
reasoning through another's consequent behaviour for oneself. If this is the case then children with
autism would appear to have problems in setting aside these default settings, rather than with
metarepresentational thought
Alternatively, it is possible that attribution of belief is necessary in theory of mind tasks, but
that children with autism fail these tasks for some reason other than a metarepresentational deficit.
If so there must be some other common factor in these tasks which children with autism find
problematic. This is the argument made by Russell and colleagues (Russell et al., 1991; Hughes &
3It might be argued that in this case the photographic representation has 'temporal opacity' because the real-
world situation has changed since the photograph was taken. This is not a valid argument, the child is in a position
to know exactly what form the photograph will take. Its contents are therefore not opaque in any sense.
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Russell, 1993). Their claim, which will be outlined fully in subsection 2.42, is that theory of mind
tasks consistently require children to inhibit a salient response. They further argue that. as children
with autism show dysfunctional 'executive control' of behaviour (see next section), they are
impaired in their ability to inhibit these form of responses.
There is a certain commonality amongst all these proposals, Children with autism appear to
have difficulties when they have one belief, but are asked to report a different belief. Moreover
these problems seem to be limited to situations where there is a 'contradiction of simultaneity'; the
false photograph task. and the reporting of false utterances have a temporal lag embedded in them
which removes this problem. In other words, to return to the start of this section and to the words
of George Orwell, children with autism cannot 'doublethink'. An impairment in 'holding two
contradictory beliefs in one's mind simultaneously, and accepting both of them', could be explained
by a metarepresentational deficit account (a failure to represent the relation between a primary and a
decoupled secondary representation), by a simulationist account (a failure to set aside the default
setting of reality) and by an executive dysfunction account (a failure to disengage from reality, see
next section).
The merits of these alternative standpoints will be discussed fully at the end of the chapter (in
section 2.4). For the meantime it is sufficient to note that a metarepresentational deficit hypothesis
could account for the range of experimental findings regarding theory of mind development in
autism (though there appears to be little need to argue for a domain specific impairment), but that
alternative explanations are possible.
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2.3 Potential Underlying Deficits 11- Executive Dysfunction
2.31 What Are Executive Functions?
The term 'executive functions' is a rather broad label which is applied to a variety of high-
level cognitive processes (high-level because they are controlled or consciously activated). Authors
typically attempt a definition of 'executive functions' by listing areas of behaviour which rely on
them, these include: planning, decision making, directed goal selection, and maintaining of ongoing
behaviours (Stuss, 1992); also self-monitoring, suppression of prepotent but incorrect responses,
and behavioural flexibility (Hughes, Russell & Robbins, in press), and also organized search
(Ozonoff, Pennington & Rogers, 1991). However, attempts at a firmer definition have been made.
Posner and Rothbart (1990) argue that 'The executive system is held to be capable of inhibiting and
thus controlling automatic activation patterns ... ', while Hughes et al. (in press) define executive
functions as ' ... the mental operations which require the individual to disengage from the immediate
context in order to guide behaviour by reference to mental models and goals. '
Given that these definitions are either relatively vague and certainly broad, or based on a list
of the supposed manifestations of these rather elusive functions, it is worth pausing to consider
why it is necessary to posit the existence of an executive system. Any explanation of the need for
executive functions begins at the same starting point, this being that introspection shows that human
behaviour can be divided into two streams. On the one hand there is behaviour that is automatic
and not under conscious control. Examples of this form of behaviour are often seen in everyday
life. It is common to have been driving a car for some miles before suddenly realising that one has
not really been paying attention to the road at all. Yet importantly (both theoretically and practically)
one has driven relatively safely, moving the wheel to take comers and changing gear. On the other
hand there is behaviour which is controlled, or willed, behaviour that is directed, intentional and
open to conscious reflection; I might for example, having realised that I have gone some distance in
my car 'unconsciously', decide to pull over and stop for a cup of coffee.
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This distinction has recently been taken up, notably by Shallice and colleagues (Norman &
Shallice, 1986; Shallice, 1988; Shallice & Burgess, 1991) to provide the basis of their model of
executive functioning. However it is certainly not a new one in psychology. William James (1890)
drew exactly this distinction between ideo-motor (automatic) and willed (action). It is therefore
somewhat appropriate that it is through further introspection that the model is developed. Shallice
and colleagues point out that the actions that are available to conscious control are simply those that
are operating when control is absent. In other words there appear to be certain action schemas
which will determine behaviour automatically if not consciously controlled. The difference between
automatic and controlled behaviour is therefore simply the imposition of conscious control on the
selection of action. A further aspect of the model follows as a consequence. There must be some
automatic system for deciding which of a variety of possible action schemas is selected when
conscious control is not operating .. Shallice and colleagues call this system 'Contention
Scheduling'. They suggest that each of the possible action schemas within the realm of behaviour
has a threshold activation value. The schemas 'contend' with each other, via a p~ess of lateral
inhibition, to reach this activation level. Once this is achieved that particular schema is acted out.
Given that lateral inhibition occurs between schemas, once one schema has been selected there is
nothing to prevent it from remaining activated unless conscious control is exercised. However, it is
clearly true that one is able to (non-consciously) alter one's behaviour. To return to the example of
driving a car automatically, if a comer approaches the wheel will be turned, even in the absence of
the awareness of doing so. Shallice and colleagues therefore propose that external stimuli or
situations are able to influence contention scheduling by selectively activating particular and
appropriate action schemas.
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The final aspect of the model is the conscious control process itself. This is termed the
Supervisory Attentional System (SAS), and its function is to guide behaviour with reference to pre-
planned goals. This requires two separable levels of control". The first is the higher, more abstract
level of monitoring and awareness; the SAS must attend to what is going on in contention
scheduling, and make reference to hypothetical goal states. The second level of control is the
lower, more practical level whereby the SAS actively imposes itself on the automatic process of
contention scheduling. This can only be done in two ways, by inhibiting the. activation of an
inappropriate action schema, and by raising the activation level of an appropriate schema. This
dissociation is important, because though the proposed planning and monitoring functions of the
SAS are rather vague concepts and are not easily broken down into concrete subsystems or
processes, they can only directly affect behaviour via the lower level of functional control.
This allows one to consider the possible implications of an impairment to the SAS in terms of
a limited number of possible consequences. The first is a loss of ability to plan, to reflect or to
monitor that would coincide with failure of the abstract level of functioning of the SAS. The other
impainnents would be due to failure at the functional level of control. Failure to activate appropriate
action schemas would lead to an absence of self-generated or initiated behaviour. Failure to inhibit
inappropriate action schemas would have two-fold consequences. Firstly, if an environmental
stimulus raised the activation level of an inappropriate action schema, there would be nothing to
prevent this inappropriate action from being selected and carried out. Impulsive behaviour or a
failure to inhibit responses to salient stimuli would be seen. Secondly, if an action schema was
operating having reached threshold activation level, there would be nothing to cause it to be
4This is not a distinction made by Shallice and colleagues. However SLUSS(1992) does relate the functioning
of the executive system to a higher level of awareness and consciousness, and Frith (1992b) discusses both self-
awarenessand functional control aspects of the SAS.
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deselected, or to lower its activation level below threshold. Perseveration of action would therefore
occur.
There therefore appear to be four possible consequences of an impairment to the SAS (though
clearly the first of these really.represents a host of rather vague and probably related functions): a)
Failure to monitor and plan, b) failure to generate self-initiated behaviour, c) impulsivity, and d)
perseveration. These are shown in figure 2.1 below, which provides a diagrammatic interpretation
of Shallice et al. 's model. Two subcomponents of the SAS are hypothesised, on the basis of the
distinction drawn above between levels of SAS control. These are the 'Contention Scheduling
Controller' and the 'Monitor and Planner'. Again it should be noted that Shallice et al. do not make
this distinction.
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Figure 2.1. A Model Of Executive Functioning
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Though the initial justification for Shallice et al.'s model is drawn from introspection and
logical argument, there is empirical support for its formulation. This comes from evidence of the
four types of impairment described above amongst patients with damage to the frontal lobes of the
brain (and in particular the prefrontal cortex).
An impairment in planning amongst frontal lobe patients has been demonstrated on Tower-
Of-Hanoi type tasks which require the ability to plan with reference to a desired goal state (Shallice,
1982). There is also some evidence of failure to initiate action in frontal patients (Ackerly &
Benton, 1948 reported in Bishop, 1993). Shallice (1988) notes that typical of frontal dysfunction
is an inability to inhibit responses triggered inappropriately by external stimuli. In the extreme this
can take the form of 'utilisation behaviour' (Lhermitte, 1983) where patients are 'captured' by
presence of objects and cannot leave them alone but use them as their function dictates. Another
form of impulsivity noted by Shallice is 'distractibility'. Though there is some controversy about
the extent of this impairment in frontal patients, it is consistent with the notion of a failure to
'disengage from the immediate context'. Finally, perseveration is evidenced in patients with frontal
lobe dysfunction by their performances on the Wisconsin Card Sort Test (Grant & Berg, 1948).
This requires patients to sort a pack of cards, carrying stimuli which differ in colour and shape,
according to a certain rule (e.g. by colour). After a period of initial sorting the rule is changed (e.g,
by shape). Frontal patients show an inability to shift to a new rule, and perseveratively sort using
the old one (see Walsh, 1978; Stuss & Benson, 1986). This has been termed 'stuck-in set'
behaviour (Sandson & Albert, 1984) and has been interpreted as an inability to inhibit 'central sets'
(Milner, 1963; Mishkin, 1964). This parallels Posner and Rothbart's notion of inhibiting current
activation patterns. Perseveration occurs because of a failure to override or switch from current
activity.
Two caveats should however be made regarding the claim that the frontal lobes are the 'seat
of executive control'. Firstly the frontal lobes are complex neurological structures, and subserve a
range of different functions (see Levin, Eisenberg & Benton, 1991). Secondly a number of
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patients without specific frontal lobe pathology perform poorly on the tasks described above (e.g.
children with attention deficit disorder, see Barkley, Grodzinsky & DuPaul, 1992; and patients with
Parkinson's disease, see Owen, James, Leigh, Summers, Marsden, Quinn, Lange & Robbins.
1992).
2.32 Why Might Executive Dysfunction Be Important In Autism?
Damasio and Maurer (1978) were the first to suggest a link between autism and frontal lobe
dysfunction, on the basis of parallels between impairments in autism and in neuropsychological
patients with frontal lobe damage in the following areas: motility, communication, attention and
perception, and ritualistic and compulsive behaviours. Children with autism characteristically
exhibit inflexible stereotyped behaviour, and have a strong preference for routines and for
sameness, which could be interpreted as a consequence of being unable to initiate actions. Hammes
and Langdell (1981) suggest that while children with autism may be able to form mental images,
they are typically 'stimulus bound'. This ties in with the notion that external stimuli have the ability
to 'capture' the child with autism's mental processes, suggesting that there is a failure to inhibit
inappropriate responses to salient external stimuli. Perseveration is also an accepted aspect of the
disorder.
Whether a lack of executive functions can explain the triad of impairments seen as
characterising the autistic syndrome is less clear. Patients with frontal lobe pathology often show
disinhibited and inappropriate social behaviour (see Bishop, 1993; Joseph, 1990), but not the
withdrawal from social interaction seen in autism. This failure to socialize could conceivably be
explained in terms of a failure to monitor the nuances of social interaction, or to plan appropriate
social behaviours (Hughes & Russell, 1993)'. Impairments in communication could similarly be
'A more convincing explanation for a failure of socialization is that executive functions are required in order to
develop or operate a theory of mind. The relationship between these two domains wiD be discussed fuDy in section
2.4. \
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explained in terms of deficiencies in planning and monitoring. As will be seen later, an absence of
imaginative behaviour can also be explained by an executive deficit account. The problem with
explanations based on monitoring and planning deficits is that they are so broad. There are very
few behaviours, or patterns of action, which do not rely on executive functions to some extent.
Any action which is open to conscious reflection is potentially under executive control. It is
therefore possible to explain almost any pattern of symptoms in terms of executive dysfunction
(Bishop, 1993).
Having said this, additional evidence for executive dysfunction amongst children, and indeed
amongst well-recovered adolescents with autism, is provided by direct studies of frontal-type
impainnents amongst these populations. These studies will now be described in some detail.
2.33 Direct Evidence Of Executive Dysfunction
Steel, Garman and Flexman (1984) presented the first evidence of frontal-type impairments in
autism, reporting a single case-study of an autistic idiot-savant. This child was found to be
impaired on a number of tests sensitive to frontal lobe dysfunction and which implicate executive
dysfunction, though clearly few finn conclusions can be drawn from a single case report. A larger
group of9 high-functioning adults with autism were tested on the weST by Rumsey (1985). She
found that the group with autism were significantly impaired on the majority of measures arising
from the test, compared to a control group of 10 adults matched for educational level. On the basis
of these results Rumsey proposed that despite their relatively high levels of intellectual and verbal
functioning, the adults with autism were exhibiting two problem-solving deficits, perseveration and
impaired 'conceptual level responding'.
It is not clear whether Rumsey took into account the increased levels of perseveration in the
group with autism when calculating differences in conceptual-level responses. Itwould appear that
an inability to inhibit perseveration would automatically result in less conceptual-level responses
being given. Other criticisms of this study include the matching of the control groups, which was
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rather loosely based on level of education and not IQ or MA. However many group differences
remained significant when IQ was accounted for.
Similar results were obtained in subsequent studies by Rumsey (Rumsey & Hamburger
1988, 1990). Both of these studies report the results of the assessment of a group of 10 high
functioning adults with autism on a neuropsychological test battery. The age profiles of these
groups is identical, suggesting that the two studies are reporting results from the same set of
participants, however the control groups employed differ between studies. Normal controls,
matched for age and educational level are employed in the first (1988) study, an additional group of
dyslexic participants are included in the second (1990) study. The combined results of these
experiments show that the adults with autism were impaired on the WCST, completing fewer
categories than controls. They were also impaired on a test of word fluency (generating as many
words as possible starting with a particular letter) relative to normal controls, though not to dyslexic
controls.
Prior and Hoffman (1990) presented 12 children with autism, and two groups of controls
matched for i) chronological age, and ii) mental age, with three tests of executive function. These
were the Milner Maze (Milner, 1965), the Wisconsin Card Sort Test, and the Rey-Osterrieth
Complex Figure Design Copying Test (Rey, 1959). It was found that the children with autism took
significantly longer than the other two groups to complete the Milner Maze test, making three times
as many errors in doing so. Prior and Hoffman noted that perseverative errors were common, and
that the younger children with autism also made impulsive responses. The groups differed
similarly on the WeST, the group of children with autism producing significantly more
perseverative errors than either control groups. On the Rey Figure test the children with autism
were impaired only on their ability to recall the figure, not on measures of initial copying. Taken
together, these results suggest that children with autism have definite problems of perseveration,
that mirror those shown by patients with frontal lobe dysfunction. There is some suggestion of
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impulsive behaviour in the younger children with autism, but relatively little support for a deficit in
planning.
In a comprehensive follow-up study of 16 adults with autism, Szatmari, Bartolucci, Bremner,
Bond and Rich (1989) found that unlike early impairments in sociability, language use and
behaviour, IQ and performance on the WeST were significantly correlated with levels of adaptation
(measured by the Vineland Adaptive Behavior Scales). This study did not compare the
performance of the adults with autism to that of controls. However in a subsequent study,
Szatmari, Tuff, Finlayson and Bartolucci (1990) report the results of the presentation of a test
battery (which included the WeST) to three groups of participants. These were 17 children and
young adults with autism, 26 children with Asperger's syndrome and 36 young psychiatric
outpatients. The children with autism, though not those with Asperger's syndrome, were impaired
relative to the outpatient controls on the three reported subsections of the WeST.
Ozonoff, Pennington and Rogers (1991) included two tests of executive functioning in a test
battery used to assess a variety of impairments in autism (including theory of mind, see above).
These were the WeST and the Tower of Hanoi. They found that their group of 23 children with
autism were impaired relative to controls (matched for age and verbal IQ) in their performance on
both of these tests. Further analysis showed that the problems experienced by the children with
autism on the WeST were in avoiding perseverative errors. They were not impaired in set
maintenance, indicating that shifting between sets was particularly problematic for them.
A final body of results which provide support for the notion of executive dysfunction in
autism, comes from work performed by Russell and colleagues to investigate children with
autism's ability to disengage from externally salient objects. In an initial study, Russell, Mauthner,
Sharpe, and Tidswell, (1991) presented children with autism, children with Down's syndrome and
normal 3 and 4 year olds with a test of strategic deception, the 'Windows Task'. This took the
fonn of a competitive game in which children had to learn how to deceive an opponent, by pointing
to one of two locations which did not contain a reward (the reward was visible to the child, but not
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to the opponent). Russell et al. found that despite having language comprehension ages of around
four years or above, the children with autism were significantly more likely to point to the location
of the reward than normal 4year old children, and that they showed striking perseveration, often
sticking with this loosing strategy for twenty trials. Russell et aI. suggest that a lack of executive
control in autism may result in knowledge of physical reality being more salient than knowledge of
mental reality for such children. In other words children with autism appear to fail this task because
of an inability to inhibit an inappropriate response to a salient object.
This suggestion was explored further by Hughes and Russell (1993). Sixty children with
autism were tested on the windows task described above, but half the children played the game
without an opponent. A control group of children with moderate learning difficulties was also
employed. The groups were not strictly and individually matched for verbal mental ages, but the
authors claim that matching was satisfactory. The children with autism found both tasks
significantly harder than did controls. However, while the children with moderate learning
difficulties found the no-opponent version of the task significantly harder than the competitive task,
the children with autism were equally impaired on both tasks. This suggests that children with
autism's problems on this task do not stem from its competitive or deceptive requirements. Hughes
and Russell argue instead, that it is disengaging from the salient object that underlies their
difficulties.
Hughes and Russell do note, however, that even without an opponent the Windows task
could be construed as being competitive; the child may see themselves as competing against the
experimenter. They therefore performed a second experiment which attempted to remove all
competitive and social elements from a test of ability to disengage from a salient object. This task
consisted of learning that a marble, which could be clearly seen inside a box, could not be obtained
simply by a direct reach into the box (doing this broke an infra-red beam which caused the marble
to drop out of reach). Initially the marble could be obtained by turning a knob at the side of the
box. Once participants had learnt this contingency, they had to learn a new route to obtain the
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marble, doing so by switching a lever (which turned off the infra-red beam) before reaching. Forty
children with autism were significantly less likely to achieve a success criteria than were matched
control groups of children with moderate leaming difficulties, and normal preschoolers. Rather
than consistently adopting the switch route, they showed more direct reaching for the marble, and a
greater 'failure to capitalize' by not consistently employing the switch route even when just having
used it successfully.
The findings of this second experiment appear to be consistent with the notion of a failure to
disengage from salient extemal stimuli in autism. However Hughes and Russell point out possible
problems with this interpretation. Firstly the children with autism were all quite able to learn the
'knob route' to success, and so were able to disengage from the marble to some extent. However
the direct causal connection between turning the knob and obtaining the marble would appear to
explain why this section of the task was trivially easy. Children with autism have no difficulties in
learning these sons of contingencies. They will often drag an adult by the hand to' a bike shed, or
to a toilet door, in the knowledge that the adult may then provide them with what they desire (a bike
to ride, or access to the toilet). It could be argued that in these cases that disengagement from the
object is not actually occurring, the child's actions are all 'linearly' and causally directed at
obtaining the object of their desire. Hughes and Russell also note that failure to use the Switch
route in the group with autism was not always due to perseverative direct reaching towards the
object (though this was common), and suggest that problems in planning and in understanding an
arbitrary route to a goal may also explain these children's poor levels of performance. They
conclude that their two experiments ' ...provide evidence for a general executive impairment in
autism rather than for a specific impairment in mental disengagement'.
Finally Hughes, Russell and Robbins (in press) tested three groups of children on a modified
and computerised version of the Tower of Hanoi task. These were 30 children with autism, 40
mentally handicapped children matched for chronological and verbal mental age, and 40 normal
children whose chronological age matched the verbal mental age of the other two groups. While all
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groups performed well on simple versions of the task, when presented with more complex
problems which required greater planning the children with autism required significantly more
moves to solving each problem than did controls, and produced significantly fewer correct
solutions. This evidence of a planning deficit was supported by evidence that children with
autism's failure on this task was not due to impulsive behaviour; they did not initiate moves any
faster than did the mentally handicapped children.
In addition to empirical evidence of executive dysfunction in autism, support for this account
could also be seen to come from evidence of neurological impairments to frontal systems in autism.
However to use such evidence (if it were forthcoming- see Prior & Hoffman, 1990) raises the
danger of a circular argument. If one is attempting to show that children with autism, like frontal
patients, have an impaired SAS one can certainly cite evidence of disorders of planning, initiation,
impulsivity and perseveration; these are deficits that would be predicted given an absence of
supervisory control. This is the line of argument taken here. However it is another thing to argue
that children with autism are like frontal patients, and therefore because frontal patients have an
impaired SAS, so must children with autism. This is not such a strong argument, as the link
between autism and impaired executive control is less direct in this case. However only in this
second case is it really relevant to draw strong parallels between the two disorders on a neurological
level, especially as the neurological locus of impaired executive control in frontal patients has not
been specifically located.
2.34 Summary
Concentrating solely therefore on a psychological level of manifestation, there remains
considerable evidence for executive dysfunction in autism. Four areas of impairment were
originally predicted on the basis of Shallice's model of Supervisory Attentional Control. In autism
there appears to be evidence of planning deficits, as evidenced by poor performance on Tower of
Hanoi type tasks (Hughes, Russell & Robins, in press; Ozonoff, Pennington & Rogers, 1991).
There is fairly firm support for difficulties in disengaging from. or inhibiting a response to, a salient
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external object (Hughes & Russell, 1993; Prior & Hoffman, 1990; Russell et al., 1991). Finally
perseveration, which is widely accepted as a characteristic feature of the syndrome anyway, has
been shown on the WeST (Ozonoff, Pennington & Rogers, 1991; Prior & Hoffman, 1990;
Rumsey, 1985; Rumsey & Hamburger, 1988, 1990). The only area in which there appears to be
no direct empirical support for an impairment is that of self-initiated behaviour, but even in this case
there is no evidence against an impairment.
2.4 Conclusions - Prospects For A Unifying Theory
The theoretical and empirical support for two potential explanations of the autistic syndrome
have been discussed in this chapter. Before moving on to a synthesis of the areas of pretend play
and autism, it is worth considering briefly, whether these accounts really provide the basis for a
fundamental, unifying theory of autism. This will be done as follows: Firstly the question of
whether a theory of mind impairment is a more fundamental deficit than executive dysfunction will
be addressed. Secondly the contrary question, whether executive deficits are primary to a theory of
mind will be considered (see Bishop, 1993, for a further discussion of these two questions).
Finally each of these two accounts will be evaluated in the light of the requirements of a unifying
theory.
2.41 Could A Theory of Mind Deficit Lead To Executive Dysfunction?
Ifone wishes to argue that an impairment in the ability to understand other minds, or in the
ability to process metarepresentations, is the fundamental underlying cause of the autistic
syndrome, one must be prepared to show how all the other characteristic problems seen in autism
arrive from the more basic theory of mind deficit. As seen in subsection 2.22, a theory of mind
account can explain impairments in socialisation (quite easily) and in communication (somewhat
more elaborately). As shall be seen in subsection 3.21 it can explain imaginative impairments also
(though this form of explanation will be criticised in this thesis). Some of the more bizarre
behaviours seen in children with autism can be accounted for by a failure to appreciate social
niceties. What is less easily explained by a theory of mind account is the executive dysfunction
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which seems to be associated with autism. How can an inability to understand other's mental states
lead to impairments in planning, in inhibiting responses to salient stimuli, and of perseveration?
Leslie tacitly admits that the theory fails to explain these deficits when he argues that a
metarepresentational impairment is domain specific. Indeed, in his model (see Leslie & Roth,
1993; Leslie & Thaiss, 1992) he proposes a separate executive module which is impaired, along
with his Theory of Mind Module in autism. Leslie therefore does not argue for the total primacy of
theory of mind, though he would no doubt argue that it is the consequences of an impairment in this
domain that are the more wide ranging in autism.
However one could attempt to explain executive dysfunction as a result of theory of mind
impairments if one was prepared to argue that metarepresentational knowledge is required for self-
awareness. Such a reflexive theory of consc~ousness has been proposed by Carruthers (in press),
and leads to the prediction that if metarepresentational understanding was impaired, then ability to
reflect on ones 'conscious' actions would be impaired also. A stronger claim that could be made is
that performing actions under conscious control would be similarly impaired. This would result in
executive dysfunction.
In essence this form of account argues that the successful functioning of the Supervisory
Attentional System, or more specifically the 'Monitor and Planner' of the model outlined in figure
2.1, relies on the ability to process metarepresentations. In this sense this argument mirrors that
made by Frith (1992b; Frith & Frith, 1991), who has claimed that the fronta1lobe is implicated in
the processing of metarepresentations, and that these metarepresentational processes underlie self-
awareness, and echoes suggestions made by Stuss (1992), who argues that the Supervisory
Attentional System contains a higher order conscious component. It is therefore possible to argue
for the primacy of theory of mind deficits over executive function deficits. Whether it is valid to do
so is questionable. The problem with this explanation is that, if anything, it is more broad and wide
ranging than an executive dysfunction account. To imply that children with autism are impaired in
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conscious self-awareness really does paint a bleak: picture for them; what can one do without an
awareness of oneself, one's actions and one's thoughts? While it could be argued that many of
children with autism's characteristic difficulties could be explained by this lack of awareness, there
is clear evidence of a degree of self-awareness in autism. Children with autism are able to report
their previous utterances (Leslie & Thaiss, 1992; Pemer et al., 1989). They can certainly also
reflect on what they are doing, and what they have done, as evidenced by a number of
autobiographical accounts written by high-functioning individuals with autism (e.g. Jolliffe,
Lansdown & Robinson, 1992).
2.42 Could Executive Dysfunction Lead To A Theory of Mind Deficit?
One advantage that an executive dysfunction account has over a theory of mind account is that
it can more readily explain the other deficit Both Russell (Russell et al., 1991; Hughes & Russell,
1993), and Harris (1993) note that theory of mind task typically require a child to suppress a
response to where a salient object is (the smartie in the 'wrong'. cupboard) and to refer to an empty
location. In other tasks the child is still required to 'disavow reality' and to inhibit an answer in
terms of what they themselves know to be true. As these authors argue, this imposes significant
executive demands on the child, and failure on these tasks could therefore be explained by executive
dysfunction rather than by a theory of mind deficit. Support for this view comes directly from
Russell et al. 's (1991) study, which showed that children with autism were impaired at deceiving
an experimenter, but that this failure was due to an inability to disengage from the target object in
the task. Similarly Sodian and Frith (1992) note that in their test of deception in autism, children
with autism may have had difficulties in performing 'Sabotage' in the two box condition (see
description of this experiment in subsection 2.23) because they were required to focus on an empty
box and inhibit a response to the box containing the smartie.
However, it is not clear that a failure to inhibit a response to a salient object can explain all
children with autism's difficulties on theory of mind type tasks. Bishop (1993) has argued that
there are tasks which children with autism find difficult and which do not require this inhibition, for
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example ascribing limited knowledge to another. In Leslie and Frith's (1988) version of this task
the experimenter knew that there was an object hidden at one location but not at the other.
Therefore the poor performance on this task found in their group of children with autism cannot be
due to these children having difficulties at indicating an empty location. It is still possible though
that the second object that they had hidden in the experimenter's absence was particularly salient for
them. Bishop also argues that Baron-Cohen' s (1991a) test of previous false beliefs shows that·
children with autism are impaired when a response does not have to be inhibited. She argues that
an answer in terms of a box's contents is not the most salient one (the box's appearance should
prompt a more salient response). This misses the point of the executive dysfunction hypothesis, it
is the child's knowledge of reality that is salient to them and which is hard for them to disengage
from.
Leslie and Roth (1993) have further claimed that children with autism can inhibit a response
to salient states of affairs in certain cases, citing their ability to pass false photograph and false map
tests correctly (Leekam & Perner, 1991;Leslie & Thaiss, 1992). While it is true that in these cases
the correct response is one that is at odds with current reality, as discussed in subsection 2.24 it
need not be at odds with what the child perceives to be the 'reality of the picture'. An executive
dysfunction account (or indeed any other explanation of autism) would not want to argue that
children with autism cannot hold two beliefs at once, just that they cannot hold two simultaneously
contradictory beliefs. It should be quite possible for a child with autism to represent (a girl in a
green dress) and the reality of the picture (of a girl in a reddress). In fact both these representations
would be aspects of the current reality for them, and a response making reference to one would not
have to be inhibited at the expense of the other.
Russell would in fact make a stronger claim regarding the links between executive
dysfunction and failure on theory of mind tasks in autism. Though he argues that most of these
tasks have a substantial executive component, he would still accept that children with autism are
impaired in their ability to attribute mental states to others. Russell's claim (Russell, in press) is
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that executive functions are necessary for the development of a theory of mind. He argues that a
concept of oneself as an 'agent' is a necessary prerequisite for appreciating that others are 'minded'
in their own right (this view echoes suggestions by Hobson, see subsection 3.22). According to
Russell a child develops the concept of agency by monitoring the effects and feedback resulting
from actions which they themselves deliberately initiate. A child who suffers from executive
dysfunction will not be able to initiate behaviour, or adequately monitor its effects, and so will be
impaired in their development of this concept, and hence of a theory of mind.
There are further reasons to believe that executive dysfunction may be quite fundamental to
autism. A number of the studies described in subsection 2.33 found a lack of executive control
amongst well recovered adults with autism (Rumsey, 1985; Rumsey & Hamburger, 1988, 1990;
Szatmari et al., 1989), executive dysfunction therefore appears to persist long after other cognitive
and behavioural problems may have been overcome. In their studies, Ozonoff, Pennington and
Rogers (1991) found that 96% of their group with autism were impaired on executive function
tasks, but only 52% were impaired on traditional theory of mind tasks. A composite score of
executive dysfunction was also a better discriminant of groups than theory of mind abilities. In
addition Ozonoff, Rogers and Pennington (1991) found that executive dysfunction was present in
both children with autism, and children with Asperger syndrome, but that theory of mind deficits
were only present amongst the children with autism.
There is therefore reason to believe that an impairment to executive functioning may be more
fundamental in autism than a failure to attribute mental states to others, but this is not to say that
children with autism are unimpaired at understanding mental states.
2.43 What A Theory Must Do.
Ozonoff, Pennington and Rogers (1990) outline four criteria which must be fulfilled by a
theory that attempts to provide a fundamental and global explanation of the problems associated
with the syndrome of autism. These are universality (the deficit must be present in all cases),
specificity (the deficit must be fundamental to autism alone), persistence (the deficit must remain as
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long as the syndrome persists), and causal priority (the deficit must not be secondary to other
features of the disorder). It is not clear that either an executive dysfunction or a theory of mind
deficit account can fulfil all these stipulations. The fact that a minority of children with autism pass
false belief tests could imply that a theory of mind deficit cannot both be universal and persistent,
though it is possible that an attenuated impairment in understanding of mental states persists in these
individuals. More problematic is the fact that theory of mind deficits could be secondary to
executive dysfunction. However, given Chris Frith's arguments, the same criticism could
potentially be levelled at the executive dysfunction account. In addition there are clear executive
function deficits in frontal patients (and possibly in schizophrenic patients) yet these individuals are
not autistic. I am not convinced that these differences can be reconciled in terms of age of onset of
the disorders, as Frith (1992b) suggests.
As well as considering what a unifying theory must do, it is worth considering briefly what
such a theory would be like. It could take one of two forms. Given the very broad range of
symptoms associated with autism that it would have to explain, the theory itself would have to be
either extremely specific (amounting to little more than a description of these symptoms), or be
based on an impairment to very fundamental processes with wide ranging implications. Put another
way, it is hard to imagine what form of theory could be advanced to explain (and not simply
describe) the specific symptoms of autism, without at the same time predicting other non-existent
symptoms. This appears to be the problem with the executive dysfunction account, and a self-
awareness/theory of mind impairment These are such broad-based explanations that their difficulty
lies not in explaining the presence of the symptoms seen in autism, but in explaining the absence of
symptoms that are not seen. If children with autism suffer from frontally mediated executive
dysfunction, then why do they not show distractibility (see subsection 2.31)1 If they lack a
reflexive theory of consciousness how is it that they can describe autobiographical events?
It may therefore be impossible to find a unifying psychological theory of autism that is not so
global as to be of little predictive power. A more appropriate way of studying the disorder may be
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to tackle a number of symptoms at a time, and to propose localised causes for these symptoms.
This is in fact the approach adopted by the majority of researchers.
2.44 Conclusions
This chapter has hopefully outlined a large number of experiments which put together a
picture of the psychological pattern of symptoms in autism. It has concentrated on two panicuJar
areas of impairment, theory of mind and executive dysfunction. These are the areas which are seen
at present as the most likely candidates for a fundamental impairment in autism. However, as
discussed above, it is not clear that either of these accounts meet the criteria for a unifying deficit, or
that they would do much more for us if they could be shown to.
This said, there still remains good evidence for both types of impairment in autism. It is also
possible that either impainnent could be more fundamental than the other, giving rise to it. There is
a great deal to be gained from determining which of these two accounts is the more primary. As
will be seen in the next chapter, pretend play provides a potential means of answering this question,
as both types of account make radically different predictions regarding the pattern of impairments
expected in pretend play in autism.
Chapter 3
Pretend Play In Autism
The purpose of this chapter is to bring together themes that have been developed in the
previous two chapters, and to consider possible explanations of children with autism's problems
with pretend play. Before this synthesis can be properly addressed it is first important to determine
exactly what these particular difficulties are. The first section of the chapter (section 3.1) therefore
consists of a (hopefully exhaustive) review of empirical research into the area of children with
autism's deficits in pretend play. The aim of this section will be to outline the extent of these
deficits, and to fully describe their characteristics. Having done this, the remaining sections of the
chapter will describe possible explanations of these deficits, Section 3.2 will describe the range of
competence deficits. which have been put forward, while Section 3.3 will concentrate on
performance deficit interpretations. Section 3.4 will weigh the merits of the various accounts, in
the light of the empirical evidence in the area, and will outline the way in which the research
described in this thesis aims to decide between these accounts.
3.1 Review Of The Literature.
3.11 Introduction To The Area
It is a commonly held belief that children with autism are specifically impaired in their ability
to engage in pretend play. Ungerer and Sigman (1981) write. "Most autistic children never develop
symbolic play. In the few autistic children manifesting symbolic play it is repetitive and
stereotyped and lacks the innovation, development and change found in normal symbolic play",
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and in her review Wulff (1985) comments, "The autistic child's play is striking in its lack of
fantasy and all other aspects of symbolic play". Such is the acceptance of this stand-point that the
National Autistic Society itself cites a 'lack of creative pretend play' as one of the features
characteristic of the syndrome.
While an observed lack of pretend play in autism is accepted, this need not necessarily imply
a specific impairment in the symbolic ability of children with autism, not least given the arguments
outlined in section 1.3 regarding the necessity to infer that pretend play is symbolic in a
metarepresentational sense. A failure to pretend might reflect a more general cognitive or social
deficit associated with autism impinging on the whole area of play development. It might also
result from a motivational deficit of some description. Since Wulff's paper a number of notable
studies in this area have been published. The purpose of this section is firstly to critically evaluate
the methodology of these and previous investigations into pretend play in autism (subsections 3.12
to 3.15); and secondly, by examining the findings of these studies in the light of this criticism, to
attempt to clarify the nature of the impairment in pretend play seen in autism (subsection 3.16).
In her review of pretend play in autism, Wulff (1985) claims that studies in this area
conducted until the mid 1960s are of limited validity as they incorrectly grouped together
individuals with both autism and schizophrenia (e.g. Loomis, Hilgeman &Meyer, 1957; Schacter,
Meyer & Loomis, 1962). Although she confined her attention to work undertaken from 1964
onwards, some confusion of terms persisted in this literature. There still remains uncertainty
regarding the exact position of the boundaries of the autistic syndrome, but the division made by
Wulff will be adopted here.
The studies to be reviewed have attempted to determine whether children with autism are
impaired in their ability to pretend by comparing the pretend play of a sample of children with
autism with other population groups. Clearly the procedure used to match controls is of vital
importance. If participant groups are not adequately matched then the implications that can be
drawn regarding any relative impairment in the pretend play of children with autism are severely
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limited. The experiments considered here fall into four broad categories; those where participant
groups are not formally matched, those where participants are matched on the basis of
chronological age (CA), those where matching is by non-verbal or general mental age (MA) and
finally those using verbal MA as the basis for matching. These categories will be examined in turn.
Throughout the following sections the term 'pretend play' will be preferred to 'symbolic play'.
However the later term will be employed when referring to studies that themselves use it as a play
categorization. In these cases it can be assumed that it is being used analogously to 'pretend play'
unless otherwise indicated.
3.12 Studies Without Formal Matching
One of the first studies to specifically investigate the pretend play of children with autismwas
carried out by Wing, Gould, Yeates and Brierley (1977). They identified a community sample of
108 autistic, autistic-like and mentally-retarded children (aged between 5 and 14), and by means of
parental interviews and experimental observations in homes and schools, classified each child as
capable of showing either symbolic, stereotyped symbolic or no symbolic play. The authors'
definitions of these terms is not entirely clear. Examples of play classed as being symbolic range
from making appropriate noises whilst pushing a toy car. and brushing a doll's hair (functional
play), to the invention of stories and drawing of imaginative pictures. Also the distinction drawn
between symbolic and stereotyped symbolic play, a repetitive form of pretence, appears rather
arbitrary.
Of the 12 children in Wing et al.'s autistic group, 8 showed no symbolic play and the
remaining 4 exhibited stereotyped symbolic play. compared to the group of 47 mentally retarded
children of whom 5 showed no symbolic play. 1 showed stereotyped symbolic play and 41
showed symbolic play. Wing et al. claim that "...complete absence of symbolic play is closely
linked to the presence of typical early childhood autism...", This conclusion may be queried. The
groups are not formally matched, either for CA. or more importantly. for MA. Exact details of
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MAs are not given, but a lower proportion of the mentally retarded group have a non-verbal MA of
less than 20 months than the other children (autistic and autistic-like groups).
A further point is that of a total of 32 children with a non-verbal MA of less than 20 months,
none show symbolic play regardless of diagnosis. This is to be expected as true symbolic play
does not emerge in normal children until around this age (subsection 1.25). As the groups are not
matched, it is dangerous to include such children in a comparison of numbers showing symbolic
play in each group. Wing et al. do take note of this and divide these children out; however the
experiment also reveals that no child with a language comprehension age of below 20 months
shows symbolic play and not all of these children are partialled out as they should be. It is unclear
exactly which groups these children fall into, but it can be inferred that the number of children with
a diagnosis of autism and both a language comprehension age and non-verbal MA above 20 months
must range from 4 to 6. This study therefore only presents us with 4 certain cases of children who
certainly who could be expected to show symbolic play, 2 of whom show stereotyped symbolic
play, 2 of whom show none.
It is possible to widen the sample by including the group of children with autistic-like
features; those with simple stereotypies and social impairments and those with repetitive speech. If
this is done, again discounting any children with a language comprehension age of below 20
months, it is found that 2 of 24 children show full symbolic play, 20 show stereotyped symbolic
play and 2 show no symbolic play.
The same pattern of results emerged from a subsequent extension of this study by Wing
(1978) which involved a slightly larger community sample of children with autism and mental
retardation below the age of 15. Children were divided into a 'psychotic' group of 84 showing to
some degree both of Kanner's criteria for autism (lack of affective contact and stereotypies; cf.
Lotter, 1966), and a 'non-psychotic' group of mentally retarded children. Again it was found that
no children with a non-verbal MA or a language comprehension age of below 20 months showed
symbolic play. However in this case all such children are separated out, leaving 31 'psychotic'
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children of whom 1 shows symbolic play, 27 show stereotyped symbolic play and 3 show no
symbolic play. The 57 mentally retarded children with non-verbal and language comprehension
ages above 20 months all show symbolic play, but again the two groups are not formally matched.
Atlas and Lapidus (1987) (also reponed in Atlas, 1990) compared the play of 26 children with
autism and 22 children with schizophrenia (mean CA of all children 114 months), as well as
investigating other aspects of 'symbolic expression'. They observed children in a 15minute free-
play situation providing them with a variety of props. The play of the children was rated as either
'no-symbolic play', 'stereotyped play' or 'pretend play'. Atlas' definitions are similar to those
used by Wing et al. (1977); pretend play includes a degree of functional play, e.g. drinking from an
empty cup, while 'stereotyped play' is really stereotyped symbolic play. Children were given a
score of 1 if they produced no symbolic play, 2 if they produced stereotyped play and 3 for
symbolic play. It was found that the children with autism had a significantly lower mean pretend-
play score than children with schizophrenia. A discriminant analysis of the children's play levels
was also carried out, and revealed that this variable was a significant predictor of original diagnosis
(P<O.02). This analysis also highlighted a 'transitional' or 'symbiotic' group of children,
consisting of children from each group showing stereotyped play. When this group is set aside,
Atlas (1990) notes that 13 of 16 children with autism show no symbolic play, while 14 of the 18
remaining children with schizophrenia show symbolic play. However, it is not appropriate to
remove 'transitional' children from the analysis, with only three play categorizations such a group
is bound to emerge. When the groups are considered as a whole it is seen that 13 of the children
with autism showed no symbolic play, 10 showed stereotyped play and 3 showed symbolic play.
These figures compare to 4 children with schizophrenia who showed no symbolic play, 4 who
showed stereotyped play and 14 who showed symbolic play. It is also possible that these groups
include children whose language age is below 20 months as did Wing et al.'s groups (the lowest
chronological ages are 53 months). This set of findings are therefore not surprising, and mirror
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those found by Wing et al., indicating that when children with autism produce pretend play, it is
typically repetitive or stereotyped.
A more serious criticism of this experiment is that the results that Atlas describes (Atlas &
Lapidus, 1987; Atlas, 1990) are not consistent with those reported in another of his papers (Atlas,
1987). In this third paper exactly the same procedure is described, the same testing conditions,
materials and rating procedures are used, but results from smaller groups are given. In this case the
groups consisted of 13 children with autism (mean chronological age 120 months) and 20 children
with schizophrenia (mean chronological age 108 months). The 13 children with autism produced a
mean play score of 2.3, which does not differ significantly from that of 2.6 for children with
schizophrenia. This finding is clearly at odds with the interpretation drawn from Atlas and Lapidus
(1987), since it shows no difference in levels of play between the groups.
Atlas may indeed have performed two quite separate experiments, using different populations,
though given the fact that the procedures are identical, and that the two papers were published in the
same year, this seems unlikely. Even if this were the case the clear difference in the results
obtained must raise questions about the methodology employed, which is the same in each case. It
seems more likely that the experiments are related; either selective reporting of the results of a single
study is occurring, or two experiments have been performed and Atlas and Lapidus (1987) is an
extension of Atlas (1987) with a further 13 children with autism tested to double the size of this
group. If this is the case then the initial group of children with autism must have had a total play
score of 30 (mean of 2.3 x thirteen subjects), compared to 42 for the group reported in Atlas and
Lapidus (1987). The 13 extra children with autism added between experiments must therefore have
all shown 'no play' (and a point has been lost somewhere as welll). This extra group is clearly
quite different from the original autistic population, a fact which would undermine the validity of
the second set of results and cast doubts on the motives for a replication.
Regardless of the validity of Atlas' findings, it appears that a good proportion of 'autistic-
syndrome' children are capable of showing some symbolic play, albeit a repetitive form of
Chapter 3 86
pretence. Whilst Wing differentiates between 'true' and stereotyped symbolic play, it seems
unlikely, given their desire for sameness and preference for rituals, that children with autism would
exhibit free, novel and generalised pretend play even if they had no specific deficit in this area.
However a major problem in accepting stereotyped symbolic playas evidence of symbolic ability is
that it is possible that the play behaviours seen are simply learnt routines that have been taught by
parents and teachers.
Finally Doherty and Rosenfeld (1984) investigated the symbolic play of a group of 15
children with severe language impairments. Of this group 7 children had a diagnosis of autism
(mean CA 153.9 months, mean verbal MA 56.0 months'), the other 8 children having a variety of
diagnoses reflecting their language impairments (mean CA 132.4 months, mean verbal MA 63.0
months). On the basis of free play observation and parental interviews children were rated as
capable of showing either sensorimotor, functional or symbolic play. All the children with autism
were said to lack symbolic play by their parents, though there was controversy as to whether
symbolic play had been observed experimentally in two of the children. Incontrast 7 of the other 8
children were rated as capable of showing symbolic play on both measures.
Doherty and Rosenfeld suggest that play assessment may be a useful tool in the differential
diagnosis of children with language disorders, and that a deficit in pretend playability may be
specific to autism. While there may be value in play assessment as a means of differentiating
children with autism and other language impaired children of a similar age, the findings of this
study cannot be taken as evidence for an autism-specific pretend play impairment given the lack of
formal participant matching.
1Verbal mental age measured by the Peabody Picture Vocabulary Test Two of the 7 children with autism
were unscorable. Mean value given for the remaining 5 children.
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3.13 Studies Employing CA Matching
While little can be inferred regarding the specificity of any pretend play deficit from the
results of studies that fail to match different groups, simply ensuring that children are formally
matched does not necessarily result in methodological validity. For example, matching for CA fails
to take into account MA differences that may well exist between children with autism and mentally
handicapped groups, and almost certainly exist between children with autism and normal children.
An early study that employed CA matching was performed by Tilton and Ottinger (1964).
They conducted an 'investigation into the free play of children with autism, comparing the play
repertoires and toys used by a group of 13 children with autism (mean CA 5 years) with those of
mentally retarded and normal children of a similar age. They found that the group with autism
showed more oral play and more repetitive use of toys, as well as fewer total play acts and less
combinatorial play than the other groups-,
As well as failing to match these groups for MA this study has nothing to say regarding
pretend play specifically. However, DeMyer, Mann, Tilton and Loew (1967) extended Tilton and
Ottinger's work: by including their 13 children in a larger group of 30 children with autism, (aged
between 2 and 7), whose toy play, including dramatic (pretend) play, was investigated by means of
a maternal questionnaire. The advantages of this approach were thought to be that it avoided testing
situations that could prove stressful to the children and that it effectively increased play behaviour
sampling time.
A control group of 30 normal children was included but again the children were matched on
CA rather than MA. Over the wide range of play behaviours examined by the questionnaire,
children with autism were reported to show less of the majority of play categories, object assembly
2Following criticism of the statistical methods employed in this study (see Quinn & Rubin, 1984) a
reanalysis of the results was later performed (Weiner, Ottinger & Tilton, 1969). This reanalysis failed to fwd an effect
of oral play and repetitive toy use, though the number of play acts and combinations remained significant.
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and oral body use being exceptions. Of the children with autism, 30% exhibited dramatic play of
some kind (compared to 90% of normal children), though only 3% showed dramatic doll play (as
opposed to 67% of normals).
The finding that 30% of children with autism were reported to show some pretend play is
consistent with the findings of Wing et a1. (1977), Wing (1978) and Atlas and Lapidus (1987).
The significantly higher numbers of normal children exhibiting this behaviour cannot be taken as
evidence for a specific deficit in the pretend play of children with autism because of the lack of MA
matching. A final point of interest is that elementary forms of dramatic play were more often
reported by mothers than observed in the laboratory. This could be the result of bias on the part of
the mothers, leading to an overestimation of their child's abilities. However in general there was
good agreement between the ratings obtained experimentally and by questionnaire (72%)
suggesting that either the removal of an artificial and potentially stressful situation, or an increase in
sampling time allowed these behaviours to be observed.
Stone, Lemanek, Fishel, Fernandez and Altemeier (1990) investigated both the play and
imitation of preschool children with autism, and compared these behaviours with those shown by
children with similarly handicapping conditions. The groups employed consisted of 22 children
with autism, 15 hearing impaired, 19 language impaired, 15 mentally retarded and 20 non-
handicapped children (mean CAs: 55.2, 50.4, 54.0, 62.4, 51.6 months respectively). Though
these groups are again age matched, the children with autism had significantly lower IQ scores than
all but the mentally retarded children, and importantly, significantly worse verbal communication
scores (as measured by the Childhood Au?sm Rating Scale) than all other groups.
The free-play of the children was observed and the number of toys used, the time spent
playing and the level of toy play (manipulative, 'relational', functional or symbolic) was recorded.
The children with autism spent less time playing than other groups and performed fewer functional
acts than other children. There was no difference in the number of symbolic play acts, but
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significantly fewer children with autism engaged in symbolic play. However, given the absence of
MA or verbal communication ability matching of groups, these findings are unsurprising.
3.14 Studies Employing General MA Matching
The studies considered so far have all concentrated on the pretend play shown by children
with autism under spontaneous or free-play conditions. Pilot work reported by Ungerer and
Sigman (1981) indicated that a structured play situation produced more sophisticated and diverse
pretend play than was produced spontaneously, and they proposed that previous studies, .....may
have failed to tap the full potential of autistic children's capacities for play". Their own study
involved a group of 16 children with autism (mean CA 51.7 months, mean MA 24.8 months), and
was later expanded to include control groups of mentally handicapped and normal children matched
for general MA (Sigman & Ungerer,' 1984a). As well as observing free-play behaviour, a
structured testing condition was also employed, which consisted of an experimenter working one-
on-one with each child. In this condition play was elicited if not produced spontaneously. A
criticism of this procedure is that the eliciting of play involved modelling of play acts and
consequently any resultant play could simply reflect imitation (Baron-Cohen, 1987). It also
appears that the modelling was not designed to produce pretend play specifically.
The group of children with autism showed less diverse functional play than controls,
especially doll-directed functional play, in both the free and structured situations. They also
produced significantly fewer symbolic acts in both situations. It is possible that the children with
autism performed these acts for longer periods of time than controls. The duration of symbolic
play did not differ between the groups in the free-play setting but is unfortunately not reported for
the structured condition. The number of symbolic acts produced by the children with autism did
rise when play was elicited, but as mentioned above this may have been due to imitation rather than
the tapping of latent symbolic abilities. An association between symbolic play and receptive
language was also found in all groups.
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The same testing conditions, free- and structured play, were employed in a subsequent study
by Mundy, Sigman, Ungerer and Sherman (1986). As part of a search for non-verbal behaviours
that might serve to discriminate autism from other developmental disorders, they examined the play
of 18 children with autism (mean CA 53.3 months, mean MA 25.7 months) and of 18 mentally
retarded and 18 normal children (mean CAs 50.2, 22.2 months, mean MAs 26.0, 25.0 months
respectively). These children were matched on the basis of general mental age, and their play
abilities were assessed by recording the total number of different functional and symbolic acts
produced in the two testing conditions. It was found that the children with autism consistently
showed fewer different functional and symbolic play acts than the other two groups, though this
difference was only significant for structured symbolic acts. Once again these results do not shed
any light on the important question of whether children with autism spent less time than controls in
functional and symbolic play in either testing condition; it is possible that they produced fewer acts
of longer duration.
. Power and Radcliffe (1989) also investigated children with autism's ability to produce pretend
play in a structured play situation. They employed a formal test of symbolic playability, the Lowe
and Costello play test (Lowe and Costello, 1976), and compared the scores obtained on this test by
a group of 247 developmentally disabled children with their performance on either the Bayley
Scales of Infant Development or the Stanford-Binet Intelligence Scale. The children were divided
into various clinical groups: mildly retarded, moderately retarded, language disordered, borderline
(IQs between 70 and 85) and atypical or autistic-like. It was found that the 19 atypical children
given the Bayley scales (median CA 36.8 months, mean MA 20.3 months) scored significantly
lower on the symbolic play test than the children in the other clinical groups given the Bayley
Scales, even when MA was controlled for.
While this would seem to indicate a specific deficit in the symbolic play of children with
autism, observed under structured testing conditions, it should be noted that the 8 atypical children
who received the Stanford-Binet Scale rather than the Bayley Scales (median CA 42.5 months,
Chapter 3 91
mean MA 26.1 months) did not show a similar deficit when compared to the other children tested
on the Stanford-Binet Scale. Also the atypical group did not consist solely of classically autistic
children, but was made up of any meeting DSM-llI criteria for pervasive developmental disorder.
It is also important to note that the Lowe and Costello test, which is based on play with miniature
objects, in fact assesses functional play rather than pretend playas recently defined (Baron-Cohen,
1987). Given these points the evidence that this study presents for a pretend play impairment
specific to autism is far from conclusive.
A final point, that also applies to Sigman and Ungerer's (1984a) and Mundy et al.'s (1986)
studies, is that though groups were matched for general MA, they were not matched for verbal MA.
The relation between play and language seen in both normal children (subsection 1.22) and children
with autism (Wing et al., 1977; Ungerer & Sigman, 1981; Mundy, Sigman, Ungerer & Shennan,
1986) suggests that verbal MAs should be used for matching if pretend playability specifically is
being investigated. Any deficit seen in a group of children with autism might otherwise be due to
differences in language levels, rather than to an autism-specific pretend play deficit. It is also likely
that non-verbal MA matching procedures disadvantage children with autism, who perform better on
non-verbal than on verbal tests (Ozonoff, Pennington & Rogers, 1990).
3.15 Studies Employing Verbal MA Matching
One well known study that did match control groups for verbal MA was that carried out by
Baron-Cohen (1987). The extent of symbolic play shown under free-play conditions by a group of
10 children with autism (mean CA 97 months, mean verbal MA 29 months) was compared to that
shown by Down's syndrome and normal controls. Play with three sets of toys was observed,
firstly stuffed animals and wooden blocks, secondly a toy kitchen with utensils and a toy telephone
and fmally a number of playpeople, Interestingly no child in any group showed any symbolic play
with the playpeople. More importantly, in the other two toy conditions significantly fewer children
with autism than controls produced any symbolic play. 80% of the children with autism showed
some functional play, compared to 90% of Down's and 100% of normal children. These
Chapter 3 92
differences are not significant, but it should be noted that the performance of controls is at or near
.ceiling.
While this experiment appears to provide firm evidence for a direct impairment in children
with autism's ability to pretend, the matchingprocedure used in this case is still not above criticism.
Lewis and Boucher (1988) point out that Baron-Cohen's use of the British Vocabulary Picture
Scale to evaluate verbal MA may have resulted in the autistic group being disadvantaged; children
with autism's vocabulary often being more advanced than other aspects of their language (Paul,
1987). The extent to which the use of this test might handicap the autistic sample, and therefore the
strength of Lewis and Boucher's criticism, is hard to estimate.
Gould (1986) assessed a group of 31 children showing "...the triad of social and
communicative impairments" (cf. Wing & Gould,1979), (mean CA 101.1 months), using the
Lowe and Costello Play Test (cf. Power& Radcliffe, 1989). The level of play predicted formally
by the test was compared with that observed experimentally. She found that this socially impaired
group had lower 'play test ages', and lower ratings of spontaneous play than a group of 29 sociable
children retarded in language comprehension. These two groups were not matched initially, so
little can be inferred from this fmding; however the groups were further divided into subgroups
scoring within the range of the play test (19 socially impaired, 10 language comprehension
compared). It emerged that the socially impaired subgroup, despite having test scores and language
comprehension ages that did not differ from those of the control subgroup, showed significantly
less and significantly poorer observed spontaneous symbolic play, at levels lower than predicted by
the test. The importance of this result is that it indicates that these children perform better when
tested fonnally than when simply observed in a free-play setting.
It might be objected that the socially impaired group was not a homogeneous one. Three of .
the 31 children, and 2 of the 19 members of the selected subgroup, had Down's syndrome.
However the fact that these latter 2 children, unlike the other members of the subgroup, did show
observed levels of play similar to those predicted by their play test scores, indicates that they were
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not contributing to the difference between formal and spontaneous testing seen in the group as a
whole.
Similar results emerge from a subsequent study by Whyte and Owens (1989). They matched
a group of 9 children with autism (mean CA 97.5 months) with 9 normal children (mean CA 22.5
months) on the basis of their scores on the Lowe and Costello symbolic play test. They then
compared the language comprehension and expression abilities of these two groups using the
Reynell Developmental Language Scales (1983). Though these groups were not initially matched
on a verbal measure, their language comprehension scores did not differ significantly. This study
therefore presents two groups of equivalent language comprehension ability who perform equally
well on the Lowe and Costello symbolic play test. The two groups did differ on one of three sub-
components of the language expression test, namely that assessing language content and there were
significant correlations between symbolic play scores and both language measures for both groups.
The authors point out that the mean language comprehension age of the autistic group was sizeably
larger than their mean symbolic play test age, and that this discrepancy was greater than that
observed in the normal group; concluding that this indicates an impairment in the development of
pretend play skills in autism. However as none of these differences are statistically significant this
conclusion seems unfounded.
Despite the fact that the Lowe and Costello play test is really a measure of functional and not
symbolic playability, it is interesting that this work appears to demonstrate a lack of functional play
in socially impaired children/children with autism in spontaneous but not structured situations.
These results suggest, as Ungerer and Sigman (1981) noted, that formal or structured testing of
pretend play might improve the performance of children with autism. A number of investigators
have attempted to determine the extent of this improvement in a similar way to that employed by
Sigman and Ungerer, by comparing pretend play under elicited as well as spontaneous play
conditions.
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Wetherby and Prutting (1984) examined cognitive-social abilities in a sample of four young
children with autism (mean CA 114 months). As part of this investigation pretend play in both
free-play and elicited play conditions was recorded. The eliciting procedure involved initial
modelling with the toys used. the child was then presented with each toy. followed by similar items
to test for generalisation ability. The quality of pretend play shown by the children with autism was
found to be poorer than that of four normal children "...functioning at similar stages of language
development.", For this analysis the 'most symbolic' act produced by each child, in either testing
condition was taken as a measure of their pretend playability. Quality of play in the two conditions
was not directly compared to examine the effect of eliciting play specifically. and nothing is said
about children's ability to generalise behaviour following modelling. The result suggests that even
with the aid of modelling children with autism are impaired relative to normal children in their
ability to play symbolically, but though the groups were paired on the basis of similar language
ability, they were not formally matched. This coupled with the small size of the subject sample.
undermines the validity of this finding.
Riguet, Taylor, Benaroya and Klein (1981) also proposed that the optimal conditions for
observing play in children with autism would involve a structured testing environment. They used
a limited number of toys in both free-play and structured conditions, again eliciting play with
modelling in the latter condition. However unlike Ungerer and Sigman they modelled pretend acts
specifically. Ten children Withautism (mean CA 120months, mean verbal MA 30 months) were
matched for verbal MA with control groups of Down's syndrome and normal children. It was
found that the autistic group played less in both conditions. and that the 'symbolic quality' of the
children with autism's play was significantly poorer than that of controls, lending support to the
argument for an impairment in pretend play in autism. A correlation between level of symbolic play
and verbal MA was observed in the children with autism.
Various questions can, however, be raised regarding Riguet et al. 's methodology. Firstly,
the rating scale used to assess play quality extended beyond simple symbolic play to elaboration
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and sequencing of symbolic acts. It may be that such a scale selectively handicaps children with
autism who find integrating and combining their behaviour particularly difficult (Rutter, 1983). It
is therefore perhaps not a pure measure of the pretend playability of these children. Secondly,
Baron-Cohen (1987) notes that only ObjJt substitution and not imagination of absent objects and
attribution of non-existent properties (cf. Leslie, 1987)was considered as evidence of pretend play,
so that pretend play capabilities may have been consistently underestimated. Finally, though
children with autism were able to imitate modelled pretend acts to an extent, they were not able to
,
transfer this behaviour to other toys provided for generalisation, suggesting that the effect of
eliciting play may be due to imitation alone.
Lewis and Boucher (1988) compared the play of a group of 15 children with autism (mean
CA 132 months, mean expressive language age 65/51 months-) with that of control groups of
children with moderate learning difficulties and of normal children, matched for expressive
language abilities. Three testing conditions were employed, these being spontaneous, elicited and
instructed play. In the elicited condition children were simply asked to show what the toys
presented to them, sets of cars or dolls with appropriate or junk accessories, could do. In the
instruCted condition specific prompts to pretend were given. It was found that in the spontaneous
condition, children with autism spent less time playing functionally than controls. However their
symbolic play was comparable to that of the other groups. This seemingly anomalous result
appears to be due to general floor effects. A wide range of miniature objects (e.g. cars and
appropriate accessories, dolls and dolls' house furniture) in addition to junk materials (boxes.
bricks, fabric strips etc.) were available. Most of the children played exclusively with the former
set of toys, producing functional play at the expense of symbolic play. McGhee, Ethridge and
3Expressive language ability measured by the Renfrew Action Picture Test which produces two scores, one
for informational content and one for grammatical correctness of the subject's replies. Here mean infonnational score
_ 65 months, mean grammar score = 51 months.
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Benz (1984) have shown that normal preschoolers spend more time playing with realistic rather
than with non-realistic toys, and that they show more pretend play with less realistic toys.
Lewis and Boucher reported that the number of functional acts produced by children with
autism in the elicited play condition did not differ significantly from those produced by controls. In
addition, levels of symbolic play increased in the elicited and instructed conditions, and no
impairment in the pretend play of the children with autism relative to that of controls was seen,
either in terms of duration or of quality of symbolic play. Baron-Cohen (1990) has claimed that
these conditions do not require children to generate symbols for themselves, and that the autistic
group's performance might simply reflect guessing on their part; a child given a car and a box can
do little else except place one inside the other when asked what they can do with them. Similarly
when told to park the car in a garage a child can easily guess that the box is meant to represent the
garage and follow the instruction. Boucher and Lewis (1990) ruled out this possibility by
publishing new data showing that the range of symbolic play shown by children with autism in the
elicited and instructed conditions was considerably more imaginative and diverse than had been
apparent from their initial report, reflecting true creativity rather than guessing in the large majority
of instances.
More problematic is Lewis and Boucher's use of the Renfrew Action Picture Test to equate
the groups. This test requires a degree of inferential understanding; children are asked to describe
scenarios which sometimes involve the explanation of someone's action. Children with autism
may fmd this aspect of the test particularly difficult, and equating groups on the Action Picture Test
may therefore advantage the children with autism over controls in terms of vocabulary and grammar
comprehension.
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3.16 Summary Of Findings
What is apparent from the above review is that the majority of studies have failed to include
control groups or to match control groups adequately. Experiments that indicate a lack or absence
of pretend play in children with autism relative to age matched controls cannot be seen as reflections
of an impaired ability to pretend. This can only be inferred from studies that have matched controls
on the basis of MA. Even those studies "that have matched control groups for MA are not above
methodological criticism. The importance of using verbal rather than general MA matching
measures has already been discussed. Only three studies assessing pretend play have in fact used
strict verbal MA matching, these being Baron-Cohen (1987), Riguet, Taylor, Benaroya and Klein
(1981), and Lewis and Boucher (1988). Even for these studies, the appropriateness of the
matching procedures used is at present unresolved.
Given these criticisms, what can be concluded about the nature of pretend play in autism?
There appears to be good evidence for an impairment in the spontaneous pretend play of children
with autism. This the firm conviction of parents, clinicians and teachers, and the experimental
investigations of Baron-Cohen (1987) and of Riguet et al. (1981) support these observations. Only
Lewis and Boucher (1988) failed to find this spontaneous impairment, a failure that is readily
explained in terms of the toys used.
What is less clear is first, whether the deftcit in spontaneous play is specific to pretend (or
symbolic) play (narrowly defined), or extends to both pretend and functional play; and second,
whether the deficit is specific to spontaneous play, or extends to play elicited in structured settings.
Concerning the first of these points, observation confirmed by generally acceptable experimental
investigations (Gould, 1986; Lewis & Boucher, 1988; Whyte & Owens, 1989) suggests that there
is a deficit in functional as well as in pretend play. Baron-Cohen's (1987) study does report a
dissociation between children with autism's relative spontaneous functional and spontaneous
pretend play abilities, but this may be the result of ceiling performance in controls. The
experimental evidence concerning the second point, namely the specificity of the deficit to
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spontaneous play situations, is more evenly balanced: the studies of Lewis and Boucher, Gould
and Whyte and Owens suggest that the deficit does not persist into structured play, in contrast to
the studies of Riguet et al. (1981) and Sigman and Ungerer (1984a).
These conclusions have implications for explanations of abnormal play in autism which have
been proposed in recent years. Possible explanations are discussed below in relation to these
implications. These fall into two categories. There are those that explain a failure to pretend in
autism in terms of a competence deficit, proposing that pretend play is something that children with
autism simply cannot do. Alternatively there are performance deficit hypotheses; implicit in these
accounts is the suggestion that pretend play is not something that children with autism can't do, but
is simply something they don't do. Two caveats should, however, be made concerning this
distinction. Firstly it is clear that children with autism will almost certainly always display some
lack of 'competence' relative to age-equivalent normal children, because of their characteristically
lower levels of linguistic and intellectual functioning. Performance hypotheses propose that an
absence of pretend play relative to verbal mental age matched controls is not the result of a lack of
competence. Secondly it is unlikely that an absence of pretend play in autism is wholly the result of
a failure to perform. It is more probable that a failure of competence in some other domain
impinges on the production of pretend play. To give an example, I might never be heard to speak
French spontaneously while on holiday in France, yet my behaviour may convince an observer that
I have a good understanding of the language. I might also, when pressed, translate given English
sentences into French. I may be able to speak fluent French, and yet choose never to do so (classic
performance). Alternatively I might have some peculiar difficulty in deciding what to say to a
French person. In this later case a failure of competence in another domain, not being able to think
of things to say, impinges on my ability to converse.
A key question is whether we would want to say that I could really speak French if I could
never think of anything to say in the language. In this case the distinctions between competence
and performance become blurred. Consequently, for the purposes of this, and the following two
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chapters, the term 'performance' will be used to refer to accounts which claim that children with
autism are able to engage in or understand symbolic play in some situations. Competence accounts
must necessarily predict that children with autism show a global failure to produce or comprehend
pretence. However, when it comes to thinking about reasons why children with autism might not
pretend, this distinction becomes less useful, and will be set aside.
The two sets of hypotheses will be discussed in turn in the following sections. Many of
these accounts stem from proposed general deficits in autism which have been discussed in some
detail in chapter 2. While there will therefore be a degree of overlap of the material discussed there,
and in the following sections, the aim of this chapter is to evaluate these proposed deficits in the
light of the predictions they make regarding pretend play specifically. Specific explanations of an
absence of pretend play will therefore be outlined here (this was not done in chapter 2), criticisms
of these specific explanations, rather than of the general deficits, will be discussed, and the
predictions made by these accounts as regards pretend play will be spelled out.
3.2 Competence Hypotheses
3.21 Metarepresentational Hypothesis
The metarepresentational deficit account of autism has already been described and discussed
in detail (subsection 2.24). While such an account is able to explain children with autism's
difficulties on theory of mind tasks, it has also been seen as a clear explanation of their apparent
failure to pretend. The explanation is based on Leslie's (1987) analysis of the metarepresentational
nature of pretence (described fully in subsection, 1.31). Clearly if pretend play is
metarepresentational, and children with autism cannot process metarepresentations, or are delayed
in acquiring this ability, they will be impaired in their development of pretend play skills. Both
Leslie (1987) and Baron-Cohen (1987) have explicitly argued that it is this selective impainnent in
the ability to produce metarepresentations that underlies the observed lack of pretend play seen in
autism.
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The most recent instantiation of the metarepresentational deficit theory has been put forward
by Leslie (Leslie & Roth, 1993; Leslie & Thaiss, 1992). While Leslie still argues that a failure to
process M-Representations (see subsection 1.31) is at the heart of children with autism's failure to
pretend, this recent model also attempts to explain why pretend play emerges in normal children at
two years, but the ability to pass theory of mind tasks develops at around three and a half years (see
subsection 1.35). Leslie proposes that an absence of pretend play in autism is caused by
impairment to the 'information processing device' which constructs M-Representations - the
'Theory of Mind Mechanism' (ToMM). The ToMM is also required to pass false belief tasks, but
so is another hypothesised device, the Selection Processor. The proposed function of this second
device is to select the appropriate counter-factual representation from which to draw inferences
from (via the ToMM). It is not at all clear why the Selection Processor should not be required to
understand another's pretence, if it is needed to understand their belief, however, this is not at issue
here. The crux of Leslie's current model as far as pretend play in autism is concerned, is the same
as thatof previous accounts put forward by him (Leslie, 1987, 1988; Leslie & Frith, 1990),
namely that an absence of pretend play is due to an inability to process the M-representation
(representational relation) required for pretence.
Though widely held, metarepresentational explanations of children with autism's apparent
problems with pretence can be criticised on three grounds, two of which have already been
discussed. Subsection 2.24 raised reasons to be cautious in inferring a metarepresentational deficit
in autism from failure on theory of mind tasks. It is possible that metarepresentational competence
is not required to predict another's behaviour in these tasks (the simulationist's view), or that
children with autism fail these tests for some other reason than their metarepresentational demands.
Subsection 1.35 summarised the arguments against the assumption that pretend play, or at least
individual pretence, is metarepresentational in nature. Clearly if pretend play only requires a child
to be able to manipulate first-order counterfactual or suppositional representations, as was argued,
the logic of a metarepresentational deficit account breaks down.
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Finally, the thrust of the performance deficit accounts to be described below is that children
with autism can indeed produce pretend play. The preceding review of the literature provides
some, albeit equivocal, evidence in favour of this suggestion. Perner (1993) has also suggested
that " ... it is not clear whether autistic children are incapable of understanding pretence - as the
decoupling-deficit theory (Leslie's theory) suggests - or whether they are - for some unknown
reason - reluctant to engage in such activity". Perner goes on to claim that empirical evidence
shows that children with autism must have intact all the necessary components of Leslie's
decoupling mechanism (see Leslie, 19874), and argues that their ability to pass the false-
photograph test, but not to produce spontaneous pretence shows that they must have difficulties
either in manipulating the content of the decoupled representation, or of generating appropriate
behaviour from it. There are therefore three potential flaws in a metarepresentational deficit
account: first it is possible that children with autism are not metarepresentationally impaired; second
it is possible that pretend play (individual pretend play at least) does not involve
metarepresentations; and third it is possible that children with autism can produce pretend play.
Clearly these three points are not mutually exclusive, the relationships between them and the
consequent implications for a metarepresentational deficit account will be returned to in the final
chapter.
Turning to the predictions made by a metarepresentational account, the failure to manipulate
metarepresentations implies that children with autism will not only be impaired in their production
of pretend play in free-play conditions, but also that pretence will be impaired under structured
conditions (of course assuming, as this account does, that pretence is metarepresentational).
4Perner. following Leslie. divides the decoupler into three subcomponents. These are the 'Expression Raiser'
whose function is to copy and quarantine representations, the 'Manipulator' which manipulates the content of the
deooupled expression, and labels and personalises its context. and the 'Interpreter, which translates the obtained
metarepresentation into action.
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Regardless of the aid given to children Withautism in elicited and instructed conditions, nothing can
overcome their basic inability (or delayed ability) to manipulate and process the metarepresentation
required for pretence. This account must also predict that comprehension of pretence should be
impaired in autism (though none of the studies described above provide a test of this suggestion),
as metarepresentations are equally if not more importantly involved in comprehension than in
production of pretence. A metarepresentational account is therefore a clear example of a
competence deficit hypothesis.
While being able to account for both children with autism's failure on theory of mind tasks,
and their lack of spontaneous pretend play, the metarepresentational impairment hypothesis has
difficulty in explaining an impairment of functional as well as of pretend play in autism. In
functional play there is no need for a child to decouple their representation (of a toy car as a small
toy car to be pushed along) from any real-world knowledge base, the essence of functional play is
that the child uses a toy appropriately (Ungerer & Sigman, 1991), in other words appropriately to
their fU'St-orderrepresentation of it. There is therefore clearly no danger of representational abuse
in functional play, and no need for decoupling, let alone inferring a metarepresentational
informational relation.
3.22 Social Theories
Hobson's Theory
A number of authors have suggested that the characteristic social impairments seen in autism
may lie at the heart of the disorder (e.g, Fein Pennington, Markowitz, Braverman & Waterhouse,
1986; Fotheringham, 1991). One of the most explicit and well reasoned of these accounts has been
put forward by Hobson (1989a, b, 1990a, b, 1991a). Hobson's fundamental argument is that a
young child's basis for understanding other people as 'other people' is their experience of early
reciprocal interactions with others. In these early affectively coordinated interactions the child has
the opportunity to realise that other people see or appreciate the world differently to the way they
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do. This realisation is mediated by the understanding of emotion, which Hobson argues is directly
perceivable in others. In other words, through affective social referencing, young children come to
realise that others have their own subjective orientations to the world. The child therefore comes to
understand that situations are 'pregnant' with a variety of meanings in that they can be perceived
and appreciated in different ways by different observers. This in turn leads to the realisation of
their own ability to hold multiple orientations to a given object or situation, and gives rise to the
ability to symbolise.
The fundamental problem in autism, as Hobson sees it, is a socio-affective one which strikes
at the early stages of this process. A failure to interact socially is a characteristic of autism, and it is
this that prevents children with autism from engaging in normal social inter-personal relationships.
However Hobson also emphasises an affective side to children with autism's problems, claiming
that the ability to perceive and understand emotions is impaired in autism. It is not clear which of
these two aspects of his theory Hobson ascribes more importance to, but essentially either would
prevent the normal development of symbolic ability, and result in a failure to engage in s,ymbolic
play. According to Hobson, children with autism are prevented from arriving at a stage at which
they are able to hold two orientations to an object (see figure 3.1, interpreted from Baron-Cohen,
1991d).
Support for this form of account comes from reports of the pretend play of congenitally blind
children. It is argued (Hobson, 199Oa, 1991a) that these children's lack of sight hinders emotion
perception and social referencing in a way analogous to the social deficits of children with autism,
and with comparable effects; there is some evidence of delayed symbolic play development in such
children (Fraiberg & Adelson, 1977). Further support for Hobson's general account, comes from
studies which have shown impaired recognition (Hobson & Lee, 1989; Hobson, Outson & Lee,
1988; Macdonald, Rutter, Howlin, Rios, Le Conteur, Evered & Folstein, 1989), naming (Hobson,
Outson & Lee, 1989), production (Macdonald et al., 1989; Kasari, Sigman, Mundy & Yinniya,
1990), and matching of emotional stimuli in autism (Hobson, 1986a, b).
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Figure 3.1. Hobson's Theory
Absent in autism
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Rogers and Pennington's Theory
Another variant of a competence deficit model for autism, which emphasises the fundamental
role of social impairments, has been proposed by Rogers and Pennington (1991). Taking as a
basis Stern's (1985) analysis of interpersonal development in infancy, they argu that a primary
deficit in autism originates in impaired formation and coordination of specific If- th r
representations. This is manifested first in impaired imitation, especially of an th r per n'
actions or affect expressions. In turn, this leads to impaired emoti n sharing; thu , while th hild
with autism's sense of self in relation to the physical environment would e relativ ly unaff t d,
their sense of self in relation to other social beings would be deficient. These latt r r pr ntati n
Chapter 3 lOS
would develop solely from observed behavioural contingencies, and would lack the characteristics
of Stern's 'intersubjective self'. Impaired performance on 'theory of mind' tasks would follow.
Rogers and Pennington propose that impairments in imitation and theory of mind abilities
then cause pretend play deficits. They emphasise the proposed role of deferred imitation in the
development of symbolism (Werner & Kaplan, 1963), and suggest that impaired imitation and
theory of mind deficits result in the child with autism being "shut out of the richness and
complexity of the social world", which in tum means that they have "too little knowledge of the
social world to act it out in play". This latter view echoes Hanis' (1989a) suggestion that children
with autism might be impaired in their ability to produce 'human' but not physical based pretence.
While it is certainly the case that children with autism are impaired in their ability to interact
socially, there are a number of arguments against the primacy of a social disorder, and against
Hobson's account in particular. Ozonoff, Pennington and Rogers (1990) found that children with
autism were impaired relative to controls on tests of sorting and matching affective vs. non-
affective stimuli, when controls were matched for non-verbal mental age, but were unimpaired
when matching was by verbal mental age (see also Braverman, Fein, Lucci &Waterhouse, 1989;
Prior, Dahlstrom & Squires, 1990; Fein, Lucci, Braverman & Waterhouse, 1992). Ozonoff et al.
argue that this reflects the fact that non-verbal abilities are relatively unimpaired in autism (Prior,
1979), and hence matching on these abilities may selectively disadvantage experimental participants
with autism. They further argued that this, rather than specific deficits in emotion perception, was
the cause of impairments found in the studies described above.
However, while this may be true to a extent, it fails to explain why children with autism,
matChed to controls by non-verbal MA are selectively impaired on affective-tasks (they are typically
unimpaired on non-affective control tasksS). Secondly, as Hobson (1991b) cogently argues, it is
'Ozonoff et al. (1990) argue that this is due to differential effects of task difficulty, though this Conn of
explanation is unparsimonious.
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possible that verbal understanding is itself dependent on affective comprehension. In other words
the relatively low levels of verbal performance seen in autism (compared to non-verbal abilities)
may be due in part to affective impairments, and hence matching for verbal abilities may 'control
away' some of the affective difficulties.
Baron-Cohen (1991d) further criticises Hobson's theory (and indirectly, Rogers and
Pennington's), noting that children with autism do show signs of attachment behaviour (e.g.
Sigman & Ungerer, 1984b), do understand simple emotions (Baron-Cohen, 1991b; Tan & Harris,
1991), and use simple emotion terms in their speech (Tager-Flusberg, 1989). These findings do
not rule out the possibility of a specific impairment in the ability to perceive how other's emotions
relate to shared situations, which is what Hobson holds to be critically impaired in autism, though
they do count against the claim for an innate and global inability to understand emotions. Baron-
Cohen also argues i) that Hobson does not explain how the normal understanding of observable
emotions leads on to the ability to impute opaque mental states, and ii) that the mechanism by which
the appreciation of differing subjective perspectives leads to the ability to hold multiple perspectives
oneself, is not made explicit in this account. The first of these criticisms could be countered if one
adopted a simulationist perspective (see Johnson, 1988 especially), as by this account one's own
(non-opaque) experience of the relation between emotions and mental states can bridge this gap.
The second is not problematic if one accepts Vygotsky's (1962) view that mental understanding is
arrived at via the internalisation of social understanding (this is in fact exactly Hobson's claim,
Hobson 1990a).
In terms of the predictions, Hobson's account resembles the metarepresentational deficit
hypothesis in that it explains children with autism's problems in pretend play in terms of a
competence-type deficit, claiming that children with autism are impaired simply in the ability to
symbolise itself. This affective account is consequently subject to the same difficulties as the
metarepresentational deficit hypothesis; all competence hypotheses would have difficulty in
explaining why children with autism's play in structured situations is not impaired (relative to
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controls) should this be confirmed. Hobson's approach might however be taken to predict that
variance in earlier affective disturbance would predict later variance in symbolic playability.
Additional to Rogers and Pennington's account is the suggested role of impaired imitation in
children with autism's play deficit. Impaired imitation could explain a lack of both symbolic and
functional play, though since Rogers and Pennington hypothesize that symbolic play would be
further affected by delayed development of metarepresentations, they might predict a more marked
effect in children with autism's symbolic as opposed to their functional play. Their account also
seems to suggest that physical pretence should be less impaired than social pretence (cf. Harris
1989a).
3.3 Performance Hypotheses
3.31 Motivational Theories
In subsection 3.16 a failure to speak French was used as an example of a performance
deficit, and it was noted that this might simply be the result of not choosing to talk in French.
Similarly, the observed lack of pretend play seen in autism may be due to the fact that children with
autism are not motivated to engage in pretence. There appear to three potentially discrete ways in
which a lack of motivation could be manifested. A lack of pretend play could be due to a specific
aversion for pretence. Lord (1985) suggests that pretend play may hold little interest for a child
with autism. Alternatively it could be due to a preference for other forms of play which are carried
out at the expense of pretence. Harris (1989a) writes, "It is conceivable that autistic children rarely
produce pretend play, not because they completely lack the ability to do so, but because the type of
object-directed play that they prefer can be readily carried on without much call for pretence".
Finally an absence of pretend play could be the result of a global lack of motivation to perform
amongst children with autism.
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Relevant to this final suggestion is a review by Zigler and Hodapp (1986) of a wide range of
factors that have been implicated as capable of reducing the motivation of retarded children, and
consequently impairing their performance (see also Merighi, Edison & Zigler, 1990). These
factors include desire for social reinforcement, unconventional reinforcer hierarchies and low
expectancies of success. While the authors' argument is applied to mentally handicapped children
as a whole, such factors could possibly produce disproportionately low levels of motivation in
children with autism. Koegel and colleagues (Koegel & Egel, 1979; Koegel & Mentis, 1985)
suggest that children with autism do indeed suffer from a global lack of motivation, reflected in
poor task performance and difficulties in acquiring and generalising skills, primarily as a result of
frequently reinforced low success expectancy. Garretson, Fein and Waterhouse (1990) suggest
that children with autism have an 'abnormal motivational framework', which corresponds to Zigler
and Hodapp's notion of unconventional reinforcer hierarchies. Evidence of poor levels of
motivation in autism also comes from suggestions that children with autism's spontaneous
performance in other domains does not provide a fair reflection of their true capabilities. Gould
(1986) argues that this is the case for reading, and notes that Bartak, Rutter and Cox (1975) found
the same for children with autism's spontaneous use of speech (see also Koegel & Johnson, 1989;
Koegel, O'Dell & Dunlap, 1988). However, there is no direct evidence for a motivational
explanation of a lack of spontaneous symbolic (and functional) play in autism.
Baron-Cohen (1989d) argues that a problem of a motivational account of children with
autism's lack of spontaneous pretend play, is that it fails to specify why children with autism are
not motivated. He suggests that attempts to do this would result in an 'elaborate' (and presumably
unparsimonious) theory. However explanations of a lack of motivation can be put forward (see
above), and do not appear to require over-elaborate justification, whether they are framed in terms
of global or specific failures of motivation. More problematic, as far as a global motivation account
is concerned, is the fact that children with autism do not always appear to be unmotivated to
perform. They perform well on certain aspects of intelligence tests, on tests of digit span and on
Chapter 3 109
block design for example. Ozonoff, Pennington and Rogers (1991) specifically note that the
children with autism in their study were well motivated to perform the variety of tasks presented to
them. While it is the true that this reflects motivation to perfonn on structured, rather than
spcntaneous assessments of abilities, Koegel's account does predict unmotivated task perfonnance.
Few direct predictions are made by these motivational hypotheses regarding pretend play
specifically. They would certainly appear to predict increased levels of pretend play in structured
situations. Harris' suggestion of a specific motivational bias towards non-pretend play leads to the
prediction that high levels of manipulative play would be seen in spontaneous play situations, but
the majority of other accounts would predict this also.
3.32 Central Executive Deficit Hypothesis
Support for the notion of executive dysfunction has been outlined in chapter 2 (section 2.3),
where it was noted that impaired executive functioning could lead to four types of impairment.
These were a) failure to monitor and plan, b) failure to generate self-initiated behaviour, c)
impulsivity, and d) perseveration. It is the third of these impairments, the inability to disengage
from, or to override, externally salient reality that has been seen as a potential explanation of
children with autism's failure to engage in pretend play. Harris (1993) notes that developmental
trends in the normal acquisition of pretend play (decentration decontextualization and integration)
reflect a shift from external, contextually driven and habitual schemas to flexible, internally
generated and planned actions. He proposes that children with autism are impaired in their
acquisition of this internal executive control and therefore have difficulty in the over-riding of
contextual schemas that is necessary for flexible planned symbolic play. In other words, though
internal executive planning also seems to playa part in this account, it is essentially the salience of
external objects that makes pretend play difficult for children with autism. According to Harris
(and following Russell's broader interpretarions of children with autism's executive difficulties,
Russell et al., 1991, Hughes & Russell, 1993; Hughes, Russell & Robbins, in press) children with
autism cannot override the 'banana-ness' of a banana for example, and pretend that it is a
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telephone. This could be interpreted as a failure to decontextualize (see section 1.21), or, to follow
Vygotsky, as a failure to emancipate meaning from object.
General criticisms of the executive dysfunction account of autism have already been covered
(subsection 2.52). Of particular relevance here is Leslie and Roth's (1993) suggestion that children
with autism can inhibit responses to salient states of affairs. As has been noted, the ability to pass a
false photograph test (the example used by Leslie & Roth) does not necessitate inhibiting a
response to one state of affairs which simultaneously, semantically contradicts another state of
affairs. This appears to be where the difficulties lie in autism. To draw together Harris' (1991)
simulationist account of the mechanisms of pretence, and his (1993) explanation of children wi th
autism difficulties in pretend play, it is the inhibiting of a response made on the basis of the reality
default settings that is problematic.
Harris (1993) notes that the executive dysfunction hypothesis makes three predictions about
the pretend play of children with autism. The first two are common to all the various performance
deficit hypotheses discussed here, these being firstly that children with autism will be impaired in
their ability to show spontaneous symbolic play and secondly that they should be able to show
symbolic play if prompted to do so. In terms of the central executive hypothesis, prompting aids
the child with autism by moving the executive control " ...back to the external contextual frame
created by the adult ..." (Harris, 1993). The central executive hypothesis is therefore well able to
explain a lack of symbolic play in spontaneous situations, and also the increases in play in
structured situations reported by Lewis and Boucher. The hypothesis is less consistent with the
evidence reported by Riguet et al and by Sigman and Ungerer. The third prediction is that any
symbolic play that is produced by children with autism will remain repetitive and stereotypical,
reflecting an inability to shift to new play themes in the face of a familiar 'play context'. There is
certainly good evidence for this (Wing et al. 1977; Wing, 1978; Atlas, 1990). A final prediction
that would appear to follow from a central executive account, as interpreted above, is that functional
play may not be impaired in autism. If it is an object's function that is particularly salient, and
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hence prevents symbolic play from being produced, then children with autism should be expected
to be able to use objects in functionally appropriate ways. This is not to say that such use would
not be stereotyped and repetitive. This prediction is at odds with the suggestions of impaired
spontaneous functional play emerging from section 3.1. However it could be argued that a child
with autism might not see an object's 'function', and consequently its salient use, in the same terms
as a psychologist. In particular miniature 'functional' toys may be objects to handle, manipulate,
spin and suck as far as a child with autism is concerned.
3.33 Generation Of Access And Retrieval Strategies Hypothesis
A final possible performance hypothesis that will be considered, is that children with autism
have difficulty in generating flexible retrieval strategies for accessing internal representations or
schemas (even when not, ostensibly, perseverating in response to external cues). Boucher and
Lewis (1989; Lewis & Boucher, 1991) have suggested that impaired generation of these strategies
could underlie the pervasive lack of creativity and originality which is a key feature of autistic
behaviour, including the lack of pretend play. Evidence for this fonn of impairment comes from a
number of domains, though there is little direct support for its influence in pretend play. In
memory, Boucher has shown impaired long term free recall but unimpaired cued recall (Boucher,
1981; Boucher &Warrington, 1976; see also Tager-Flusberg, 1991). Impaired word fluency has
been demonstrated for generation of miscellaneous words, but not for words within a semantic
category (Boucher, 1988). These results suggest that information is stored in memory, but not
strategically accessed by children with autism. When external strategies are imposed children with
autism are unimpaired in their generativity. Finally Lewis and Boucher (1991) found that children
with autism's drawings showed a greater degree of inter-relatedness than did those of controls,
which they took to imply 'restricted use of generative strategies'.
A generative hypothesis, like the central executive hypothesis, is consistent with the majority
of rrodings on play summarised at the end of section 3.1. This is not surprising since these two
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hypotheses appear to be mirror images of each other: the central executive hypothesis suggests that
internal representations are not accessed because of a failure to inhibit attention to the more salient
external world; the generative hypothesis suggests that pretend play does not occur because the
internal representations needed for creativity and flexible planning are not readily accessed. Few
specific criticisms have been levelled at the generation of access and retrieval strategies account,
almost certainly because it has not been stated explicitly until recently (Jarrold, Boucher & Smith,
1993). However, it is not clear that a generation of retrieval strategies hypothesis would
necessarily predict impaired spontaneous functional play in autism, since functional objects would
presumably provide external cues for functional play.
3.4 Other Hypotheses
Clearly there are a number of possible theories that can be advanced to explain children with
autism's difficulties in symbolic play. The ones considered above are the major, most explicit
hypotheses, but this list is certainly not exhaustive. It is conceivable that other general cognitive or
social impainnents associated with autism could impinge on the area of symbolic play development.
For example Mundy and Sigman (1989a, 1989b) have put forward an interactive cognitive-
affective model in an effort to account for joint-attention deficits which they see as being of
fundamental importance in autism. This account has been criticised by a number of authors
(Baron-Cohen, 198ge; Leslie & Happe, 1989; Harris, 1989b; Hobson, 1989a) and is not specific
about the resultant implications for symbolic playability, but serves to indicate the room for further
interpretations of children with autism's difficulties in symbolic play.
It is also possible that the apparent problems in pretence exhibited by children with autism
reflect the combination of a number of the impairments discussed above. For example children
with autism might have a socio-affective deficit which results in the delayed acquisition of symbolic
(rather than metarepresentational skills), which is exacerbated by executive deficits which impinge
on their ability to over-ride the salient functions of objects. A related point is that a number of the
accounts described above overlap to an extent Hobson's and Rogers and Pennington's theories
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could be seen as explanations of the route to a metarepresentational deficit in autism. As was noted
in section 2.4, a metarepresentational deficit could lead to, or could indeed by caused by, executive
dysfunction. A preference for object related playas opposed to pretence (one of the suggested
motivational accounts) could reflect an executive failure to disengage from the salient features of
external objects. These examples show the importance of not focusing too narrowly on the
distinctions between competing accounts. They also emphasise the point made in section 3.16,
namely that the distinction between performance and competence deficits, though a useful tool for
thinking about whether children with autism can or cannot pretend, becomes less helpful when one
tries to be specific about the reasons why they can or cannot pretend.
3.5 Conclusions
3.51 What Is There To Determine Regarding Pretend Play In Autism?
Having considered important and relevant issues regarding pretend play, and concerning
autism, experimental studies of pretend play in autism have now been reviewed, and crucially. a
number of possible explanations of impairments in pretence in autism have been identified. Clearly
the prime aim of this thesis is to decide between these accounts. It may of course be necessary to
propose alternative hypotheses. but the theories described in this chapter provide a useful starting
point. The fact that these theories can be usefully divided into two groups, competence deficits
which predict that children with autism cannot pretend, and performance deficits which predict that
they can pretend, means that they need not all be pitted simultaneously against each other. The first
step of the research which is about to be described, is to decide between competence or
performance deficit accounts. Only once this has been accomplished need the research move on to
the second stage of deciding between specific hypotheses.,
It is clear that both of these two stages do need to be addressed. It is not possible to eliminate
either of them on the basis of the review of empirical research in this area conducted in section 3.1.
This review showed firstly, that very few studies have adequately matched participant groups in
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examinations of relative pretend play abilities in autism. Of those that have adopted verbal MA
matching, only two have addressed the question of competence or performance deficits by
examining structured pretend play (Riguet et al., 1981; Lewis & Boucher, 1988). The findings
from these two studies differ, and so no firm conclusions can be drawn either way. this stage of
research has to be tackled and the following two chapters will describe how this was done.
An analysis of the specific explanations of a pretend play deficit has also failed to eliminate or
conflrm any particular hypothesis, presumably because of the lack of relevant empirical evidence to
judge them against There is therefore little to suggest that a particular performance hypothesis, or
a particular competence hypothesis, is more likely to prove correct than its counterparts. There are
a number of potentially important questions which remain to be addressed, and which will provide
ways of separating various accounts. These include the status of any impairment to functional play
in autism, the role of social and motivational factors in determining levels of pretend play, and the
importance of the functions of objects in pretence. However, only when the broad distinction
between competence and performance deficits has been investigated will it be possible to tell which
of these questions is particularly relevant.
3.52 What Can Autism Teach Us About Pretend Play?
Chapter 1 outlined a variety of different psychological analyses of the mechanisms governing
pretend play in normal children. Though a new analysis was proposed as a result of these
discussions, this was arrived at chiefly by theoretical reasoning and on the grounds of parsimony.
An examination of the pretend play of children with autism is therefore potentially able to provide
empirical evidence for, or against, this and other theories of pretence.
The first question that could be addressed is whether individual pretend play requires the
ability to process metarepresentations. Should it be concluded that a pretend play impairment in
autism takes the form of a competence deficit this would be support for Leslie's theories. However
if it is found that children with autism can produce individual pretend play under certain
circumstances then the metarepresentational deficit theory must be wrong on one count at least.
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Bither individual pretend play cannot be metarepresentational, or children with autism can process
metarepresentations.
A subsequent question which could be examined. is whether social pretend play (or to be
specific. complex social pretend play) is metarepresentational. Ifchildren with autism were shown
to be able to produce individual and not social pretend play, then the analysis of pretence proposed
in subsection 1.42 would be strongly supported. If,on the other hand. they were able to produce
both forms of pretence one would have to conclude that understanding social pretence does not
require metarepresentational understanding, or again, that children with autism are not
metarepresentationally impaired. One could then adopt a simulationist position similar to that taken
by Harris (1991), and argue that pretend play and theory of mind understanding require the setting
aside of default settings, rather than the processing of metarepresentations.
3.53 What Can Pretend Play Teach Us About Autism?
If a particular deficit is hypothesized as being fundamental to autism, then it must impinge on
the area of pretence. The various specific accounts outlined above show that the broader deficits
outlined in chapter 2 have the potential to explain a pretend play impairment in autism. It is
therefore obvious that pretend play provides a testing ground for fundamental deficit theories,
support for a competence deficit in pretend play would count against the primacy of executive
dysfunction, and support for a performance deficit would argue against the primacy of a theory of
mind deficit.
Pretend play also provides a means of sharpening up these broader theories. If support is
obtained for a central executive explanation of pretend play impairments in autism, this may well
tell us more about the specific executive functions which might be particularly impaired in autism
(impulsivity or planning for example). Similarly it is possible that a metarepresentational deficit
explanation is supported, and in addition it is found that children with autism are particularly
impaired at human-based pretence. This could potentially be interpreted as evidence for Leslie's
notion of a domain-specific ToMM.
Chapter 4
Can Children With Autism Pretend?
4.1 Introduction
The review of previous investigations into pretend play in autism carried out in the preceding
chapter reveals that the underlying cause of children with autism's difficulties in pretence, and
indeed the extent of these difficulties, is still unclear. What is essentially required as a first step
towards a clearer understanding is a conclusive means of deciding whether these difficulties are the
result of a competence deficit or of a performance deficit. It is worth briefly considering how this
might best be achieved. Inorder to prove an impairment in performance in pretend play one would
need to demonstrate unimpaired (or relatively less impaired) pretence in structured play.
Conversely one could discount a performance explanation if one showed equally impaired
structured pretend play. However both sets of accounts predict impaired spontaneous pretend play
in autism. Two predictions can therefore be spelled out:
Competence prediction: Impaired spontaneous and impaired structured pretend play.
Performance prediction: Impaired spontaneous, but unimpaired structured pretend play.
Of the experiments reviewed in the previous chapter, Lewis and Boucher (1988) is the one
that comes closest to providing an adequate test of these predictions. However, as noted
(subsection 3.15) there are a number of criticisms of this experiment that limit the support that it
provides for a performance account Perhaps most importantly, the authors failed to demonstrate a
significant spontaneous pretend play impairment in their group of children with autism. As
Chapter 4 117
previously described, this was possibly the result of floor effects in the control groups and is
therefore easily explained. However there are three reasons why a replication, demonstrating such
an impairment is necessary. Firstly an absence of spontaneous pretend play in autism is a well
established research finding, failure to show such an impainnent must therefore cast doubt on the
homogeneity of the autistic participant group or, as in the case of Lewis and Boucher (1988), on
the methodology employed. Secondly if either the nature of the participant groups, or the
methodology of the experiment have been called into question in this way, the Validity of the results
from any assessment of structured play must be also undermined. Finally, though failure to
demonstrate impaired spontaneous play does not separate performance or competence accounts in
any way, it is inconsistent with the predictions made by both sets of hypotheses. Whatever the
findings regarding structured pretend play, such a set of results can not provide firm support for
either a performance or competence account. A replication of Lewis and Boucher's findings was
therefore required. This chapter describes attempts made to provide such a replication.
4.2 Experiment 1
4.21 Introduction
In addition to failing to find a spontaneous pretend play impairment in their group of children
with autism, a second limitation of Lewis and Boucher's experiment, is that it involved a group of
'relatively able' children with autism. These children had a mean chronological age of 11 years, 10
months and a mean verbal mental age of 5 years, 9 months. It could be argued that, even if
suffering from a delay in the acquisition of the pretend systems necessary for carrying out pretence,
children of this mental age may have developed, albeit at a retarded rate, to a stage at which they
were able to play symbolically (Baron-Cohen, 1989d).
A third criticism of Lewis and Boucher's study is that made by Baron-Cohen (1990), who
suggested that at least some items in Lewis and Boucher's instructed play tasks could be performed
successfully by guessing what to do when only one junk object is available as a prop. Boucher and
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Lewis (1991) argued strongly, and convincingly, that this was not the case. However it would be
desirable to assess whether children with autism still perform as well as controls when they have to
make a choice from available play materials in an instructed play condition.
A final limitation of Lewis and Boucher's experiment is that although it demonstrated
relatively normal 'physical pretence' in the children with autism, including doll play involving
physical actions, it did not provide firm evidence of an ability to act out human emotions or social
interactions (Harris, 1989a). A paucity of social interaction is a key feature of autism, and there is
evidence to suggest that recognition and understanding of emotion is impaired in autism (subsection
3.22). It is therefore important to determine whether children with autism can produce pretend play
representing social and emotional behaviour, in addition to producing pretend play representing
physical actions.
This initial experiment attempted to provide a methodologically valid replication and extension
of Lewis and Boucher's findings. The pretend play of children with autism and matched children
with moderate learning difficulties was assessed under free, elicited and instructed conditions. The
criticisms and limitations of Lewis and Boucher's experiment outlined above were taken into
account. Care was taken to ensure that the toys used were not functional, in an effort to reduce
functional play to a minimum, and to promote free pretend play in controls. A developmentally
younger group of children with autism were assessed. When instructions to pretend were given
children were always presented with a range of props from which to choose an appropriate
substitute. Finally children with autism's ability to produce social and emotional as opposed to
physical pretence was directly tested. The experiment therefore aimed to address the following
questions:
1. Is the pretend play of children with autism impaired in spontaneous play conditions?
2. Is the pretend play of children with autism similarly impaired in structured (elicited and
instructed) play conditions?
3. Is the ability to produce emotional and social pretence specifically impaired in autism?
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4.22 Method
Participanss
Two groups of participants were assessed. These were a group of 14 children with autism
and 14 children with moderate learning difficulties (MLO). The autistic group contained 3 girls and
11 boys while the MLD group included 5 girls and 9 boys. The children with autism were selected
on the basis of a diagnosis of autism, and all met the criteria for autism laid down by Wing and
Gould (1979) and more recently Gillberg (1990b), namely the characteristic triad of impaired
language development and use, impoverished social interaction and repetitive and stereotyped
behaviour. The children with moderate learning difficulties were all attending special schools for
children with learning disabilities.
The two groups were individually matched using the Derbyshire Language Scale (DLS)
(Knowles & Masidlover, 1980). This test measures the child's language comprehension ability in
termS of their actual level of comprehension, (e.g, one word, two words), rather than in terms of
verbal mental age. Children scoring above the upper level of the test were excluded from the
esperiment as were children at the one word level and below. as it was felt that the verbal demands
of the experiment would be beyond these children. One disadvantage of the DLS is that it does not
provide a mental age equivalent score on the basis of language comprehension ability. The British
Picture Vocabulary Scale (BPVS) was given to the majority of the participants in this experiment.
These measures were taken after the present experiment had been carried out, but within a period of
six months. Details of the participants, including BPVS verbal mental ages are given in table 4.1.
Thougb not matched for BPVS scores the two groups did not differ significantly in their verbal
mental ages (P=O.74, t-test); neither did they differ significantly in chronological age (P=O.29; t-
test).
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Table 4.1. Mean, SD and range of chronological age (CA) and range of Derbyshire Language Scale
(DLS) level.
Group n BPVS Score CA DLS Level
.. (months) (months)
Children with 14 mean 49.5* 101.7 -
Autism SD 25.7 25.6 -
range 13-89 67-147 2:4-10:22
Children with 14 mean 46.5# 96.4 -
MID SD 19.0 13.0 -
range 27-93 72-121 2:4-10:22
*Two of the children with autism were unavailable for BPVS testing.
#One of the children with MLD was unavailable for BPVS testing.
Materials
Three sets of materials were used, doll figures, lego blocks and a doll with junk objects. The
doll figures set consisted of nine figures in all, three dolls-house type dolls, three 'Playmobile'
figures and three 'Fisher-Price' figures. In each case a male, a female and a child figure were used.
Dolls were chosen in order to specifically investigate children's ability to engage in 'human-based'
pretence. The Lego blocks were included as pilot work had indicated that children with autism
were both motivated and reasonably competent in their play with Lego. Finally the doll and junk
objects set was made up of a dolls-house type-figure plus a ball of blu-tac, a matchbox covered in
silver foil, a piece of sponge, a piece of tissue paper, a freezer bag tie, a cylindrical pen top, a
picture hook, a paper clip, two small plastic rods and a small plastic adapter (used to inflate
footballs).
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All three sets were designed to be 'non-functional' in nature, in other words they contained
toys that were not conducive to purely functional play. When props were introduced, in the fonn
of junk: materials, the fact that they were by their very nature non-functional, ensured they could not
encourage functional play. Similarly the lego pieces used were predominantly large blocks with no
obvious function, the only exception being two sets of wheels which were added during the elicited
play phase. The inclusion of wheels was seen as justified (though see below) as children with
autism are commonly interested in cars, trains, planes and other vehicles and it was thought that if a
child built a vehicle from a number of pieces of lego then this would constitute pretend play rather
than functional play.
Procedure
Pretend play was assessed in two consecutive play sessions. The doll figures and lego
blocks were presented in the first play session, which lasted for around twenty-five minutes, while
the doll with junk: materials were used in the second shorter play session of approximately fifteen
minutes in length. Children were assessed individually, usually in a quiet room with only the
experimenter present. However in four cases it was not possible to take the children to another
room and these children were tested in a quiet comer of their classroom. Play sessions were
videotaped for later analysis.
Three testing conditions were employed with each set of toy materials: a spontaneous play
condition, an elicited play condition and an instructed play condition. In the spontaneous play
condition the child and the experimenter sat together at a table on which the toys were placed, and
the child was told that they could play with the toys while the experimenter did some writing. No
input was given from the experimenter except for non-specific encouragements to continue playing
if the child turned to the experimenter for guidance. In the elicited play condition the child and the
experimenter sat together at a table on which the toys were placed and prompts to play were given
by the experimenter. Specifically the child was asked "What can you do with these?" and "Show
me what you can do with these?" whenever they stopped manipulating the toys. Finally in the
Chapter 4 122
instructed play condition specific instructions to pretend were given. With the doll figures set of
materials only, the instructions were of three different types, physical, social, and emotional,
designed to test participants' ability to produce these forms of pretence. A detailed list of the
specific instructions used are given in table 4.2. Both the spontaneous and elicited play conditions
lasted a maximum of five minutes, but were terminated earlier (after a minimum of two minutes) if
the child clearly lost interest in what they were doing or showed signs of distress. The instructed
play conditions were not timed.
Play Coding Scheme
For both the spontaneous and elicited play conditions the videotaped record of the child's
behaviour was scored using five exhaustive and mutually exclusive categories: Symbolic Play,
Intermediate Symbolic Play, Functional Play, Manipulative Play and No Play. The time spent in
each form of play, and the number of acts falling into each category were recorded. The play
categories were defined as follows:
Symbolic Play: Object substitution, attribution of absent properties or imaginary objects present;
e.g, using matchbox as a car, saying doll is wet, doll eats imaginary food.
Intermediate Symbolic ~ Play that could be symbolic but that cannot confidently be inferred as
such due to ambiguity in the actions or a lack of verbalisation.
functional Play: Appropriate play with materials; e.g. doll walking.
Manipulative Play: Sensorimotor play, e.g. sucking, rolling, twiddling; and Ordering play, lining
up I stacking toys.
NQ Play: Child has toys available, but is not actively playing with them.
In the instructed play conditions each response to an instruction was rated as one of the
following: Pass, Intermediate Pass (response could constitute a pass but cannot confidently be said
to be successful) and Fail.
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Table 42. Instructions given for each play set
Toy Set Instructions
Doll Figures Show me how he jumps up and down
Physical Show me how he runs around
Show me how he lies down
Show me how he rolls over
Social Show me how he shakes hands
Show me how he has a cuddle
Show me how he waves bye-bye
Show me how he has a fight
Emotional Show me how he can be sad/unhappy
Show me how he can be angry/cross
Show me how he can be happy/excited
Show me how he can be scared/frightened
Lego: Make a motorbike
Make a person
Make a table
Make a dog (using table from previous instruction)
Make a tree like this (Lego tree presented for comparison)
Doll + Junk: Show me how he wears a hat
Show me how he walks with a stick
Show me how he sits on a chair
He's very tired, what does he do? (Le. make him go to bed)
Show me how he drives a car like this (Fisher Price car presented)
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Four randomly selected videotapes, two of children with autism and two of MLD children,
were coded by an independent rater in order to determine the reliability of the coding schemes used.
The rater was given the category definitions outlined above. The inter-rater reliability, comparing
agreement on the categorisation of each play act in spontaneous and elicited play sessions, was
satisfactory (Cohen's Kappa=0.70), as was the inter-rater reliability for coding of the instructed
play acts (Cohen's Kappa=O.73).
4.23 Results
The average length of each individual play assessment for all three sets of toys in both
spontaneous and elicited play conditions was 191.8 seconds (sd 45.0s) for the children with
autism, and 221.5s (sd 36.2s) for the MLD children. The difference in length of play condition is
almost significant (F=3.70, df=l, P=O.07). Both groups of children played for shorter periods
with the doll figures alone than with the lego and the doll plus junk material (F=7.28, df=I,
P=O.02); the average length of play with the doll figures was 183.8s (sd 51.5s), with Lego 211.4s
(sd 55.7s), and with the doll plus junk 224.8s (sd 55.7s). The children with autism spent
significantly less time playing with the doll figures than did controls (F=7.19, df=2, P=O.01).
A Note About The Analysis
Despite employing three sets of materials, and assessing play in three conditions, the analyses
presented below will consider children's performance with only two of the toy sets, in only two of
the conditions. Having carried out the experiment, it became apparent that the use of the Lego toy
set was open to criticism (Marion Sigman, personal communication). It could be argued, and the
argument is a strong one, that constructing an object from Lego does not necessitate pretence.
Constructional activity of this kind need not involve symbolic object substitution. A further
problem concerns the introduction of wheels in the elicited play condition with Lego. Not only
does this alteration invalidate a comparison with play with the other two toy sets, which were not
altered or added to throughout each condition, and with the spontaneous play with Lego, hut it is
also certain to increase levels of functional play amongst children. Given these methodological
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problems the Lego play was omitted from the analysis of spontaneous and elicited play behaviour
outlined below. However details of levels of particular play behaviours with the Lego toy set are
presented in Appendix 1.
A second methodological problem concerned the instructed play condition. Upon
consideration, the appropriateness of some of the instructions used is questionable. In particular it
is doubtful whether the physical and social doll alone instructions necessitate a symbolic act as a
response. Instructions such as "Make the boy jump up and down" (physical), and "Show me how
he waves bye-bye" (social) may instead by adequately carried out functionally. To overcome these
important problems, a second experiment was carried out in an attempt to properly determine
children with autism's relative ability to carry out instructed symbolic acts (Experiment 2, see
below). An analysis of the results to the current instructions will therefore not be presented here,
but is given in Appendix 1.
Two analyses will be presented however, comparing children's play with the doll figures and
with the doll plus junk materials, in spontaneous and elicited conditions. The first will examine
time spent in each type of play behaviour, though as the groups spent varying lengths of time
playing with the different materials, the length of time spent in any particular kind of play activity
was calculated as a percentage of assessment time rather than in absolute terms. A second analysis
examines number of acts of each play type produced by children; again to take into account
differences in lengths of time spent in each condition, rates of act production are considered.
A final point, which is relevant to all the experiments to be presented here, concerns the fonn
of statistical analysis employed. Where possible, group performances are compared using a
repeated measures design, rather than treating the groups as being independent. Such an approach
is valid, given the fact that children are always matched individually across groups. This procedure
will emphasise any group differences that might emerge, though it should be noted that all the data
presented here has also been analysed using an independent groups design, and in no case was
there a substantial or notable difference in the fonn of the results obtained.
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Analysis of Percentage Time
The percentage of total time spent by each child in symbolic play, symbolic and intermediate
symbolic play combined, functional play, manipulative play, and no play, was analysed using a
three factor Anova. The factors were Group (children with autism or MLD; repeated measures),
Condition (spontaneous and elicited; repeated measures) and Toy Type (doll figures and doll plus
junk; repeated measures). In view of previous research findings indicating impaired symbolic and
functional play in autism, the Group effects arising from analyses of these play types were subject
to one-tailed tests; one tailed values for the Group effects in the manipulative and no play analyses
were also employed, it being hypothesised that children with autism should spend more time in
these behaviours if not engaging in symbolic or functional play. Otherwise significance levels are
based on two-tailed tests.
The means for each play type by Group, Condition and Toy Type are given in table 4.3, and
are shown graphically for each toy set in figures 4.1 and 4.2. The results of the Anova analyses
for each play type are given in table 4.4.
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Table4.3. Means of percentage time spent in each play category
Group
Children with Autism Children with MLD
Condition Condition
Play Type Materials Spontaneous Elicited Spontaneous Elicited
Symbolic Doll Figures 1.0 13.2 2.5 7.9
Doll + Junk: 4.3 14.2 9.2 23.5
.,
Symbolic + Doll Figures 5.8 19.1 9.0 16.9
Intermediate Doll +Junk 10.1 24.4 28.9 43.5
Functional Doll Figures 17.2 20.5 29.8 30.3
Doll +Junk 2.2 8.6 1.6 8.1
Manipulative Doll Figures 57.1 38.6 49.5 40.3
Doll +Junk: 79.6 59.8 68.3 39.7
No Play Doll Figures 19.9 21.9 11.6 12.5
Doll + Junk 8.1 7.2 1.2 8.7
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Figure 4.1. Distribution of play time with Doll Figures toy set.
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Figure 4.2. Distribution of play time with Doll Plus Junk toy set.
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Symbolic play
The main effect of Group was not significant. There was a significant main effect of
Condition, reflecting more symbolic play in the elicited conditions. The Group x Condition
interaction was not significant.
The main effect of Toy Type was significant; more symbolic play occurred with doll plus
junk objects than with doll figures. The Group x Toy Type interaction was significant, reflecting a
significant effect of Toy Type for the children with MLD (F=12.74, df=I, P<O.Ol), but not for the
children with autism. Similarly there was a significant effect of Group on the doll plus junk
materials (F=4.74, dfe l, P, l-tailed=O.02), but not on the doll figures set. See graph 4.1.
The Condition x Toy Type was not significant, but a significant three way interaction
emerged. This reflected the fact that the children with MLD alone experienced an effect of
elicitation with the doll plus junk, but not with the doll figures (see values in table 4.3).
Graph 4.1. Percentage time spent in symbolic play: Group x Toy Type interaction
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Symbolic plus Intermediate Symbolic play
The results of the analysis of this combined category were similar to those obtained from an
analysis of symbolic play alone. However in this case the main effect of Group was significant,
children with MLD showing more of this type of play. Again there was a significant main effect of
Condition due to the effect of elicitation increasing time spent in symbolic or intermediate symbolic
play. The Group. x Condition interaction remained non-significant.
The main effect of Toy Type was significant, more symbolic and intermediate symbolic play
occurred with doll plus junk than with doll figures as before. The Group x Toy Type interaction
was again significant, reflecting the same differential effect of Toy Type for the children with MLD
(F=21.37, df=l, P<O.Ol), but not for the children with autism, and the same effect of Group on
the doll plus junk materials (F=15.23, df=l , P<O.01). but not on the doll figures set. In this case
no other interactions were significant.
Functional play
The analysis of percentage time spent in functional play revealed a significant main effect of
Group; children with autism spent less of their time in functional play than did controls. There was
also a significant main effect of Toy Type, due to more functional play with doll figures than with
doll plus junk. Of the other effects only the Group x Toy Type interaction approached significance,
reflecting the combination of these two main effects, see graph 4.2.
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Graph 4.2. Percentage time spent in functional play: Group x Toy Type interaction
40
30
Mean%
Time
20
10
0
Doll Figures Doll + Junk
Toy Type
Manipulative play
The significant main effect of Group found in this analysis reflected the predicted higher
levels of manipulative play amongst the children with autism. There was a significant main effect
of Condition due to less manipulative play in elicited conditions, and there was a significant main
effect of Toy Type, as more manipulative play occurred with doll plus junk than with doll figures.
No interaction approached significance.
Nop/ay
The main effect of Group was significant; as predicted children with autism spent more time
'not playing' with the materials. The main effect of Condition was not significant, but there was a
significant main effect of Toy Type, there being more 'no play' with doll figures than with doll plus
junk materials. No interactions approached significance.
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Analysis of Number of Acts
The children with autism spent less time playing in general than the children with MLD,
significantly so with the doll figures. therefore any group differences in the number of acts
produced could simply be the result of the different lengths of time spent playing. To overcome
this disparity a measure of rate of act production was obtained - the number of acts produced was
divided by the time spent playing. (This measure is more appropriate than a percentage measure of,
for example. number of symbolic acts divided by total number of acts. If a child only produced
one act in total, which was symbolic, they would then gain a highly unrepresentative score of
100%). Mean rates of act production for each Group, Condition and Toy Type are given in table
4.5. The rates of act production for each child were analysed in the same way as percentage time
spent; the five categories of play type were used in three factor Anova analyses of the form
described above. In addition the total rate' of production of play acts (symbolic plus intermediate
plus functional plus manipulative) was analysed. The results of the various three factor Anova
analyses are summarised in table 4.6.
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Table4.5. Means of rates of act production for each play category and toy set (acts per minute).
Group
Children with Autism Children with MLD
Condition Condition
Play Type Materials Spontaneous Elicited Spontaneous Elicited
Total Play Doll Figures 3.31 5.99 3.56 7.18
Acts Doll +Junk 2.51 3.59 2.88 5.36
Symbolic Doll Figures 0.17 0.86 0.17 0.40
Doll + Junk 0.29 0.58 0.42 1.18
Symbolic + Doll Figures 0.42 1.24 0.48 1.04
Intermediate Doll +Junk 0.65 1.15 1.30 2.23
Functional Doll Figures 1.01 2.23 1.56 3.21
Doll +Junk 0.30 0.47 0.16 0.86
Manipulative Doll Figures 1.88 2.51 1.51 2.93
Doll +Junk 1.55 1.96 1.42 2.26
No Play Doll Figures 1.24 1.78 0.83 1.26
Doll + Junk 0.53 1.00 0.11 0.94
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Total Number Of Play Acts
All three main effects were significant. The main effect of Group reflected a lower rate of
total act production (symbolic, intermediate symbolic, functional and manipulative acts) amongst
the children with autism. The main effect of Condition was due greater act production under
elicited conditions, and the main effect of Toy Type reflected greater act production with the doll
figures than with the doll plus junk. No interactions were significant.
Symbolic Play
There was no significant main effect of Group, but again there was a significant main effect
of Condition, symbolic acts occuning more frequently under elicitation. The Group x Condition
interaction was not significant.
The main effect of Toy Type was not significant, though there was a trend for more symbolic
acts to be produced with the doll plus junk. The Group x Toy Type interaction was significant,
reflecting a significant effect of Toy Type for the children with MLD (F=27.93, df=l, P<O.Ol), but
not for the children with autism. Similarly there was a significant effect of Group on the doll plus
junk: materials (F=3.95, dfe l, P, I-tailed=O.03), but not on the doll figures set. See graph 4.3.
The significant Group x Condition X Toy Type interaction reflects the fact that children with MLD
alone experienced an effect of elicitation on their rate of symbolic act production with the doll plus
junk materials, but not with the doll figures. The Condition x Toy Type interaction was not
significant.
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Graph 4.3. Rate of symbolic act production: Group x Toy Type interaction
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Symbolic plus Intermediate Symbolic Play
Including intermediate symbolic acts in the analysis increases the significance of the main
effect of Group. In this case there is a trend towards an impaired rate of act production amongst the
children with autism. As before there was a significant main effect of Condition, due to the effect
of elicitation, but the Group x Condition interaction was not significant
In this case the main effect of Toy Type was significant, less symbolic and intermediate
symbolic acts were produced with the doll figures. The significant Group x Toy Type interaction
was, as before, due to a significant effect of Toy Type for the children with MLD alone (F=17 .57.
M-I, P<O.OI), and to a significant effect of Group on the doll plus junk materials alone (F=9.02,
M=l. P<O.Ol). These differential effects are perhaps clearer in this analysis. see graph 4.4 (cf.
graph 4.3). No other interactions were significant.
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Graph 4.4. Rate of symbolic plus intermediate act production: Group x Toy Type interaction
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Functional Play
The main effect of Group was not significant in this instance, though there was a clear trend
for a lower rate of functional acts amongst children with autism. The main effect of Condition
remained significant, again functional acts were produced more rapidly under elicitation. There
was also a significant main effect of Toy Type; functional acts were produced over four times more
frequently with the doll figures than with the doll plus junk. No interactions were significant.
Mtmipulative Play
The main effect of Group was not significant. The main effect of Condition was significant,
due to a greater frequency of manipulative acts production in elicited play conditions. The main
effect of Toy Type was not significant, but there was a trend for more rapid manipulative act
production with the doll figures. No interactions were significant.
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No Play
In this case the main effect of Group was significant, reflecting a greater rate of 'pausing'
amongst the children with autism than the children with MLD as expected. The main effect of
Condition was significant; surprisingly, pauses occurred more frequently under elicited conditions.
This may reflect the fact that elicited play prompted the children into producing more acts of all play
types, which were of relatively short duration, and consequently would be punctuated by more 'no
play' episodes. The main effect of Toy Type was significant; 'pauses' occurred more frequently
with the doll figures than with the doll plus junk. No interactions were significant.
4.24 Discussion
A clear pattern of results emerges from the two sets of analyses described above. Given the
size of each analysis, and the number of findings presented, this pattern may not be entirely
obvious, though it is worth noting that many of the effects described below can be picked out from
figures 4.1 and 4.2. The trends and effects obtained will therefore first be summarised, before
discussing their implications as regards the research questions outlined initially.
Comparing elicited with spontaneous play revealed that elicitation prompted children to spend
more of their time in symbolic (and intermediate symbolic play), at the expense of manipulative
play. There was no effect of Condition on time spent in functional or no play, though children did
not spend a great deal of time in these behaviours generally. Therefore, in terms of time spent in
each behaviour, elicitation was successful in shifting children away from manipulative behaviour,
to symbolic activity. However. intriguingly, children produced acts of each play type more rapidly
under elicited conditions, even showing more no play, or pauses, in elicited play. Elicitation
therefore also increased general levels of activity amongst children. Children produced all types of
acts more rapidly under elicitation. This is true even of manipulative and functional acts, but as
children do not spend longer in these forms of play under elicitation, these act must be shorter, and
must be punctuated with longer and more frequent symbolic acts. The observed increase in rate of
pausing must reflect this pattern of more frequent shorter acts; the more acts are produced the more
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children will stop in between them. Once again, if these pauses are short, it is possible for the rate
of pausing to increase in elicited conditions, while the time spent 'not playing' decreases. The
absence of any Group x Condition or Condition x Toy Type interactions indicates that these effects
are general and robust. All children, with both toy sets, show greater general activity under
elicitation, coupled with a specific shift away from time spent in manipulative play, to time spent
playing symbolically.
Clear and stable Toy Type effects were also seen. Children spent more of their time in
functional play, and in no play with the doll figures. More of these types of acts occurred with the
don figures also. In contrast more time was spent in symbolic (and intermediate symbolic) and in
manipulative play with the doll plus junk materials. There was also a greater rate of symbolic (plus
intermediate act production) with this set. Again there was a general absence of Group x Toy Type
interactions, reflecting the stability of these effects. It is worth noting that these results clearly
indicate that the doll plus junk materials is the more suitable toy set for the purposes of this
experiment. as it maximises symbolic play, and minimises functional play (compare figures 4.1 and
4.2). One of the potential problems of Lewis and Boucher's (1988) study was the high levels of
functional play amongst controls. They found that controls spent on average 30.5% of their time
playing functionally. In this case similar levels of functional play are seen with the doll figures (the
children with MLD spent 29.8% of spontaneous play in functional play with them), but controls
spent only 1.6% of spontaneous play time in functional activity with the doll plus junk. This toy
set at least succeeds in removing the potential problem of high levels of functional play in control
children. A doll plus junk objects would therefore appear to be an ideal choice of material for use
in any further investigations of symbolic play deficits. Conversely, doll figures might be an
appropriate toy set for a study of functional play deficits in autism (see graph 4.2).
Of crucial importance is the pattern of group differences which emerges from the findings.
Children with autism differed from controls in that they spent more of their time in manipulative
play and in no play. They did not produce manipulative acts more rapidly than controls, but did
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show a greater frequency of pausing. It was also suggested that children with autism might show
less functional play. This suggestion was confirmed; children with autism spent significantly less
time in functional play than did controls, and there was a trend for them to produce fewer functional
acts also.
Children with autism also spent less time in symbolic plus intermediate symbolic play. This
difference was not significant when symbolic play alone was examined, but the absence of a main
effect in this case can be explained by floor effects amongst controls. The children with MLD spent
approximately only 6% of their time in spontaneous symbolic play. These low levels are largely
due to the inclusion of the doll figures toy set, which as described above prompted relatively large
amounts of functional activity. This toy set appears to be subject to the problem that beset Lewis
and Boucher's experiment, namely that high levels of functional play reduce levels of symbolic
play, and mask a significant group effect. Including intermediate symbolic acts in the analysis
raises levels of control children's symbolic play sufficiently to allow a global group difference to be
seen. However, a Group effect does emerge from the symbolic play only analysis, when the doll
plus junk toy set alone is considered. As discussed, this toy set is not subject to the same problems
as the doll figures, and hence it allows a significant Group effect to be clearly seen (see graph 4.1).
Exactly similar effects are seen for symbolic play act production (graph 4.3). A fmal important
point is that the absence of any Group x Condition interaction indicates that Oroup effects persist
across both conditions.
Having outlined the pattern of results, it is now important to consider the implications of
these findings. This experiment was initially designed to provide answers to three important
research questions. These were:
1. Is the pretend play of children with autism impaired in spontaneous play conditions?
2. Is the pretend play of children with autism similarly impaired in structured (elicited and
instructed) play conditions?
3. Is the ability to produce emotional and social pretence specifically impaired in autism?
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Clearly the fact that the instructed play data were not analysed here, because of the
inappropriateness of the original instructions, means that this experiment is not able to address the
third of these questions, and can only provide a partial answer to the second one, by comparing
performance in the elicited condition with that observed in spontaneous play. Experiment 2,
described below, fills these gaps with a more appropriate examination of instructed symbolic play
performance.
It is clear that the answer to question 1 is a firm 'yes'; children with autism do show
significantly less symbolic play than matched controls in spontaneous conditions. Though the
analysis of percentage time spent in symbolic play alone does not reveal a significant main effect of
Group, this reflects artificially low levels of symbolic play amongst controls with the doll figures
toy set. When the more appropriate doll plus junk toy set is considered a significant impainnent
emerges. Similarly removing floor effect in controls by including intermediate symbolic play in the
analysis allows the impairment to be seen.
To the extent that it addresses the second question, this experiment also indicates that children
with autism's ability to produce symbolic play is also impaired in structured conditions. There is
no suggestion of a Group x Condition interaction such as would indicate that the impainnent seen
in the children with autism does not persist into elicited play. In fact, if anything, there is a
suggestion that the symbolic play of controls benefits more from elicitation. This is shown by the
significant Group x Condition x Toy Type interactions which emerged from the symbolic play
percentage time and rate of act productions analyses, and which suggest that there is a differential
effect of elicitation upon the symbolic play of the children with MLD with the doll plus junk toy set.
While this would appear, at first sight, to be a blow for performance hypotheses, the absence of the
Group x Condition interaction which these accounts predict is perhaps not necessarily surprising.
The procedural difference between the spontaneous play and the elicited play conditions in this
experiment was quite slight. In both conditions the child sat at a table with the experimenter and
was encouraged to play with the toys on the table. In the free play condition further encouragement
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to play was given if the child turned to the experimenter for guidance. In the elicited play condition
prompts to continue playing were given if the child stopped playing. Thus, although nominally
assessing spontaneous play the 'free' play condition is, in fact, quite structured. In addition, the
elicited condition is not as structured as it could be by, for example, requiring children to carry out
instructed play acts. These criticisms of the elicited play conditions employed heighten the
importance of properly investigating performance under highly structured play conditions by
assessing instructed play (see Experiment 2).
These results confmn that children with autism do produce less spontaneous symbolic play
than matched controls. It also indicates why Lewis and Boucher failed to find such an impairment
in their (1988) study, confirming that too high levels of functional play amongst controls can mask
a symbolic play deficit. The use of the doll plus junk toy set in particular was responsible for
lowering levels of functional play in this instance, and this in tum can explain why this study
differed further from Lewis and Boucher's in that it showed an elicited symbolic play deficit
amongst the children with autism, and a clear functional play deficit also. Another possible reason
for these discrepancies is that Lewis and Boucher's group of children with autism had a verbal
mental age of 69 months. It is possible that the amount of symbolic play produced by this group
was sufficient to compound the floor effects amongst controls caused by the toys available. The
mean verbal mental age of the children with autism employed in this study was approximately 49
months!. That a clearer deficit emerged in this instance could be taken to suggest that Lewis and
Boucher's sample were of an inappropriately high developmental level for an adequate test of a
performance account of pretend play difficulties in autism (Baron-Cohen, 1989d). However, it
1In fact the mean verbal mental age of this group is certainly lower than this value. Two children with
autism were unavailable for subsequent testing on the BPVS, and these children were the least developmentally able
of &he group.
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would seem rather that it was the materials employed in the original study that were primarily
responsible for the pattern of results obtained.
In summary, this Experiment provides a fum answer to the first research question outlined
initially, indicating that children with autism do suffer from impaired production of spontaneous
symbolic play. The results also show that this deficit persists into the slightly more structured
elicited play condition. However it remains to determine whether children with autism are impaired
in their production of symbolic play in' highly structured conditions.
4.3 Experiment 2
4.31 Introduction
As instructed play abilities were not properly tested in Experiment 1, the study was only able
to provide a partial answer to the second of the three important research questions under
consideration, and failed to address the third of these questions. The aim of this second experiment
was simply to clear up these loose ends by adequately assessing children with autism's ability to
carry out instructed pretence.
To ensure that, in this case, the methodology employed was valid, all the instructions used
were carefully designed to require a symbolic response. It was felt that none could be carried out
appropriately using a functional play act. Further, given the doll plus junk toy set's success in
reducing functional play in Experiment 1, a similar set of materials were employed in this instance.
Baron-Cohen's (1990) argument about the possibility of children guessing responses to
instrUctions to pretend was countered by ensuring that children were never presented with a single
prop for object substitution. Where object substitution was required a number of props were
always presented, and an appropriate choice of prop was required. Finally, to examine potential
emotional and social symbolic play deficits (Harris, 1989a), specific instructions of these types
were included.
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4.32 Method
Participants
The same two groups of participants who took part in Experiment 1 participated in
Experiment 2, with the addition of one extra matched pair of children. The groups therefore
consisted of 15 children each (see table 4.7 for details). The autistic group contained 3 girls and 12
boys while the MLD group included 5 girls and 10 boys. As before the groups were matched
individually on the basis of their scores on the Derbyshire Language Scale, though BPVS scores
are again given. The two groups did not differ significantly in their chronological ages (P=0.80, t-
test), or BPVS scores (P=O.74,Hest).
Table4.7. Experiment 2: Details of participants.
Group n BPVS Score CA DLSLevel
(months) (months)
Children with 15 mean 48.2* 98.1 -
Autism SD 25.0 28.4 -
range 13-89 47-147 2:4-10:22
,
Children with 14 45.4#
.
96.0mean -
MID SD 18.7 12.6 -
range 27-93 75-121 2:4-10:22
*Two of the children with autism were unavailable for BPVS testing.
#One of the children with MLD was unavailable for BPVS testing.
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Materials
In all cases a dolls house figure was available to the children. The other materials used varied
with the type of instructions: physical, social and emotional. For physical instructions some of the
junk objects employed in Experiment 1 were used again; these were a piece of tissue, a ball of blu-
tac, a plastic rod, a picture hook, a freezer bag tie and a small plastic football adapter. For 'social'
instructions a dolls house 'mother' figure and a playmobile 'baby' figure were presented along with
the usual 'child' figure. The materials used for 'emotional' instructions were a playmobile dog, a
.present (matchbox covered in wrapping paper) and a playmobile 'boy' figure.
Procedure
Each child was given twelve instructions, four physical, four social and four emotional. The
instructions are shown in table 4.8. The instructions themselves were designed to elicit symbolic
object substitution using these objects, and the non-functional nature of these materials ensured that
any object substitution they appeared to be involved in could be assumed to constitute pretence. In
order to ensure that appropriate responses to the social questions would necessarily involve
pretence, another figure was presented in order to allow for the 'passage' of imaginary objects
between the two actors.
The instructions were given one set at a time, but tbe order of presentation of each set was
systematically varied. The order of presentation of the four instructions within each set was also
randomised.
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Table 4.8. Instructions used
InstruCtion Type Instructions
Make the boy jump over a puddle
Physical Make the boy sit on a chair
Make the boy throw a stone
Make the boy eat a biscuit
Show me how mummy feeds the baby
Social Show me how mummy gives the boy a sweet
Show me how the boy throws a ball to mummy
Show me how the boy looks at a book with mummy
Show me how the boy can be scared of the doS[
Bmotional Show me how the boy can be excited about the present
Show me how the boy can be sad about tosina the present
Show me how the boy can be angry with someone
Response Coding Scheme
The responses to each instruction were divided into three categories: pass, intermediate pass
and fail. To pass the child had to perform an appropriate act that clearly involved pretence.
Intermediate passes were those which did not clearly involve pretence or were not obviously
appropriate to the instruction. If the child made an inappropriate response, or offered no response
at all this was coded as a fail. The criteria used for rating each set of responses are given in table
4.9.
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Table 4.9. Scoring criteria
Instruction Type Rating Criteria
Pass Clear, appropriate action with object substitution
Physical Intermediate Appropriate action without use of an object
Fail Inappropriate or no action
Pass Appropriate action with both figures employed
Social Intermediate Unclear use of both figures
Fail Only one figure used; inappropriate or no action
Pass Clear acting out of emotion or appropriate vocalisation
Emotional Intennediate Stating, e.g. "He's sad!"; unclear action
Fail Inappropriate or no action
Inter-rater reliability was obtained by an independent observer rating four randomly chosen
videotaped sessions, two from each group of children, using the category definitions outlined
above. The inter-rater reliability obtained was satisfactory (Cohen's Kappa = 0.72).
4.33 Results
Responses to the three types of instructions were analysed using two factor Anovas; the
factors being Group (children with autism or MLD; repeated measures) and Instruction Type
(Physical, social or emotional; repeated measures). Two separate analyses were performed, one on
the total number of pass responses, the other on the total number of passes plus intermediate
passes. The mean number of responses in each category for each instruction type are given in table
4.10, and are also shown in graph 4.5.
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Table 4.10. Mean number of responses
Group
Response Type Instruction Type Children with Children with MLD
Autism
Physical 2.80 2.13
Passes Social 2.67 2.07
Emotional 1.13 1.40
Passes plus Physical 3.33 3.27
Intennediate passes Social 2.80 2.93
Emotional 1.93 2.00
.~.. ...
Graph 4.5. Group performances by Instruction Type
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Number of passes
The analysis of number of pass responses yielded a significant main effect of Instruction
Type (F=8.92, df=2, P<O.Ol). Emotional instructions were significantly harder to pass than
physical or social ones (P<O.Ol; Tukey test). The main effect of Group was not significant
(F=1.69, df=l, P=O.21), and in fact performance was superior amongst the children with autism
(hence the use of 2-tailed P values), see table 4.1O/graph 4.5. There was no significant Group x
Instruction Type interaction (F=1.49, df=2, P=O.24).
Number of passes and intermediate passes
Including intermediate passes in the analysis made no difference to the form of the results.
Again there was a significant main effect of Instruction Type (F=14.62, df=2, P<O.Ol), due to less
success on the emotional instructions as before (P<O.Ol; Tukey test). The main effect of Group
(F=O.03, df=l , P=O.86) and the Group x Instruction Type interaction (F=O.08, df=2, P=O.92)
were not significant.
4.34 Discussion
The results of this second experiment show that the children with autism were not impaired in
their ability to carry out instructed pretend acts, relative to the matched control group. In fact when
passes alone are analysed the children with autism perform at a (non-significantly) higher level than
the MLD children. This perhaps surprising finding is due to the MLD children producing more
intermediate pass responses. When intermediate as well as clear passes are considered, there is
essentially no difference in the performance of the two groups on any of the three types of
instruction. The similarity in performance of the two groups cannot be explained in terms of
'pessing' responses; participants were forced to make an appropriate choice of prop from the
selection before them. These results strongly suggest that the pretend play of children with autism
is not impaired in highly structured situations.
The findings also appear to provide a clear answer to the question of whether children with
autism have particular difficulties in producing social and emotional pretend play. The absence of
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Group x Instruction Type interactions indicate that they do not have particular problems with these
forms of pretence, at least not under highly structured conditions. This finding is consistent with
the notion that emotion comprehension deficits are not seen in groups of autism matched to controls
for verbal mental age, as are the children in this study (Ozonoff, Pennington & Rogers, 1990). It
is also in line with suggestions that children with autism may be unimpaired in their recognition of
simple emotions, but deficient in their understanding of more complex emotions such as pride and
embarrassment (Capps, Yirmiya & Sigman, 1992). Baron-Cohen (1991b) has shown that children
with autism are not impaired in their understanding of situations and desires as causes of emotion in
the way that they are when beliefs are involved. The emotions acted out in this experiment are
relatively simple ones, and do appear to be situational or desire-based. Similarly Baron-Cohen
(1991c) has demonstrated that children with autism are unimpaired relative to controls in their
ability to recognise basic social relationships and social reciprocity. It seems likely that this low-
level social understanding provides the reason for the unimpaired performance on the relatively
simple social instructions employed here.
It may be suggested that instructed play is not a test of pretend playability but rather a test of
language comprehension, and that since language matched groups were used in the present study
unimpaired performance on an instructed play task was a foregone conclusion. However this
would only be true if the psychological mechanisms underlying language acquisition and pretend
play were identical, which they clearly are not. At the very least a child has to be able to select and
substitute a lump of blu-tac for a toy ball, or a wrapped matchbox for a present, and enact an
appropriate scenario utilising the substitute objects, over and above understanding the instructions
"Show me how the boy throws a ball to Mummy" I "Show me how the boy can be sad about losing
the present". Instructed play is maximally structured in that it does everything for the child except
ten him or her how to carry out the pretence: it puts strong pressure on the child to play, it provides
an idea for play, but it does not indicate how the instruction should be carried out with the available
materials.
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Even if language comprehension and carrying out a pretend play instruction used the same
psychological mechanisms, ensuring that children with autism carry out instructed playas
successfully as language matched controls. the impaired performance of children with autism in
spontaneOus play situations would still need to be explained.
4.35 A Comparison Of Performance Across Experiments 1 And 2
Inorder to compare children's performance on instructed play in this experiment with their
performance on the free play test carried out in Experiment 1, the scores obtained by matched pairs
ofparticipants in both experiments (excluding the pair of children who only took part in experiment
2) were compared. For Experiment 1 the percentage time spent in symbolic plus intermediate
symbolic play across both play conditions was taken as a measure of performance. For Experiment
2 the total number of passes and intermediate passes for each instruction type were compared. In
ea<;h .case pairs of children were divided on the basis of whether the child with autism had
performed as well, or better than their matched control, or whether they had performed less well.
'The distributions obtained are shown in table 4.11, and were found to be significantly different
(Chi2.4.44, df=I, P=O.04), the children with autism improving significantly more over the two
conditions than did controls.
Table 4.11.Comparison of matched pairs' performance across experiments 1 and 2
Spontaneous & Instructed
Elicited Play Play
Child with autism performs as well or 3 9 12
better than control
Child with autism performs less well than 11 6 17
control
14 15 29
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4.4 Conclusions
Three research questions were identified at the beginning of this chapter. These were:
1. Is the pretend play of children with autism impaired in spontaneous play conditions?
2. Is the pretend play of children with autism similarly impaired in structured (elicited and
instructed) play conditions?
3. Is the ability to produce emotional and social pretence specifically impaired in autism?
Experiment 1 answered the first of these questions, showing that children with autism spent
less time playing symbolically than did matched controls in spontaneous play conditions, and also
produced a lower level of symbolic acts. It also attempted to address the second question, but in
this case the implications of the various findings were less clear. There was no doubt that children
with autism were significantly impaired in the amount of time they spent in symbolic play under
elicited conditions. However, the degree of structure in what were essentially conditions of weak
elicitation differed little from that in fairly constrained 'spontaneous' conditions. In retrospect this
was unfortunate, and means that a comparison of spontaneous and elicited play is not a strong test
of performance and competence predictions as it might be.
Experiment 2 was able to provide a stronger test, as it tested instructed play. The results of
this experiment provide a clearer answer to the second research question, it appears that children
with autism are not impaired in their production of symbolic play under highly structured
conditions. It also addressed the third question and indicated that producing emotional and social
pretence is not particularly problematic for children with autism.
These answers go some way towards separating performance and competence explanations
of children with autism's characteristic difficulties in pretence. Recall that both sets ofhypotbeses
predict impaired spontaneous pretend play in autism. This was found in Experiment 1. However a
competence deficit account predicts impaired structured pretence. while a performance account
predicts unimpaired structured pretend play. The results of the instructed play tests in Experiment 2
indicate that highly structured pretend play is not impaired in autism. In addition the comparison of
Chapter 4 155
perfonnance in these instructed tasks with the results of the free play assessment in Experiment 1
indicate that children with autism benefit significantly more than language matched controls from
being required to produce pretend play in a highly structured situation (see Table 4.11). This
fmding is striking in view of the fact that the 'free' play situation used in Experiment 1 was in effect
already moderately structured. These findings therefore generally support the hypothesis that the
lack of spontaneous pretend play regularly observed in children with autism relative to language
matched controls does not result from a competence deficit.
Chapter 5
Comprehension Of Pretence
5.1 Introduction
Experiments 1 and 2, described in chapter 4, provided clear evidence of the expected deficit
of impaired spontaneous pretend play in autism. They also provided some evidence against a
competence explanation of this deficit, in that they indicated that instructed pretend play was
unimpaired in autism. However this evidence was not as strong as it might have been. In
particular, elicited pretend play, rather than being clearly unimpaired, was found to be significantly
impaired. The failure to observe unimpaired elicited pretend play, as predicted by performance
accounts, could be explained in terms of the relatively weak structure of the elicited conditions, (see
previous chapter). However, it would be desirable to provide further support for a performance
deficit, so as to be able to confidently progress to attempting to identify what form such a deficit
might take. The purpose of Experiment 3 was to look further into the question of competence and
performance to see if this support would be forthcoming.
5.2 Experiment 3
5.21 Introduction
The aim of the present experiment was to clarify the question of competence or performance
deficits in pretend play in autism by attempting to tap directly into any pretend capabilities that
might be present in children with autism. One thing that all studies of pretend play in autism have
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incommon is the fact that they have all investigated production of pretend play. If children with
autism do indeed have intact competencies for pretence that they find difficult to exhibit this may
Bot be the best way to approach an assessment of these abilities. A more suitable strategy would be
to investigate these children's understanding of pretence, thereby removing any problems that
miabt be associated with production itself.
Harris and Kavanaugh (1993) have recently developed a method of assessing comprehension
of pretend acts in young children (see subsection 1.24). With the aid of a 'Naughty Teddy' hand
puppet, they acted out scenarios in which pretend substances were deposited on an unfortunate toy
animal, and assessed understanding of pretence by questioning the children about the nature and
consequences of Naughty Teddy's actions. Children as young as 3 years of age found this task
relatively easy. Given the simplicity of this task it was decided that it would be an appropriate way
in which to assess comprehension of pretence in children with autism. This study was designed
with the help of Paul Harris, and builds on Harris and Kavanaugh's procedure.
5.22 Method
partidpanls
Groups of children with autism and of children with MLD were again assessed in this study.
The groups consisted of 12 children each, all drawn from the groups employed previously in
Experiment 2 (see table 5.1 for details). The autistic group contained 2 girls and 10 boys while the
MW group included 5 girls and 7 boys. As before the groups were matched individually on the
basis of their scores on the Derbyshire Language Scale. though BPVS scores are again given. The
twO groups did not differ significantly in their chronological ages (p-G.Sl, t-test), or BPVS scores
(P-O.90. t-test),
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Table5.1. Experiment 3: Details of participants.
Group n BPVS Score CA DLS Level
(months) (months)
Children with 12 mean 48.7 92.8 -
Autism SD 24.5 26.6 -
range 22-89 47-135 2:11-10:22
Children with 12 mean 49.9* 98.4 -
N1ID SD 20.1 12.2 -
range 30-93 84-125 2:11-10:22
.One of the children with MLD was unavailable for BPVS testing
MateriIJls
The various play episodes all involved the pouring or tipping of a substance from an
appropriate container (literally or non-literally) onto a target figure. (See below for full details).
Two target figures were used. a dog and a horse. These were playmobile figures and were both
brown in colour. The acts themselves were carried out by 'Naughty Teddy', a Sooty glove puppet.
The containers used were orange squash bottles, tea-pots, flour bags, honey-pots, toothpaste tubes
and squeezy tomato ketchup bottles. Two of each type of container were employed, one containing
the appropriate substance, one empty.
Procedure
Testing was carried out in a single session. Children were assessed individually, usually in a
quiet room with only the experimenter present. However in three cases it was not possible to take
the children to another room and these children were tested in a quiet corner of their classroom.
Tbese sessions were videotaped for later analysis. The experiment itself consisted of six play
episodes (see table 5.2). As mentioned above, each episode involved Naughty Teddy pouring or
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tipping a substance onto a target animal. The set of episodes were presented twice, once in pretend
mode where the containers used were empty, and once in literal mode where the containers held the
appropriate substance, which was actually poured over the target. A different target animal was
used in each set of episodes. The order of presentation was varied, half of each group receiving
pretend episodes first, the other half receiving literal episodes ftrst. In addition the order of
presentation of the six.episodes ineach set was randomized. The literal mode was included in the
experiment to test children's ability to name the substances involved and to describe the results of
Naughty Teddy's actions. It would obviously be important to show that if one group performed
poorly on the pretend episodes then this was not simply due to a lack of appropriate vocabulary.
After each play act three questions were asked. The first was a Substance question, "What
did NaUghty Teddy put on the (target's) head?". This question was designed to test children's
ability to comprehend the pretend act on the simple level of identifying the pretend substance
poured from the container. The second was an Outcome question which varied depending on the
substance used (see table 5.2). The purpose of the Outcome questions was to test a more complex
level of understanding, specifically children's ability to understand the pretend consequences of the
pretend act. Outcome questions took the form of a forced choice. for example in Bpisode A where
onnge is poured on the target, children were asked "Is the (target) wet or dry now?". The forced
choice of alternatives was designed so that in the pretend mode children were given a choice
between the pretend state of affairs (e.g. wet) and the target's literal physical state (e.g. dry). In
episodes E and F this choice was based on colour, it was therefore important that both target
animals were brown. Finally aMode forced choice question was asked, "Did Naughty Teddy put
real (substance) on the (target) or only pretend (substance)?". The purpose of the Mode questions
was to test children's ability to reflect on the pretend status of the acts presented to them.
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Table 5.2. Action, substance, container and Outcome question in the six play episodes
Episode Action Substance Container Outcome Question
A Poured Orange Bottle Wet/Dry
B Poured Tea Tea pot Hot/Cold
C Poured Flour Bag Messy/Clean
D Poured Honey Pot StickylDry
E Squirted Toothpaste Tube White/Brown
F Squirted Ketchup Bottle RedIBrown
It was felt that if children failed to understand the forced choice questions, that they might
simply resort to echoing the last of the two alternatives offered. In order to prevent this strategy
allowing children to achieve a perfect score, the structure of these questions was varied so that in
three episodes the appropriate pretend answer came first while in the other three it came second. In
the case of the Outcome forced choice questions the appropriate pretend alternatives were second in
episodes B, C and F. In the case of the Mode questions the appropriate pretend choices were
second for episodes A, C and E.
The children's answers to the three questions posed following each episode were divided into
three categories; Correct, Incorrect or No response. A Substance answer was rated as Correct if
acceptably close to the actual substance, for example "Jam" was accepted for Honey (see table 5.3
for a list of acceptable Substance responses). It should be noted that neither response to an
Outcome question following a pretend episode can be classed as being incorrect as such, a child
who answers that the target is "dry" after having pretend orange poured over it is simply reponing
the literal state of the target. However for the purpose of this investigation the pretend alternative
was classed as being 'correct'. The total number of correct responses to each of the three question
types (max. 6) was recorded for both the pretend and the literal episodes.
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Table 5.3. Accepted Substance Responses
Episode Accepted Responses
A Orange, Juice, Water
B Tea, Coffee, Water
C Flour, Sugar, Powder
D Honey, Jam, Marmalade
E Toothpaste
F Ketchup, Sauce
5.28 Results
The mean number of correct responses given by each group, for each episode mode, and for
each of the three test questions are shown in table 5.4 below. The results were analysed separately
for each of the three question types; in each case a four factor Anova design was employed.
Factors were Group (Children with Autism or with MLD), Order of presentation (Literal first or
Pretend first), Mode (Literal or Pretend) and Episode (A, B, C, D, E or F), The Order factor was
included because it was suspected that children receiving the pretend episodes second would
perform better on the pretend questions than those receiving them first, simply because they
remembered the responses they had given in the preceding literal episodes. The Group and Order
factors were independent", repeated measures were taken on the Mode and Episode factors. The
results of the three separate analyses are summarised in table 5.5.
1It was not possible to employ repeated measures on the Group factor in this instance, as there were cases
when a child's individual match in the other group did not receive the same order of presentation of conditions.
Further, matches did not receive the same order of Episodes and therefore can only be treated as independent.
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Table 5.4. Mean number of correct responses by group, for literal and pretend test questions.
Literal Episodes Pretend Episodes.
Group Substance Q OutcomeQ ModeQ Substance Q OutcomeQ ModeQ
Autism 5.00 4.50 3.75 3.50 3.00 3.00
lvtLD 5.17 4.58 3.83 4.58 3.17 3.33
Table 55. Results of 4 Factor Anova Analyses for each Question Type
Substance Q. Outcome Q. Mode Q.
Source df F P F P F P
Group (0) 1 0.70 0.41 0.04 0.85 0.093 0.76
Order(O) 1 1.29 0.27 2.90 0.10 4.29 0.05
GxO 1 0.39 0.54 0.03 0.86 1.48 0.24
Mode(M) 1 19.15 <0.01 15.61 <0.01 2.08 0.16
GxM 1 3.71 0.07 0.01 0.91 0.08 0.78
0xM 1 0.50 0.49 3.19 0.09 0.31 0.58
GxOxM 1 0.42 0.52 3.19 0.09 0.00 0.99
Episode (E) 5 0.22 0.95 3.43 <0.01 1.36 0.24
GxE 5 0.38 0.86 1.26 0.29 1.74 0.13
OXE 5 1.83 0.11 0.90 0.48 1.27 0.28
GxOxE 5 1.26 0.29 1.66 0.15 0.99 0.43
MxE 5 0.31 0.91 0.99 0.43 12.40 <0.01
GxMxE 5 0.49 0.78 0.55 0.74 0.38 0.86
0xMxE 5 1.70 0.14 0.52 0.76 0.40 0.85
GxOxMxE 5 1.21 0.31 1.52 0.19 0.12 0.99
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Substance Question
The analysis of number of correct responses to the Substance questions, "What did Naughty
Teddy put on the (target's) head?", revealed a significant main effect of Mode, fewer correct
responses were given to Substance questions following pretend episodes than those following
literal episodes. The main effect of Group was not significant, but the Group x Mode interaction
approached significance. Post hoc tests revealed that this reflected differential effects of Mode on
the two groups (F=19.86, df=l, P<O.01, children with autism; F=3.00, df=l , P=O.10for children
with MW). It should be noted however that the effect of Group on number of correct responses
. given in the pretend mode was not significant (F=1.62, df=l, P=O.22). The mean number of
correct responses to the Substance questions for each group and mode are shown below in graph
5.1.
Graph 5.1. Mean number of correct Substance responses for each group and episode mode.
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The main effect of Order of presentation of episodes was not significant, in fact there was a
trend for performance on the pretend Substance questions to be better when the pretend episodes
preceded the literal ones rather than vice-versa (mean responses: 4.40 pretend then literal, 3.61
literal then pretend) (see graph 5.2). There was also no main effect of Episode, and no other
significant interactions.
Graph 5.2. Effect of Order of presentation on responses to Substance questions, for each group
and mode.
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Outcome Question
Analysis of the number of correct responses to the Outcome questions e.g. "Is the (target)
wet or dry now?" again revealed a significant effect of Mode due to fewer correct answers to
OutcOme questions following pretend episodes. There was no significant main effect of Group and
no significant Group x Mode interaction. The mean number of correct responses for each group
and mode are shown below in graph 5.3.
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Graph 53. Mean number of correct Outcome responses for each group and episode mode.
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The main effect of Order of presentation of episodes approached significance. as did the
Order x Mode and Group x Order x Mode interactions. These trends reflect an effect of Order on
performance in the pretend mode; as before performance on the pretend questions tended to be
better when the pretend episodes preceded the literal ones (mean responses: 4.00 pretend then
literal. 2.31 literal then pretend). Interestingly. the effect of Mode (poorer performance in the
pretend mode in general) was not apparent within the MLD group when the pretend questions
preceded the literal ones. These potentially confusing trends are best illustrated graphically. see
graph 5.4.
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Graph 5.4. Effect of Order of presentation on responses to Outcome questions. for each group and
mode.
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In this case the main effect of Episode was significant. This was due to significantly higher
scores in Episode B (pouring tea) than in Episodes E (squeezing toothpaste) and A (pouring
orange). (P<O.OI, <0.05 respectively; Tukey tests).
It should be remembered that the Outcome question took the fonn of a forced choice. The
order of the two options in the choice, literal outcome and pretend outcome. were alternated to
ensure that a strategy of simply repeating either the first or the second alternative would not result in
a score of 6 correct. However it is still the case that children who had no understanding of the
consequences of the pretend act, and who resorted to guessing, would score 3 out of 6 simply by
chance. As both groups are scoring at around this level on the pretend Outcome questions (see
table 5.3, graph 5.3) it could be argued that this cannot be taken as a reliable indication of
comprehension abilities in either group. Indeed if a score of 3 represented floor performance it is
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possible that a real disparity in ability that exists between the groups would be hidden because the
less able group adopted a guessing strategy.
It was predicted that children might simply echo the second of the forced choices offered.
The effect of Episode found in the analysis of responses to the Outcome questions indicates that
this form of strategic guessing was occurring. The design of the experiment was such that the
order of the forced choice for each episode remains the same for both modes, though the order is
varied between episodes. A correct response in the literal mode (e.g. "wet") is also correct in the
pretend mode. Therefore if children from either group consistently adopted a strategy of repeating
the second of the choices offered, a significant Episode effect would be found. Those episodes
with the correct answer placed second (here episodes B, C and F) would produce higher scores
than the three episodes with the incorrect attribution second (episodes A, D and E). The Episode
effect found reflects exactly this pattern of results, see graph 5.5. Therefore, though the effect of
guessing appears limited in the literal mode, it cannot be ignored in the pretend mode. The lack of
any Group x Episode interaction indicates that both groups were equally subject to this effect.
Graph 5.5. Effect of Episode on response to Outcome questions, for each mode (all groups)
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Mode Question
The analysis of correct responses to the final question "Did Teddy put real (substance) on the
(target) or only pretend (substance)?" revealed no significant effects of Group or, in contrast to the
previous two questions, of Mode, though there was a tendency for performance to be worse in the
pretend mode. There was no significant Group x Mode interaction. The mean number of correct
responses for each group and episode mode are shown in graph 5.6.
Graph 5.6. Mean number of correct Mode responses for each group and mode.
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In this case the effect of Order of presentation was significant; children who received the
pretend episodes first performed better than those receiving the literal episodes first (see graph 5.7).
The effect of Episode was not significant, but there was a significant Mode x Episode interaction
(See explanation below). No other interactions approached significance.
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Graph 5.7. Effect of Order of presentation on responses to Mode questions. for each group and
mode.
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It was my firm impression that both groups of children had some trouble in understanding
what was required by this particular question. It also seemed clear that children were often
auessing their responses (graph 5.6 shows that scores deviate little from the chance value of three).
It appeared that children were again employing an echolalic guessing strategy. As with the
OutcOme question the position of the forced-choice alternatives in the question structure was
controlled for, however in this case a correct answer in the literal mode (e.g. "real orange")
becomes incorrect in the pretend mode. and vice versa. In Episodes B, D and F the 'real'
alternative came second, in Episodes A, C and E the 'pretend' alternative was second. Children
responding echola1ically would therefore be correct on Episodes B, D and F and incorrect on
Episodes A, C and E in the literal mode. This pattern would be reversed in the pretend mode.
Graph 5.8 shows that this reversal of the predicted pattern of results is exactly what emerged, and
explains the Episode x Mode interaction found. Again the absence of a significant Group x
Episode x Mode interaction indicates that both groups are equally reduced to guessing.
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Graph S.B. Effect of Episode on response to Mode questions, for each mode (groups combined)
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5.24 Initial Discussion
The aim of this experiment was to provide evidence to support and strengthen, or to
contradict and weaken, the findings of Experiments 1 and 2. Specifically it was intended that by
focusing on comprehension, rather than production of pretence, this study would tap directly into
underlying abilities for pretence, thereby removing possible performance difficulties. This allows
us to predict that if children with autism do indeed suffer from some form of performance deficit,
then there should be no difference between the groups in this study. Conversely if pretend play is
impaired as the result of a competence deficit, then the manipulations in this experiment can do
nothing to improve the performance of those participants with autism, and their understanding of
pretence will be shown to be impaired.
What evidence emerges from the experiment to separate these two predictions? The first
point is that two of the three experimental questions are clearly 'too hard' for both sets of children.
Though it does appear that the outcome question is less difficult than the mode question. there is
good evidence to suggest that an echolalic strategy is being employed by a number of children in
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each group. The similar patterns of performance of the two groups on these questions cannot
therefore be taken as support for a performance deficit in pretend play in autism, though the
children with MLD are equally as likely to guess their responses as the children with autism.
The only question which can therefore shed light on the question of performance or
competence is the Substance question, and here the results are equivocal. The experiment
necessarily included a test of participants' abilities to name the substances involved. Table 5.4 (and
graph 5.1) indicate that both groups were equally able to describe the real substances used. This is
an important result, as it implies that any impairment in either group in the pretend episodes cannot
be attributed to a lack of appropriate vocabulary. Despite having, in a sense, controlled for these
factors, we must still concentrate on comparing performance in the pretend mode of presentation.
While no Group effect emerged from the analysis, it is really a Group x Mode interaction, reflecting
impaired pretend but not literal comprehension, that would prove more interesting.
This interaction is clearly close to significant, and had a one-tailed test been employed (and
many would argue for a predicted impairment in the group of children with autism) significance
would be reached. It should be recalled that post-hoc examination of effects revealed that this
interaction was not due to significantly poorer performance amongst the group of children with
autism on the pretend Substance questions (P=O.22, 2-tailed), but the result of a greater effect of
Mode on this group. In other words the children with autism suffered more from the change from
literal to pretend episodes than the children with MLD. While it might be stretching a point to cite
this result as support for unimpaired comprehension of pretence in autism, the mean score of 3.50
amongst the children with autism does reflect substantial competence, and does not seem consistent
with a global inability to comprehend pretence. In no cases did the children with autism answer
literally, by claiming for example that the bottle, or the bag, had been put on the target's head. It
does seem that they were answering in pretend terms when they were able to. It cannot be argued
that those children with autism who received the pretend mode of presentation second were
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succeeding in this mode by simply echoing responses made in the literal mode. because of the
absence of an Order effect (and indeed a tendency for the opposite pattern to occur).
To conclude. the validity of the study described here is undermined by the inability of both
groups of participants to understand the Outcome and Mode questions. The Substance question
alone does not provide enough information to separate the competence and performance accounts.
and the study therefore fails to achieve its stated aim.
5.25 A Retest
There are essentially two weaknesses of Experiment 3. as described above. Firstly the
Outcome and Mode questions were too difficult for the participant groups. A second problem was
that results of the Substance question analysis were not entirely clear. a Group x Mode interaction
approached significance. Two courses of action presented themselves in the light of these
problems, the first was to redesign the experiment in an effort to simplify the questions involved,
the second was to expand the initial test and to use the same methodology with developmentally
more able children. The later option was adopted, as it seemed unlikely that simpler questions than
those already employed could be devised without weakening the experiment's power to test true
comprehension of pretence. As well as testing developmentally older children it was decided that
the size of the groups should be enlarged in the hope that equivocal results such as the Substance
question Group x Mode interaction would be clarified one way or the other. It was also decided to
employ a control group of normal children in the retest The extent of guessing in the initial run of
the experiment was surprising in the light of Harris and Kavanaugh's (1993) work, so including a
normal control group might indicate whether guessing reflected a particularly difficult procedure, or
the use of developmentally disabled children.
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5.26 Method 2
participants
The number of children with autism assessed in the retest of Experiment 3 was increased to
twenty four. This group consisted of 5 girls and 19 boys. As before, all the children met the
criteria for autism laid down by Wing and Gould (1979) and more recently GiUberg (1990b),
namely the characteristic triad of impaired language development and use, impoverished social
interaCtion and repetitive and stereotyped behaviour.
In addition the experiment included three other participant groups. These included a group of
children with moderate learning difficulties (MLD) and a group of normal mainstream school
children, both individually matched to the children with autism on the basis of receptive verbal
mental age as measured on the British Picture Vocabulary Test. A fourth group was made up of
children with moderate learning difficulties individually matched to children with autism by
expressive verbal mental age as measured by the Renfrew Action Picture Test (1972). Eleven of
the children with MLD were included in both matching groups, though there were only three cases
when a child with MID matched the same child with autism on both language measures
Two groups of children with MLD were included because of possible problems in matching
children with autism on either language test alone. The BPVS measures vocabulary
comprehension, which is often more advanced than other aspects of language in autism (Paul,
1987), and using the BPVS may therefore selectively disadvantage children with autism (Lewis &
Boucher, 1988, see also subsection 3.15). Conversely the Action Picture Test (APT) requires a
degree of inferential understanding; an ability which is known to be impaired in autism. Matching
on this test may selectively advantage children with autism (as noted in subsection 3.1S).
Consequently it is argued that equating participant groups using the BPVS provides a strong test of
hypotheses predicting unimpaired performance in children with autism, whereas use of the APT
provides a strong test of hypotheses predicting impaired performance. Details of the participant
JI'Oups are given in table 5.6.
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The mean chronological age of the children with autism was not significantly different to that
of either of the two groups of children with MLD (P=O.22, MLD group matched for APT; P=O.31
MLD group matched for BPVS; t-tests), but was significantly higher than that of the normal
children (P<O.OI, t-test). The APT scores of the children with autism and MLD group matched for
APT did not differ significantly. Similarly the groups matched for BPVS scores did not differ
significantly in their mental ages compared to the children with autism. The fact that the mean
chronological age and mean verbal mental age of the normal children were similar (60.0 vs. 54.4
months) indicates that this group was one of average, and representative verbal ability.
Table 5.6. Details of participants for retest of Experiment 3
Group n CA APT Score BPVS Age
(months) (months)
Autism 24 mean 104.0 26.4 54.5
SO 28.9 5.7 21.1
ran2e 47-154 17.5-35.5 33-94
MW 24 mean 113.4 26.4
Matched SO 23.5 5.8
IbyAPT range 75-149 17-35.5
MW 24 mean 111.7 54.2
Matched SO 20.2 20.7
bvBPVS range 80-149 33-93
Normal 24 mean 60.0 54.4
SD 13.9 21.0
range 44-96 31-94
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As before, participants in each of the four groups were assigned to one of two subgroups,
based on the order of episode presentation. Twelve children in each group received the pretend
episodes followed by the literal episodes, the other twelve received the two sets in the other order.
The matching of these subgroups was satisfactory, there were no significant differences in their
BPVS or APT scores, and the chronological ages of the autistic and learning disabled subgroups
did not differ from one another. The two normal subgroups were significantly younger than the
other subgroups (P<O.Ol; t-tests), but did not differ significantly from each other. Subgroup
details are given in table 5.7.
Table 5.7. Details of participant subgroups (means given)
Group n CA APT BPVS Age
(months) Score (months)
Autism Literal then Pretend 12 106.3 27.1 56.8
Pretend then Literal 12 101.7 25.8 52.2
:MID Literal then Pretend 12 112.3 26.3
byAPT Pretend then Literal 12 114.5 26.5
:MID Literal then Pretend 12 112.8 51.8
IbyBPVS Pretend then Literal 12 110.6 56.6
Nonnal Literal then Pretend 12 62.3 52.3
Pretend then Literal 12 57.8 56.5
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5.27 Results 2
The mean number of correct responses given by each group, for each episode mode, and for
each of the three test questions are shown in table 5.8. The results were analysed as before, a four
factor Anova analysis was performed for each of the three question types. Factors were Group
(Children with Autism, children with MLO matched by APT, children with MLO matched by
BPVS or normal children), Order of presentation (Literal first or Pretend first), Mode (Literal or
Pretend) and Episode (A, B, e, 0, E or F). The Group and Order factors were independents,
repeated measures were taken on the Mode and Episode factors. Additionally, in this instance post-
hoc Scheffe tests were used to determine whether the performance of the children with autism on
each question differed from that of controls (considered as a whole), both across literal and pretend
episodes, and on the pretend episodes alone. The results of the three separate analyses are
.ummarised in table 5.9.
Table S.B. Mean Scores for each Group and Question Type
Literal Episodes Pretend Episodes
Group Substance Outcome Mode Substance Outcome Mode
Autism 5.67 5.04 4.13 4.42 2.67 3.67
MLO-APr 5.58 5.38 4.71 4.38 3.38 3.92
MlD-BPVS 5.71 5.08 4.46 4.38 3.38 4.21
Normal 5.50 5.63 5.46 4.58 3.54 3.88
2As before ilwas not possible to treat the Group factor as a repeated measure, as order of condition and
episode presentation was not controlled for across individual matches.
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Table 5.9. Results of 4 Factor Anova Analyses for each Question Type
Substance Q. Outcome Q. Mode Q.
Source df F P F P F P
Group (G) 3 0.02 0.99 1.36 0.26 1.12 0.35
Order(O) 1 1.17 0.19 6.93 0.01 3.41 0.07
GxO 3 0.06 0.62 1.55 0.21 1.24 0.30
Mode(M) 1 42.54 <0.01 77.93 <0.01 10.75 <0.01
GxM 3 0.25 0.86 0.35 0.79 1.55 0.21
0xM 1 0.40 0.53 6.49 0.01 0.13 0.72
GxOxM 3 0.89 0.45 2.15 0.10 1.68 0.36
Episode (E) 5 10.99 <0.01 0.89 0.49 1.63 0.15
GxE 15 1.15 0.31 0.84 0.63 2.48 <0.01
0xE 5 0.73 0.62 1.42 0.22 0.70 0.62
GxOxE 15 1.09 0.36 1.95 0.02 0.54 0.92
MxE 5 5.39 <0.01 3.69 . <0.01 17.44 <0.01
GxMxE 15 1.43 0.13 0.95 0.51 1.06 0.40
0xMxE 5 1.94 0.09 0.38 0.86 1.21 0.30
GxOxMxE 15 0.60 0.87 0.64 0.85 0.66 0.82
Substance Question
The analysis of number of COtTeCtresponses to the Substance questions, "What did Naughty
Teddy put on the (target's) head?", revealed a non-significant main effect of Group. There was a
significant main effect of Mode, fewer correct responses were given to Substance questions
following pretend episodes. The Group x Mode interaction was not significant. Scheffe tests
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indicated that the children with autism did not perform significantly worse than controls on all
episodes (F(3,92)<O.OI, P>O.99), and on the pretend episodes (F(3,92)<O.Ol, P>O.99). The
mean number of correct responses to the Substance questions for each Group and Mode are shown
in graph 5.9.
Graph 5.9. Mean number of correct Substance responses for each Group and episode Mode.
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The main effect of Order of presentation of episodes was not significant, although there was a
trend for performance to be better when the pretend episodes preceded the literal ones rather than
vice-versa. There was a significant main effect of Episode; children found the substances
particularly difficult to identify in Episode D (harder than episodes A. B. E and F, P<O.Ol. Tukey
test) and in Episode C (harder than episode A, P<O.O1, Tukey test). The Mode x Episode
interaction was also significant, reflecting an effect of Mode (pretend episodes harder) in all cases
except episode B. The Group x Mode x Episode interaction approached significance, indicating
that the above Mode x Episode interaction was less marked in the group of children with autism.
The Order x Mode x Episode interaction was also close to significance, this reflected the above
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order effect on certain episodes (E and F) in the pretend mode only. There were no other significant
interaCtions.
Outcome Question
Analysis of the number of correct responses to the Outcome questions e.g. "Is the (target)
wet or dry now?" again revealed a non-significant main effect of Group. The children with autism
did produce the fewest correct Outcome responses. The nonnal children produced the most correct
responses. but not significantly more than the children with autism. The main effect of Mode was
significant; as with the Substance questions, fewer correct responses were given in the pretend
mode of presentation. The Group x Mode interaction was not significant Scheffe tests confinned
that the performance of the children with autism was not significantly different from that shown by
all controls on all episodes (F(3.92)=1.06. P=O.37) or on the pretend episodes alone
(F(3.92)=O.72. P=O.55). The mean number of correct responses for each group and mode are
shown below in graph 5.10.
Graph 5.1O.Mean number of correct Outcome responses for each group and episode mode.
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The main effect of Order of presentation was significant. This effect mirrored the trend seen
in the Substance question analysis, and was due to inferior performance when the literal episodes
were presented first. The Order x Mode interaction was also significant, and indicated that this
main effect of Order was more marked in the pretend mode. In other words performance on the
pretend episodes was better if they were presented first, than if they succeeded the literal episodes.
The Group x Order x Mode interaction approached significance, the above Order x Mode
interaCtion was most marked amongst the two groups of children with MLD.
One of the major drawbacks of the initial run of the experiment was that children with autism
(and the children with MLD) were scoring at chance levels. In that case this was due to strategic,
echolalic guessing. Echolalic guessing was indicated by a significant main episode effect reflecting
superior performance on those episodes where the 'correct' attribution came second (B, C and F),
and inferior performance when it came first (A, D and E). Table S.8 shows that the children in the
retest were still seoring at around chance levels on the pretend Outcome questions. This low level
of performance is partly caused by the Order effect deseribed above, the subgroups of children
receiving the literal episodes first performed particularly poorly on the subsequent pretend outcome
questions. However, in the case of the children with autism for example, even those children
receiving the other, less problematic order of presentation were still not performing at levels much
above chance (mean score for this subgroup = 3.17, compared to 2.17 for the other subgroup of
children with autism). It is therefore still important to investigate whether echolalic guessing was
occurring in the retest, as it was in the original run of the experiment.
In this case the main effect of Episode emerging from the analysis was not significant, but
there was a significant Mode x Episode interaction. This was due to an effect of Mode (worse
I
performance in pretend mode) on all episodes except episode B, and imponandy, was not due to an
effect of Episode in one mode but not in the other. The Group x Episode interaction was not
significant, and neither was the Group x Mode x Episode interaction. However the Group x Order
:x. Bpisode interaction was significant This three v:ay interaction represented differential Group x
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Bpisode interactions for the subgroups receiving the two different orders of episode presentation.
'Ibis Group x Episode interaction was non-significant for the four subgroups who received the
pretend episodes first and the literal episodes second (F=1.03, df=lS, P=O.43) but was significant
for the other subgroups who received the literal episodes followed by the pretend ones (F=1.76,
df-lS, P=O.04). In the latter case this was due to a significant effect of Episode amongst the group
of children with MLD matched by the APT (superior performance on Episode A, inferior
performance on Episode B) and also to inferior performance by the children with autism on
Episode A. No other significant interactions emerged from the analysis.
These results suggest that very little strategic echolalic guessing is occurring. The Episode
effect that would be expected if such a strategy were adopted is not found in the retest when taken
as a whole, nor in either of the two modes of presentation. Nor is it evident in any of the four
JI'Oups, when their performance as whole groups is considered. The only evidence for an Episode
effect is amongst subgroups receiving different orders of episode presentation. Only those children
receiving literal episodes followed by pretend episodes showed a significant (sub)Group x Episode
interaCtion. The subgroup of children with autism did perfonn significantly less well on Episode A
than the other subgroups, but not on Episodes D and E as would be predicted were they guessing
echolalically. Even then this subgroup of children with autism did not show the expected Episode
effect.
However the fact that children are not adopting a guessing strategy does not necessarily mean
that they are not guessing responses at all; they could be doing so randomly. This does seem
unlikely given the considerable evidence to suggest that they readily adopt an echolalic strategy
when confused by the ques~ons. However, to check whether random guessing was occurring
children's performance on individual episodes across modes was investigated. If it was the case
that children were scoring at around 3 out of 6 simply because some episodes were too hard to
understand, it would be expected that children would be consistently incorrect on certain episodes
(wrong in both literal and pretend modes) and consistently correct on others. Conversely if they
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were simply guessing responses the most likely pattern would be inconsistency across modes. The
observed levels of consistency were compared with those predicted by random guessing using a
Chi2 goodness of fit test, see table 5.10. Two possible expected distributions were tested. One
assumed random guessing for both literal and pretend episodes (probability of success = 0.5 in
both cases), the other assumed guessing in the pretend mode only and used the mean scores
actually obtained in the literal mode as the probability of success in that mode (e.g. 5.04/6 for
children with autism, see table 5.8). The observed distributions were significantly different from
those predicted by random guessing in both modes of presentation (P<O.Ol for all groups). But
only the normal children showed a pattern of responses that was significantly different from that
predicted by guessing in the pretend mode alone (p<O.053).
3Note one of the expected frequencies for the normal group in this case <S, however the observed distribution
is sd11 signiflC8Iltly different from the expected one if this cell is excluded.
Chapter S 183
Table 5.10. Distribution of consistent and inconsistent responses to literal and pretend Outcome
questions
Performance Across Modes
(for each episode)
Group Distribution Type Consistently Inconsistent Consistently
Correct Incorrect
Children Observed 58 69 17
with Expected, guessing in both modes 36 72 36
Autism Expected, guessing in pretend mode 60.48 72.00 11.52
Children Observed 76 60 8
with Expected, guessing in both modes 36 72 36
MLD(APl) Expected, guessing in pretend mode 64.56 72.00 11.52
Children Observed 71 61 12
with Expected, guessing in both modes 36 72 36
MLD(BPVS) Expected, guessing in pretend mode 60.96 72.00 11.04
Normal Observed 82 56 6
Children Expected, guessing in both modes 36 72 36
Expected, guessing in pretend mode 67.56 72.00 4.44
Mode Question
The analysis of correct responses to the final question "Did Teddy put real (substance) on the
(.. et) or only pretend (substance)?" revealed no significant main effect of Group. As in the case
of the previous two questions the main effect of Mode was significant, again due to poorer
perfonnance in the pretend mode. Once again post-hoc Scheffe tests indicated that the children
with autism were not performing significantly worse than controls on all episodes (F(3.92)=O.82,
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P=O.48). or on the pretend episodes only (F(3.92)=O.16. P=O.93). There was no significant
Group x Mode interaction. The mean number of correct responses for each group and episode
mode are shown in graph 5.11.
Graph 5.11. Mean number of correct Mode responses for each group and mode.
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In this case the main effect of Order of presentation was not quite significant (p=O.07). but
once again those children receiving the literal episodes first perfonned less well than those receiving
the pretend episodes initially. The main effect of Episode was not significant. but there was a
significant Group x Episode interaction. This was due to the children with autism performing
significantly worse than the other three groups on Episode F.
As in the original run of the experiment the Mode x Episode interaction was significant.
Again this was due to echolalic guessing amongst all groups. The interaction is caused by superior
perfonnance on Episodes B, D and F in the real mode and inferior performance on these episodes
in the pretend mode (for these episodes the 'real' alternative comes second in the forced choice).
Similarly for Episodes A. C and E where the 'pretend' alternative was second children perform
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well in the pretend mode and poorly in the literal mode, because they consistently select the second
choice. Graph 5.12 shows that this reversal of the predicted pattern of results is exactly what
emerged. The absence of a significant Group x Mode x Episode interaction confirms that all
groups were equally likely to adopt this pattern of guessing. No other interactions approached
significance.
Graph 5.12. Effect of Episode on response to Mode questions, for each mode (groups combined)
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5.28 Discussion Of Retest
The major failings of the original run of the initial experiment were that children were reduced
to guessing responses to the Outcome and Mode questions, and that the results of the Substance
question could not clearly be interpreted as support for either a competence or a performance
account. The aim of the retest was to circumvent these problems by using larger, developmentally
more able groups of children. The size of each group was therefore increased from 12 to 24, the
average verbal mental age of the groups was raised from around 4 years to 4 years 6 months, and
Chapter S 186
three control groups as opposed to just one were employed. The extent of guessing in the original
ron was somewhat surprising. A control group of normal children was therefore included in the
retest, partly to investigate whether the performance of the developmentally handicapped groups
was in any way deviant for children of their verbal mental age.
The results of the retest show that the modifications made to the participant groups were
partially, though not wholly, successful. The problematic Group x Mode interaction emerging
from the original analysis of responses to the Substance question is now clearly non-significant
(p..().86). Further, guessing is no longer occurring in response to the Outcome questions.
However, children are still forced to guess their answers to the Mode questions.
The fact that the normal control group's performance, across all three sets of questions,
mb:rors that of the other three developmentally handicapped groups indicates that these three non-
normal groups are performing as expected for children of their developmental level. When
pessing occurs in response to the Mode questions, the normal children are as likely to adopt this
strategy as the other groups. This suggests that the surprising extent of guessing observed in
response to the Outcome questions in the original run of the experiment was not itself 'non-
1'lOI'Dlal'. Clearly this conclusion is inferred rather than proved: normal children were not used in
the original run, but the inference is a strong one and raises questions about the differences between
the current procedure and Harris and Kavanaugh's methods (see discussion below).
5.29 General Discussion
The main aim of this experiment was to build on the findings of Experiments 1 and 2, and
further separate competence or petformance accounts of impaired pretend play in autism. This was
attempted by focusing directly on comprehension of pretence, with the intention that this would tap
directly into underlying pretend abilities. As noted above this removes any possible 'performance'
deficits which might be associated with the physical production of pretence. Therefore if children
with autism do indeed suffer from some form of performance deficit. then there should be no
difference between the groups in their ability to comprehend pretence. However if a competence
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deficit underlies children with autism's problems with pretence, their comprehension as well as
their production of pretence will be impaired.
The retest of the experiment removed a number of problems emerging from the original run,
and provides much clearer evidence to separate performance and competence accounts; so it is the
results of the retest that will be discussed here. The first question to address is whether the children
with autism employed in this study were impaired on any of the questions presented to them. The
answer to this question must be a clear 'no'. In all three analyses, whether of responses to...
Substance, Outcome or Mode questions, no significant main effects of Group emerged to indicate
impaired performance in the group of children with autism. More importantly, no significant
Group x Mode interactions were found to indicate impaited performance in the crucial pretend
mode. The use of post-hoc Scheffe tests to compare the performance of the children with autism
on the pretend episodes with that of the combined set of controls confirms the general absence of
puup differences. In fact the only significant interactions involving Group effects were the Group
x Order x Episode interaction in the Outcome analysis (indicating impaired performance in a subset
of children with autism on one Episode only - see above) and the Group x Episode interaction in
the Mode question analysis (due to impaired performance amongst children with autism on one
Episode). These minor effects cannot really be taken as evidence of impaired comprehension of
pretend play in autism.
A further point is that though children were clearly guessing their responses to the Mode
question (the possibility that guessing was occurring in response to the Outcome question will be
discussed further below), all children showed exactly the same pattern of guessing. The
performance of children with autism in this experiment therefore mirrors that of controls extremely
closely.
This similarity in performance of the groups cannot be explained in terms of superior
vocabulary amongst children with autism compensating impaired pretend understanding, since the
groups do not differ in their performance on the literal episodes either. Indeed the use of the BPVS
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to match two control groups guards against differences in vocabulary. Nor can it be the case that
Jiving half of each group the literal episodes before the pretend ones artificially raised the
perfonnance of these subgroups on the pretend episodes, through the carrying over of responses,
SO as to prevent Group differences from being demonstrable. The fact that performance was
pnerally worse when literal episodes preceded pretend episodes counters this suggestion.
This study therefore provides no finn evidence to suggest that the comprehension of pretence
shown by children with autism is in any way deficient, relative to controls. However, this does not
neeessarily imply that comprehension of pretend play in autism is unimpaired. There are three
criticisms that might be advanced to argue against drawing such an inference. Firstly, it might be
claimed that unimpaired performance on the type of tasks employed here does not implicate the
ability to comprehend pretend play 'proper'. Secondly, it might be argued that this study has failed
to show competence amongst the children with autism anyway, given the extent of guessing seen
amongst all groups in response to the Mode questions, if not also to the Outcome questions. A
final, related, claim is that the poor performance seen in control groups on the Outcome and Mode
questions, which is surprising in the light of previous research, raises questions about the particular
methodology employed here which limit the conclusions that can be drawn from this study. These
three potential criticisms will now be addressed in turn.
Fundamental to this experiment is the assumption that assessing comprehension of pretence
removes potential production problems that might be present in autism. If this study is successful
ira demonstrating unimpaired comprehension of pretend play in autism, then it would seem that the
characteristic absence of spontaneous pretend play seen in autism is due to some form of
perfonnance deficit. However, this conclusion is only valid if these two forms of pretence, the
form assessed here, and that not seen in spontaneous conditions, amount to one and the same
thin,. Indeed it might be argued that this study taps something other than 'pretend play' as
properly defined.
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In particular, it could be argued that in answering the Substance question, children need not
engage in pretence at all. They may be able to respond correctly by simply associating the container
with its usual contents. The fact that receiving the literal Substance questions before the pretend
ones did not do anything to increase performance on the latter set, suggests that the extent of any
'associative labelling' of this nature is limited; presumably the link between container and content
would be stronger if it had already been demonstrated explicitly to the child. However, this
particular criticism also begs questions about the nature of everyday pretence. Presumably children
must take some account of the identity of the container if they are to ascribe an appropriate pretend
substance to it. In other words 'proper' pretend play (and the imagination of absent objects is
defined by Leslie, 1987, as one of three fundamental forms of pretence), must rest on a degree of
associative linkage between real and pretend identities - few would argue that a child who
-imagines' that an empty cup contains tea (to borrow an example from Leslie) is not engaging in
pretend play. A further point is that children were free to say that 'nothing' had been poured onto
the target animal. If they were fixating on the container, which in the majority of cases could be
clearly seen to be empty, rather than entering into a 'pretend mode of thinking" then this would
appear to be the most likely response.
In theory the same criticism could be applied to the Outcome questions, after all a child
presumably associates a teapot with 'hot' contents. It seems unlikely that anyone would claim that
the ability to attribute non-literal properties such as 'wetness' to the target animal would not
constitute comprehension of pretence, which further serves to indicate that associations must
necessarily form a part of the normal experience of pretence.
Even if one accepts that the questions employed in this experiment are valid tests of the ability
to comprehend pretend play, one need not conclude that the unimpaired performance on these
questions seen here indicates unimpaired comprehension of pretence in autism. It is of course
possible that children could answer the Outcome and Mode questions successfully without an
understanding of the pretend situation, simply by guessing their responses. Obviously this
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criticism does not apply to the Substance question, which was open-ended, but it is clear that
echolalic guessing occurred in response to the Mode questions. The fact that children with autism
were unimpaired on the Mode questions cannot then be taken as support for an ability to distinguish
between pretend and literal situations.
What is less clear is whether guessing occurred in response to the Outcome questions, where
mean scores for the pretend episodes were around 3 out of 6 for all groups. The effect of Order of
presentation in part explains these low levels of performance, children did do particularly poorly if
they received the pretend episodes second. However even for those children who receive these
episodes first, pretend outcome scores are not much above 3. The absence of Episode effects in all
but two minor cases indicates that strategic, echolalic guessing is not being adopted, and further
analysis shows that none of the groups are guessing randomly in both modes. It is still possible
that children (from the non-normal groups at least) are randomly guessing their pretend outcome
responses if not their literal outcome answers. Against this suggestion, the fact that all groups
readily adopt an echolalic guessing strategy when confused by the Mode questions suggests that
they would presumably adopt a similar strategy if they found the Outcome questions difficult.
More problematic than the possibility of random guessing in response to Outcome questions,
however unlikely this may see~ is that while other research clearly indicates that children as young
as three years of age have a fum understanding of pretence, the control children assessed in this
stUdy performed relatively poorly on the Outcome and Mode questions, despite baving mean verbal
mental ages of above four years. The review of studies conducted in subsection 1.24 indicated that
by three years of age, children are capable of making pretend-real distinctions (Flavell, Flavell &.
Green, 1987; Woolley &. Wellman, 1990). At around three years of age children also begin to
,contraSt real and pretend identities in their spontaneous speech (Woolley &. Wellman, 1990), and
are able to recall past object substitutions and imagining of absent objects (Gopnik &. Slaughter.
1991).
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While it is therefore clear that children as young as three years of age are capable of
distinguishing between pretend and real identities, the poor performance of children on the Mode
question employed here (which tested this ability) can potentially be explained in terms of task
difficulty. Both Flavell et al. (1987) and Woolley and Wellman (1990) tested children's ability to
contrast pretend and real identities in object substitution. In these instances children are aware of
the real identity of the object, which has some form of instantiation before them. In addition this
object is being used in a way that is clearly inappropriate given this real identity. However in the
Mode question used here, children have are asked about the status of the imaginary substance
'poured' onto the target animal. In the pretend episodes this substance has no actual instantiation
before the child, and the actions involved are therefore not so obviously inappropriate. Children
are therefore not presented with such an explicit contrast of pretend and real states on which to base
a judgement. It seems likely that making a distinction in this case might be more difficult for young
children. Support for this view comes from Lillard's (1993a) experiment, in which four- and five-
year-old's incorrectly affirmed that a character who was ignorant of the existence of a certain
animal, could pretend to be such an animal. Again in this case there is no clear instantiation of the
'real identity' to serve as a basis from which to distinguish a pretend identity, and no inappropriate
'action component' to aid a distinction.
Children's poor performance on the Mode questions are therefore not necessarily as
surprising as they might first seem. However the low levels of perfonnance in response to the
OutcOme questions require further explanation. This is especially true given that Harris and
Kavanaugh (1993) found high levels of performance amongst normal three year olds using exactly
the procedures adopted here (see their experiment 6, subsection 1.24). While they did not include a
Mode question in their protocol, they did ask a Substance question (their question 2) and a forced-
choice Outcome question (their question 4). Table S.ll compares the performance of their two
sroups of participants, 16 children aged 28 months and 16 aged 34 months, with that shown on the
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pretend episodes by the normal control children in this study. Means are converted to percentage
scores as Harris and Kavanaugh (1993) presented 4 episodes rather than 6.
Table 5.11. Comparison of performance of normal children on pretend Substance and Outcome
questions.
% Performance (pretend episodes only).
Study N Age Substance Questions Outcome Questions
(months)
Harris& 16 28 75.0% 83.3%
Kavanaugh (1993) 16 34 81.3% 87.5%
F.xL1Q~UJent3 Retest 24 60 76.3% 59.0%
In the present study, children's problems with these questions were clearly compounded if
they received the literal episodes before the pretend ones (this effect of Order was significant for the
Outcome questions, and approached significance for the Substance questions). This perhaps
surprising effect of order of presentation can be explained in terms of the effect it had on the
pretend episodes. Children who had already received the literal episodes may well have been
biased towards a literal reading of subsequent acts (children were not actively discouraged from
'adopting a literal interpretation of the pretend acts; saying that 'nothing' had been tipped on the
target for example). The fact that half the children in each group received this confusing order of
presentation would appear sufficient to account for levels of performance on the pretend Substance
questions, which are comparable to those seen (albeit in a younger sample) by Harris and
Kavanaugh. However this effect alone cannot explain the poor performance observed in response
to the Outcome questions. Even those children who received the pretend episodes before the literal
ones performed relatively poorly on these questions.
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The procedure employed by Harris and Kavanaugh did differ from that used here in one
important respect however. They employed a warm-up period prior to each experiment, the aim of
which was to engage children in preliminary pretending. Harris and Kavanaugh emphasise the
importance of these sessions, claiming that they served to alert children to the playful and non-
literal context of the subsequent tests. It is possible that the absence of warm-up sessions in the
current study lowered the likelihood of children adopting a 'pretend reading' of the pretend
episodes. Instead they may have been more disposed to assess the situations literally.
The poor performance of all the children, including controls, on both the Outcome and Mode
questions can therefore be explained. but this does not explain away the problem of low levels of
performance. It could be argued that the experiment has shown that all groups failed to
comprehend the pretend situation. and that this was due to the methodology employed (it is
certainly the case that the inclusion of literal episodes confused a large number of the children). It
adpt be further argued that the controls' performance might be being artificially lowered as a
result, and that floor effects amongst these groups are masking a potential deficit amongst the
ddldren with autism
This is an important criticism, and one that can not be dismissed lightly. It certainly holds for
die Mode questions, where there is clear evidence of strategic guessing amongst all the groups.
However it is not valid in the case of the Substance questions, where guessing is not possible and
where the children with autism perform relatively well. I would also claim that it is not relevant to
dle case of the Outcome questions. Though it can not be proved that children with autism did not
randomly guess their answers to this question in pretend episodes, it seems highly unlikely that
dle)' would resort to random guessing when it is clear that they adopt strategic guessing when
confused in other cases.
Is it then fair to say that the experiment has demonstrated true comprehension of pretence in
autism? The children with autism perfonned well on the substance question, which would appear
to indicate some, albeit perhaps low-level, understanding of pretend acts; the children appreciate
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that when a container is tipped 'in pretend fashion', its 'pretend contents' emerge. As noted above
a criticism of this interpretation is that children could pass the Substance questions simply by a
form of associative labelling, realising that 'tea always comes out of tea-pots'. Reasons to doubt
that this was occurring have already been outlined, however it is worth returning to the point that
this must be, in a sense, what occurs in everyday pretence. When a normal child sees mother tip
pretend tea on an animal (for example) they can only reason through this action by assuming that
the tea-pot is meant to contain tea. Success on the substance question therefore does appear to
implicate a degree of comprehension of pretence, but possibly at a fairly basic level.
More sophisticated comprehension would be evidenced by success on the Outcome
questions. Here children ~th autism do less well (though as well as controls), and it is therefore
probably reasonable to say that the evidence for sophisticated comprehension is limited. Of course
this does not mean that children with autism cannot be sophisticated pretenders, nonnal children
presumably are, and they performed similarly on these questions.
Before moving on to consider how these results tie in with those outlined in the previous
chapter, it is worth noting that though the evidence for global comprehension of pretence in autism
is DOt unequivocally provided by Experiment 3, the results obtained do stand at odds with what
would be expected if children with autism had no ability to understand the pretend acts. As
mentioned above, it would seem likely that children with autism who failed to comprehend the
scenario would very readily avow that 'nothing' had been tipped on the animal in response to
Substance questions. They would also be expected to adopt an echolalic guessing strategy to both
the Outcome and Mode questions. As they do neither of these two things it seems fair to credit
them with some level of comprehension. As a result I would cautiously argue that while aspects of
the experiment hinder a clear interpretation of the results, further aspects indicate that
methodological problems are masking true abilities in all groups, rather than hiding a deficit
amongst the children with autism.
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5.3 Conclusions
The purpose of Experiment 3 was to shed further light on the question of whether
competence or performance deficits mediate an absence of pretend play in autism. Experiments I
and 2 investigated spontaneous, elicited and instructed play. The degree of structure involved in
these conditions increases from spontaneous to elicited play, and from elicited to instructed play. A
purely performance deficit account, which assumes that the greater the structure the less the child
has to 'perform' themselves, predicts decreasing levels of impairment as structure increases. This
was broadly what was observed. Though there was no difference in the extent of children with
autism's impairment in spontaneous and in elicited pretend play, however there was a clear
improvement in performance in instructed pretend play. Comprehension of pretence, as tested in
Experiment 3, provides an even more structured testing situation in that the child has to produce no
pretend play at all. If children with autism's deficits are purely due to problems in performance,
then they should be unimpaired on this task. Again this was broadly what was found. While a
degree of caution must be exercised before claiming unimpaired performance in Experiment 3, it is
fair to say that the extent of relative impairment observed in these studies does diminish with
increasing structure as a performance account predicts.
What is perhaps clearer is that these results are inconsistent with a competence deficit
account, which must predict impaired pretend play amongst children with autism, in all situations.
It appears that children with autism can pretend in certain situations, contrary to the claims of
competence hypotheses. Having said this, there are four possible reasons to question this
suggestion. One possible reason for discounting this interpretation is that the groups of children
with autism might not have been representative of children with autism as a whole. There is no
reason to believe that this is the case. All children with autism were selected on the basis of
showing the three characteristic impairments associated with autism, and selection was made after
careful consultation with teachers who knew the children well, and in the majority of cases, after
referring to the child's statement of special needs. With the exception of 4 children in Experiments
"
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1 and 2. and one child in the retest of Experiment 3, all the children attended schools for children
with autism. If any doubt was expressed about the validity of a diagnosis of autism that child was
excluded from the investigations (similarly if any of the control children were thought to have
'autistic-features' then they were excluded). In the context of this argument it is important to
remember that impaired spontaneous pretend play was found in the children with autism assessed
inExperiment I, as expected.
Secondly it could be argued that as the group of children with autism eventually used in
Experiment 3 was not the same as that used in the first pair of experiments, that results cannot be
generalised across all three experiments. The majority of children with autism used in the first two
experiments also participated inExperiment 3, so this criticism is not entirely valid. The children
who were added in the retest of Experiment 3 were all from the same schools as children already
participating in the research, and were all selected in an identical way as those assessed originally.
Neither group was entirely homogeneous, indeed given the extent of variety of abilities and
developmental profiles amongst children with autism this was not to be expected, but there was
nothing to suggest that one group was more, or less, homogeneous than the other. Oearly it is still
the case that not all the children in the retest of Experiment 3 were assessed in Experiments 1 and 2.
I would wish to argue that the children finally used in Experiment 3 would behave in an exactly
similar way to those used initially, and that a valid comparison can be drawn across experiments.
However even if one did not accept this assurance, one is still faced with one group of children
with autism who show impaired spontaneous pretend play and unimpaired instructed pretend play,
and another who show unimpaired comprehension of pretence. Even at this level this must surely
be compelling evidence against a competence interpretation.
A third conceivable criticism is that those tasks in which children with autism were
unimpaired do not actually assess pretend abilities. It could be argued that the instructed play
conditions used in Experiment 2 do not require a child to pretend, and similarly that true
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comprehension of pretence is not required to performwell on Experiment 3. These arguments have
been outlined and discussed previously (see discussion of Experiment 2, general discussion of
Experiment 3). The instructions used in Experiment 2 do explicitly give the child the scheme for
pretence, however the child still has to produce the actions appropriate to that scheme. The design
of the experiment ensured that the child could not simply select the correct prop by guessing, and in
addition the child was still required to perform an appropriate action with the toys. Experiment 2
therefore suggests that children with autismmay be impaired in generating schemes for pretence. It
is conceivable that some form of associative labelling strategy could be used to answer the
Substance questions in Experiment 3. However the results suggest that this form of strategy is not
being employed. What it is fair to say is that evidence has only been provided for the ability to
engage in low-level pretence amongst children with autism. There is no evidence of flexible,
creative pretend play, or of sophisticated understanding of subtle aspects of a pretend situation.
A final criticism is that matching children for language comprehension abilities 'matches
away' competence deficits that might exist in the children with autism. While it is certainly true that
there are parallels between pretend play and language in both normal children and children with
autism (see subsection 1.22), there is little reason to assume that they are directly related in the way
that the above criticism implies. If it was the case that matching for language comprehension at the
same time matches for pretend playability, why is it that children with autism still show impaired
production of pretend play when matched in this way (Baron-Cohen, 1987, Riguet et al., 1981)1
The fact that the children with autism assessed in Experiments 1 and 2 showed impaired
spontaneous symbolic play yet unimpaired instructed play shows that pretend play deficits in
autism cannot be attributed to delayed language acquisition in this way, as these children were
matched to controls on the basis of language comprehension abilities.
On the basis of the results of these first three experiments I would therefore wish to claim that
children with autism's failure to produce pretend play is not the result of some fonn of competence
deficit. Inother words, pretend play (at least at a basic level) is something that children with autism
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can do, but is something that they don't do spontaneously. In this sense, children with autism's
difficulties in pretence would appear to be the result of some form of performance deficit.
However, as noted in subsection 3.16, the notion of a deficit in performance (relative to verbal
mental age matched controls) is a potentially confusing one. While it may be the case that children
with autism simply don't choose to pretend. it is more likely that a failure of competence in some
other domain impinges on the ability to produce pretence. Having accepted that children with
autism can pretend in certain circumstances, the following chapter will describe work carried out in
an effort to determine why they don't pretend in all circumstances. Though this will be done by
focusing on the proposed 'performance' deficits outlined in section 3.3, it must be remembered that
any so-called performance deficit may result from a deficit of competence which prevents children
with autism from exhibiting their apparently intact ability to pretend.
Chapter 6
Why Do Children With Autism Not
Pretend?
6.1 Introduction
The two previous chapters have provided evidence to suggest that children with autism can
~ under certain circumstances. This suggests that the spontaneous failure to produce pretence
commonly seen in autism, and observed in Experiment 1, is not due to an inability to pretend per
se. The question that must therefore now be addressed, in the light of this suggestion, is that of
why children with autism do not pretend. Three potential explanations of a deficit in 'performance'
were proposed in section 3.3. These were a Motivational hypothesis, a Central Executive Deficit
hypothesis (CEO), and a Generation of Access and Retrieval Strategies hypothesis (OARS). The
purpose of this chapter is to describe the work which was undertaken in an attempt to decide
between these three accounts. Two experiments will be described in this chapter, Experiment 4
(section 6.2) and Experiment 5 (section 6.3). Before turning to the first of these, it is worth
recalling the precise details of the three hypotheses that are to be tested here (see also section 3.3).
The motivational account predicts that children with autism do not spontaneously engage in
pretence because they are not motivated to do so. This impairment could take the form of a general
lack of motivation, it could be due to a specific aversion to pretend play, or it may reflect a
preference for other forms of (non-symbolic) play. This account makes few testable predictions
beyond suggesting that the extent of pretend play seen in autism should increase with the dearee of
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structure provided by the play situation. The CED hypothesis is really one of a number of
executive deficit accounts which could be put forward in order to explain an absence of
spontaneous pretence in autism; for example it might instead be suggested that a failure to plan
behaviour prevents free pretend play. However, the particular proposal to be considered here is
that of a failure to inhibit a response to the external functional features of an object. To borrow
Harris' terminology (Harris, 1993), it is hypothesized that children with autism are unable to 'shift
the locus of executive control', and override these externally salient features with intact internal
pretend schemes. Finally, the GARS hypothesis suggests that pretend play does not occur
spontaneously in autism because the internal representations needed for creativity and flexible
planning are not readily accessed. These representations are presumably intact, but the child with
autism is impaired at generating the means for retrieving them.
While there is certainly evidence for impaired generation of retrieval strategies in autism. and
while motivational deficits may well be associated with the disorder, there is arguably stronger
support for executive dysfunction in autism. The CED hypothesis also appears to make more
explicit and more easily testable predictions regarding pretend play than the other two accounts. It
was therefore decided that an examination of why children with autism do not pretend should begin
by testing the Validityof the CEO account
6.2 Experiment 4
6.21 Introduction
The purpose of Experiment 4 was to provide a direct test of the hypothesis that a failure to
produce pretend play in autism is the result of specific executive dysfunction in autism. If it is the
case that children with autism produce little spontaneous pretend play because they are unable to
impose their own play schemas on objects which possess their own, well defined function, as
suggested above. these children should be particularly impaired in their ability to use such objects
in pretend object substitution. The present experiment attempted to test the CED hypothesis by
looking at the effect of 'functionality' on Objectsubstitution in autism.
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Before turning to the methodology employed, it is therefore necessary to think back to
investigations of object substitution in normal children (reviewed in subsection 1.21). In addition
to Doting the developmental trend of decontextualization, a move from object substitution with
realistic prototypical items to the use of inappropriate dissimilar items, a distinction was drawn
betweeD perceptual and functional decontextualization in object substitution. Ungerer, Zelazo,
Kearsley and O'Leary (1981) found that the majority of 18 month old children preferred to use
objects with no clear function as props in substitution, rather than use functional objects. Further
Jackowitz and Watson's (1980) results provide evidence of both functional and perceptual
decontextualization, and suggest that these two effects are of similar strength and are roughly
additive.
In an investigation of object substitution in young normal children, Golomb (1979) presented
children with a selection of different props for substitution, noted their choice of prop. then
removed it and asked the child to choose again. By doing this she was able to order the props in
tenDS of substitutability as seen by the child. The present experiment borrows from this method.
Children were asked to select a prop to stand as a substitute for a certain target object. In order to
determine how readily children with autism would select a prop with a well defined function, we
presented them with an object whose function differed from that of the target, a counter-functional
object (CF). So as not to confound problems of perceptual decontextualization with effects of
function, the CF was perceptually similar to the target object. Four other props were also
presented. These were non-functional (NFs), they had no clear function of their own. However
they did differ from each other in terms of their perceptual similarity to the original target object.
The first of the NF props had the same form as the target (and therefore, as the CF). the others
were systematically less perceptually similar.
On the basis of the evidence of both perceptual and functional decontextualization discussed
previously, it was hypothesised that non-autistic control subjects would choose the first NF prop·
initially, and show a steadily decreasing preference for the less appropriate NF props. Some small
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effect of function was expected, but as the CF was perceptually similar to the target, it was
expected that it would be selected relatively early on. However it was predicted that children with
autism would choose the CF prop significantly later than controls, because of its counter-
fuDctionality, and because of their proposed difficulty in imposing external executive control on
salient external objects. In other words, if Harris is correct in supposing that such a problem
binders the production of spontaneous pretend play in autism, we would expect to see increased
effects of functional decontextualization amongst these children. We would predict that perceptual
decOOtextualizationwould be unimpaired.
6.22 Method
participants
Inessence the participant groups assessed inExperiment 4 were the same as those employed
iD the retest of Experiment 3; the two investigations were in fact run concurrently. Therefore four
groups were tested, children with autism, children with MLD matched for BPVS and for APT
scores and mainstream children matched on the BPVS (for a justification of the use of the BPVS
aDd the APT see subsection 5.26). However the groups did differ slightly from those used in the
retest of Experiment 3 as one child with autism who suffered particularly from behavioural
problems refused to co-operate in Experiment 4. Also a child with autism who had been tested in
the first run of Experiment 3 was not available for testing at the time of this experiment Therefore,
as before, twenty four children with autism participated in this experiment, 4 of whom were girls
20 of whom were boys.
As a result of these slight alterations the chronological and verbal mental ages of the groups
do differ slightly from those given in table 5.6. A further factor which alters the ages is that a
number of the children with autism and with MLD were in fact tested on the initial run of
Experiment 3 rather than on the later retest Details of the participant groups as employed in this
experiment are given in table 6.1.
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The mean chronological age of the children with autism was not significantly different to that
of either of the two groups of children with MLD (P=O.30, MLD group matched for APT; P=O.33
MLD group matched for BPVS; t-tests), but was significantly higher than that of the normal
children (p<O.01, Hest). The APT scores of the children with autism and MLD group matched for
APT did not differ significantly. Similarly the groups matched for BPVS scores did not differ
significantly in their mental ages compared to the children with autism. As before, the fact that the
mean chronological age and mean verbal mental age of the normal children were so similar (59.3
vs. S4.0 months) indicates that this group was one of average, and representative verbal ability.
Table 6.1. Details of participants inExperiment 4.
Group n CA APT Score BPVS Age
(montbs) (montbs)
Autism 24 mean 107.1 26.6 54.2
SO 28.2 5.9 20.7
ranJ,te 58-154 17.5-37 33-94
MD 24 mean 115.0 26.6
Matched SO 23.5 6.1
bYAPf range 75-149 17-37.5
MD 24 mean 114.0 53.8
Matched SO 20.3 20.2
bY BPVS ranJ,te . 80-149 32-93
Nannal 24 mean 59.3 54.0
SD 13.8 20.3
range 44-96 31-94
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Materials
The figures used in the procedure (see below) were made out of cardboard, and were
approximately 40cm tall and 28cm wide. Five gender-appropriate figures were used with each
child. The majority of children were Caucasian, but eight were Afro-Caribbean or Asian and
racially appropriate figures were used with these children.
Five object sets were used. Each set contained a real item (R), a counter-functional item (CF)
and four non-functional items (NFI-NF4). For example the 'toothbrush' object set consisted of a
miniature yellow toothbrush (R), a yellow pencil of the same thickness and length (CF) and four
lengths ofyeUow doweling (NF1-4)· All the items in a particular set were the same colour, and all
NF items were made of the same material. Items R, CF and NFl were designed to be as
perceptually similar as possible, having the same size and shape. Items NF2, NF3 and NF4 were
varied on one dimension (e.g. length, width) systematically, so that they became less perceptually
similar to the R, CF and NFl items.
It was important that particular care was taken in designing the materials to be used in the
experiment. In order to provide 'room' for a potential reluctance amongst children with autism to
cboose the CF prop, it was vital that control children picked the CF prop for each object set
relatively early on. It was also desirable to design the sets so that perceptual decontextualization
could be seen. It could be argued that manipulating the materials too drastically, simply to show
the expected pattern of prop choices in controls, inight produce artificial performance amongst all
participants. However in the light of extensive previous research showing that perceptual
decontextualization was an established phenomena, it was felt that it would be reasonable to
question the use of object sets that failed to produce this pattern of choices in control children.
Extensive piloting of potential materials was therefore carr!ed out in an effon to obtain
n:aaterlals that allowed for perceptual decontextualizatlon, and gave low CF scores. The procedure.
used for these sessions was essentially that used in the experiment proper (see below for details).
Normal nursery-age children were employed, and were drawn from a different school than the
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normal children who finally participated in the experiment. Four separate sessions took place. each
one testing slightly different sets of materials. The number of children used in each session ranged
from six to ten. and the ages of the children ranged from 4S to 57 months. To avoid repeating a
areat deal of less relevant details only the set of objects that was finally arrived at after these pilot
session is given here (see table 6.2).
procedure
Children were tested in a single session. lasting about five minutes. Testing took place in a
quiet room, in which only the participant and experimenter were present. One of the five
appropriate figures was placed on a table in front of the child. The experimenter then repeated the
following infonnation, using the appropriate R prop ineach instance:
"This is Jenny/John. I want to show you what Jennyflohn does when slhe gets up in the
morning. First of all s/he cleans his teeth." (Experimenter 'brushes' the figure's teeth with the
toothbrush). "Then s/he eats her/his breakfast, s/he eats pizza for breakfast", (Experimenter 'feeds'
cbe pizza to the figure). "After a pizza s/he eats a sweet", (Experimenter 'feeds' the sweet to the
figure). "Then s/he puts on her/his long scarf', (Experimenter puts scarf around the figure's neck).
''Then s/he takes her/his small book ..," (experimenter 'gives' the book to the figure), " .., and goes
off to school", (Figure is removed).
The five R props were then placed to one side, though still in full view of the participant, A
second figure was placed upon the table, and the following instructions were repeated: "This is
Mary!M:atthew. I wonder if you can show me how Mary!M:atthewgets up in the morning. First of
aU can you show me how s/he cleans her/his teeth?", The four remaining 'toothbrush' props (CF
and NFsl-4) were then placed in a line in front of the child, Care was taken to ensure that the
props were ordered randomly. The prop which the child selected as a substitute for the toothbrush
was noted, and removed. The remaining three props were also removed. but were kept together
for future presentation. The child was then sequentially asked to demonstrate how Mary/Matthew
ate their pizza and their sweet, how they put on their scarf and how they took their book to school.
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Once all five actions had been carried out, the figure was removed and replaced with a new
one. The procedure was repeated using the props that had not yet been chosen from each set. This
continued until all but one of the props in each object set had been chosen (a total of five figures,
including the original one were therefore presented).
Each prop in an object set was given a score from 1 to 5 based on the sequence of choices
made by the participant (e.g. prop chosen rust = 1, etc., prop left eventually unchosen = 5). Of
particular interest were the scores for the CF props, and a TOTAL CF score was obtained simply
by adding the five individual CF scores from each object set, for each child. The possible range of
the TOTAL CF score was 5 to 25.
6.23 Results
The CF scores for each object set, and mean TOTAL CF scores for each group of participants
are shown in table 6.3, and the CF scores for each object set for each group are shown in graph
6.1. A two factor Anova analysis of the CF scores was performed, the factors being Group
(repeated measures, 41evels), and Object Set (repeated measures, 51evels). The analysis revealed
no significant main effect of Group (F=0.83, df=3, P=O.48). A post-hoc Scheffe test confirmed
that the children with autism's mean CF score did not differ from that of the combined controls
(F(3, 23)=0.02, P>O.99). There was a significant main effect of Object Set (F=16.31, df=4,
p<O.Ol), but no significant Group x Object Set interaction (F=O.76, df=12, P=O.69). The Object
Set effect was due to significantly higher CF scores for the toothbrush and pizza sets than for the
other three sets (P<O.Ol,Tukey test), and to a significantly higher CF score for the sweet set than
for the book set (p<O.05, Tukey test).
hepler 2
Table 6.3. Mean CF scores by Group.
Group
CF Scores Autism MLD-APT MLD-BPVSI Normal
Toothbrush 2.50 2.75 3.13 2.88
Pizza 2.71 2.83 3.33 2.63
Sweet 2.38 2.17 2.33 1.88
Scarf 2.25 2.00 2.08 1.92
Book 1.58 1.79 1.63 1.50
TOTAL 11.42 11.54 12.50 10.79
Graph 6.1. Mean CF Scores
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A second analysis was performed to look at decontextualization effects within each group,
and for each object set. This took the form of a three factor Anova analysis of the scores for each
of the props, CF and NFsl-4. The factors were Group (independent measures", 4 levels), Object
Set (repeated measures, Slevels) and Prop Type (repeated, Slevels - CF and NFsI-4). Clearly, as
each prop had to be picked at some point, no main Group, Object Set or Group x Object Set effects
could emerge from this second analysis (each object set would produce a score of IS for each child,
1+2+3+4+S, regardless of the order of their choices).
This analysis revealed a main effect of Prop Type (F=131.13, ,df=4, P<O.Ol), due to
significantly higher scores for NFs2, 3 & 4 than for CF and NFl props. In other words, physical
decontextualization was occurring, with little clear sign of functional decontextualization; children
were initially picking either the CF or the NFl prop, and then moved on to the less physically
appropriate props. There was a significant Object Set x Prop Type Interaction (F=10.13, df=16,
P<O.Ol). but this reflected differential effects of Object Set on particular prop types; a clear
decontextualization effect still occurred for each object set. The Group x Prop Type and Group x
Object Set x Prop Type interactions were not significant (F=O.74. df=12, P=O.72; F=O.7S, df=48,
P=O.90 respectively). This second analysis therefore reveals similar decontextualization effects
amongst all groups. The mean scores for each prop type (averaged across all object sets) are
shown for each group in table 6.4, and reproduced in graph 6.2. This graph shows details for two
of the groups only. children with autism and the children with MID matched for BPVS scores; as
perfonnance across all four groups are so similar including more than two groups would confuse
the graph. Mean scores for each prop type and for each object set (averaged across all groups) are
given in table 6.S and shown in graphs 6.3 and 6.4.
lIn this instance it was not possible to take repeated measures of the Group factor, as the subsequent analysis
is too large for any statistical package to compute.
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Table 6.4. Mean Prop Type scores by Group.
Group
Prop Type Autism MLD-APT MLD-BPVS Normal
CF 2.28 2.31 2.50 2.16
NFl 2.13 2.23 2.03 l.98
NF2 3.00 2.99 2.97 2.98
NF3 3.60 3.45 3.41 3.74
NF4 3.99 4.02 4.13 4.13
Graph 6.2. Decontextualization effects by Group (children with autism and MLD. BPVS matched
only)
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Table 6.5. Mean Prop Type scores by Object Set.
Object Set
Prop Type Toothbrush Pizza Sweet Scarf Book
CF 2.81 2.88 2.19 2.06 1.63
NFl 2.11 2.23 2.09 1.57 2.45
NF2 2.56 3.11 3.17 2.91 3.15
NF3 3.47 3.23 3.52 3.85 3.67
NF4 4.04 3.55 4.03 4.60 4.16
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Graph 63. Decontextualization effects by object set (for Toothbrush, Scarf and Book sets)
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Graph 6.4. Decontextualization effects by object set (for Pizza and Sweet sets)
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The results of the second set of analyses shown in the tables and graphs above emphasise the
effect of perceptual decontextualization amongst all groups. In every case, whether the effect of
Prop Type is examined by group (across all object sets) or by object set (across all groups) the
mean score for the NF props increases with perceptual dissimilarity to the target object, doing so
steadily as predicted (NFl <NF2<NF3<NF4). In fact when this effect of Prop Type is examined
across both groups and object sets, the perfect pattern of perceptual decontextualization is found in
17 out of 20 cases2.(P<0.0i3)
However, in addition the tables and graphs also provide an indication of limited functional
decontextualization. Though the mean scores for the CF and NFl props do not differ significantly,
scores for the NFl props are consistently lower than those for the CFs. When group mean scores
are examined for each object set, NFl scores are lower than CF scores in 16 of 20 cases. This
distribution differs significantly from that which would be expected if children were equally likely
., pick either of these two props initially (p<O.Ol, binomial probability test)4.
In the earlier review of studies of decontextualization in normal children (subsection 1.21) it
was tentatively suggested that functional decontextualization might be subject to an age effect,
specifically it was hypothesised that older children might be more effected by functional
diJs:imilarity than younger participants. The analyses described so far provide no way of testing
2This effect is also evident on an individual level of perfonnancc. 64% of children (groups combined) show a
sipitlcantly greater number of perfect patterns of decontextualimtion than could be expected by chance
3If children were equally likely to adopt either this pattern or a different one, this distribution would be
sipif1C8Dt at the 1% level (binomial test). However it is clear that the probabillty of adoptina a perfect pattern of
pllysical decontextualization is well below O.S, and hence the distribution is clearly significant at this level. In fact if
eadl NF prop were equally likely to be chosen, the probability of producina a perfect pattern at random would be
0.042. the probability of this then occurring in 17 out of 20 occasions is clearly minute.
4Tbis effect does not persist to an individual level of analysis.
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this suggestion, however it is clearly worth investigating. Two final analyses will now be
delcribed which attempt to evaluate the possibility of age effects on functional decontcxtualization.
If older children are more susceptible to functional dissimilarity we would expect them to
Ihow higher CF scores than younger children. Correlations of CF score and verbal mental age (as
measured by the BPVS) were made for each group except the children with MLD matched for
APT, clearly no BPVS measures were available for this group. The results of this correlational
aaalysis are given in table 6.6 and a scatter-plot of the data is shown in graph 6.S.
Table 6.6. Correlation of Total CF score to Verbal Mental Age
Group Correlation P
Coefficient (r)
Autism -0.53 <0.01
MlD-BPVS -0.03 0.90
Normal -0.10 0.64
Graph 6.5. Plot of Total CF score against Verbal Mental Age
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This analysis reveals an intriguing result. There is a significant (inverse) relation between
verbal mental age and Total CF score for the children with autism, but not for the other two groups.
This could be taken to suggest that children with autism are, in fact. especially susceptible to
counter-functionality as originally hypothesised, but that the inclusion of older children in the
groups has masked this effect in the earlier analyses A careful examination of the scattergram
(pph 6.S) suggests that this is unlikely. Rather than the younger children with autism producing
larger CF scores than the younger controls, it is the older controls producing larger CF scores than
the older children with autism that seems to account for this finding. In other words we appear to
be looking at a failure to accept the CF as a prop in older controls rather than a failure to do so in
younger children with autism
To check that this is in fact the case a second age-related analysis was performed. Each of the
three groups matched on the BPVS was divided into a subset of fourteen children with a verbal
mental age of 50 months or below, and a second set of ten children with a verbal mental age of 57
months or above. (Clearly the choice of how to divide the groups is an arbitrary one, this particular
division was chosen as it corresponded to a gap in the range of BPVS scores of the participants,
and also would appear to ensure a fair reflection of the children with autism's pattern of
performance as suggested by the scatter-gram. Exactly similar results emerge from an analysis
which splits the groups in half, see Jarrold, Smith & Boucher, submitted).
The analysis that was carried out with these subgroups was essentially the same as that used
initially. Results that mirror those of that earlier analysis (those not associated with the effect of
age. for example Group and Object Set effects) will not be mentioned here unless they differ from
those found initially. Firstly a three factor Anova design was employed the factors being VMA
Subgroup (independent measures, 21evels), Group (repeated measures. 3 levels), and Object Set
(repeated measures, 5 levels). The main effect of VMA Subgroup approached significance
(F=4.04. df= 1, P=0.06), due to the fact that the more able children showed lower CF scores. The
Group x VMA Subgroup interaction was not significant (F=2.28, df=2, P=0.11). The more able
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children with autism did show significantly lower CF scores than their less able counterparts,
(F=7.73, df=I, P<O.Ol; post-hoc test), as would be predicted given the negative correlation found
earlier. However the CF scores of the less able children with autism were not significantly greater
than those of less able controls, nor were the CF scores of the more able children with autism
significantly lower than those of more able controls (see table 6.7 and graph 6.6). This was
confmned by post-hoc Scheffe tests, comparing the performance of each subset of children with
autism with the combined performance of the appropriate control subgroups (F(2, 13)=0.57
P=O.58, less able subgroups; F (2, 9)=3.08, P=O.IO,more able subgroups). The VMA Subgroup
x Object Set and Group x VMA Subgroup x Object Set interactions were not significant (F=O.99,
df=4, P=O.42, F=O.69, df=8, P=O.70 respectively).
Table 6.7. Mean CF scores by Group and VMA Subgroup
Group
VMA Sub2roup Autism MLD.BPVS Normal
Less able 2.64 2.46 2.23
More able 1.78 2.56 2.06
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Graph 6.6. Mean CF scores by Group and VMA Subgroup
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As before a second test was performed to investigate the effects of Prop
Type. In this case a four factor Anova design was employed. The factors were VMA Subgroup
(independent measures, 2 levels), Group (repeated measures, 3 levels), Object Set (repeated
measures,S levels) and Prop Type (repeated, 5 levels - CF and NFsl-4). Again it must be
remembered that as every prop had to be picked at some point, only interactions with Prop Type
can be examined with this design. The VMA Subgroup x Prop Type interaction was 1 arly
significant (F=8.01, df=4, P<O.Ol). This was not due to a differential effect of Prop Type n th
two subgroups, in other words the pattern of choices made by the ubgr up w r imilar.
However there were significant effects of VMA Subgroup on variou pr p typ s. Th 11'1 r ab]
subgroups produced lower NFl scores (F=12.22, df=l, P<O.OI), and high r Nand N 4
scores (F=16.20, df=l , P<O.Ol; F=11.06, dfe l , P=O.Ol respectively, post h c If ts). Th r
was also a strong tendency for the more able subgroups to give lower , d = 1,
P=O.06). This could be seen to suggest that the more able children are le uru r-
functionality, indicating that in fact functional decontextualization might r 1I with ng Clint r l
predictions. However, graph
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6.7 (and table 6.8) which shows mean prop scores for each subgroup, indicates that these effects
are in part due to a clearer pattern of performance amongst more able participants. The extent of
perceptual decontextualization is more marked in the more able group, while the degree of
functional decontextualization (the slope between CF and NFl) is certainly comparable to that
shown by the less able children. It could in fact be argued that there is evidence of increased
functional decontextualization with increased developmental level. The difference in the mean NFl
scores is relatively larger than the difference in the mean CF scores. The VMA Subgroup x Group
x Prop Type interaction was not significant (F=l.40, df=8, P=O.20).
The VMA Subgroup x Object Set x Prop type interaction approached significance (F= 1.S1,
df-16, P=O.09). This trend was again due to clearer patterns of performance amongst the more
able subgroups of children. The Object Set x Prop Type interaction was significant (F=7.22,
df-16, P<O.OI),as in the initial analysis, but the differential effects of Object Set on
decontextualization patterns (see graphs 6.3, 6.4) were more limited in the more able children. The
four way interaction was non-significant (F=O.87, df=32, P=O.68).
Table 6.8. Mean Scores by VMA Subgroup and Prop Type (across Groups)
Prop Type
VMA Subgroup eFt NFl·· NF2 NF3·· NF4·
-- 2.44 2.25 3.00Less able 3.40 3.90
More able 2.13 1.75 2.95 3.83 4.33
t - --Effect of VMA on scores for each prop type: P<O.10, P<O.05, P<O.O1
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Graph 6.7. Mean Scores by VMA Subgroup and Prop Type
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6.24 Discussion
The main purpose of this investigation was to provide a specific test of a central executive
explanation of children with autism's pretend play difficulties. This account (as formulated here)
suggests that children with autism do not engage in pretend play because they are impaired in their
ability to impose internal pretend schemas on external objects. This problem arises because of a
failure to override externally salient functions of the props typically available for pretence. The
results of this experiment show that children with autism have no particular difficulties in
overriding prop functionality: they are not impaired in their ability to select the CF props when
appropriate as would be expected.
A failure to demonstrate such an impairment cannot be attributed to the methodology of the
experiment. A sufficiently large choice of alternative non-functional props was available to allow
for a bias against the counter-functional prop to be clearly seen. It might be argued that the majority
of the non-functional props (NFs2,3 & 4) are so dissimilar from the target object as to bias against
their choice even for children with autism. In other words children with autism might face a
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struggle between counter-functionality and perceptual dissimilarity, and the NF2,3 & 4 props might
be so perceptually dissimilar as to overcome a counter-functionality effect, which itself might still
be non-normal. The smooth patterns of decontextualization present in all groups, and with all
object sets, provides evidence against this argument. There is nothing to suggest that NF2 is
especially inappropriate as a substitute; the score for each successive NF prop seems to rise
steadily, rather than in a step-wise fashion.
The difference in CF scores for the five object sets does not constitute a methodological
problem for the experiment either. In fact the slight variety in the strength of 'counter-functionality'
amongst the five individual CF objects serves to emphasise the absence of any Group effect in the
experiment. The lack of any impairment in the group of children with autism, on any of the object
setS. or in general, can not therefore be attributed to over-strong counter functionality causing floor
effects in controls. Neither can it be explained by excessively weak counter-functionality which
might not impair executive function.
That the five object sets gave different mean CF scores is not necessarily surprising. The
JCOfCS for the book and the scarf sets may have been lowered by the fact that the procedure stressed
die length of the scarf and the small size of the book. This will have focused attention onto the
need to select an adequate substitute prop, and biased against choosing the shorter or larger non-
functional items. The higher CF scores for the toothbrush and pizza object sets can also be
explained. It is possible that the 'counter-functionality' of the pencil (the CF for the toothbrush set)
was especially emphasised because the figures used in the experiment were made of cardboard, a
material which is well suited to being 'written upon's. It is also conceivable that the CF for the
SResults from earlier pilot work suggests that this may be the case; the CF scores for the identical set of
soodlbrush materials were lower when plastic dolls were used rather than cardboard fiauros. Clearly plastic is less
conducive to the appropriate functional use of the pencil.
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pizza. set, the 2 pence coin, stood out from the other non-functional props because it was made
from a different material. This may again have biased against choosing it.
Perhaps the most striking feature of the findings emerging from this experiment is the degree
of similarity amongst the performance of the children with autism and controls. In fact the only
group difference that emerges from the analysis is that the children with autism's Total CF scores
correlate with verbal mental age, while those of the two control groups matched on the BPVS do
not. The analysis of performance by age subgroup reveals that this is not due to especially high CF
scores amongst the younger children with autism. Therefore if anything the children with autism
assessed in this experiment respond to the effects of object functionality 'more normally' than do
controls, the older control children do not appear to be able to pick the CF as readily as they
should (Though it should be noted that the older children with autism do not produce significantly
lower CF scores than the older controls; see table 6.7 and graph 6.6).
Having considered the analyses of CF choices, it is worth focusing briefly on the results of
the broader analyses of patterns of decontextualization. It is clear that children do engage in
perceptual decontextualization, as they reliably pick the non-functional props on the basis of their
perceptual similarity to the target object. This is shown in the fact that mean choice scores for the
NFl props are significantly lower than those for the NF2, NF3 and NF4 props. Further, group
mean scores for these props are consistently ranked in exactly the order that would be expected
(NFl<NF2<NF3<NF4), indicating that perceptual decontextualization is not simply a matter of
always picking the most appropriate prop first, but a trend that continues right throughout the series
of choices. This finding is striking considering that only perfect patterns were allowed as evidence
of perceptual decontextualization. This is a very conservative criterion, we would probably want to
say that a child who picked props in the following order for example: NFl <NF2<NF4<NF3 was
also exhibiting decontextualization,
While the evidence for perceptual decontextualization is overwhelming, the support for
functional decontextualization is limited. Group mean scores for the CF props were not
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significantly greater than for the NFl props as measured by parametric analysis, as would be
expected were functional, decontextualization occurring. However a non-parametric analysis
revealed that these group means were consistently greater for the CF props. This suggests that
children are indeed less likely to pick the CF prop, but that this effect is only a very weak one, and
not large enough to make mean scores differ significantly.
There are three important implications of these findings regarding decontextualization, firstly
the extent of perceptual decontextualization adds weight to the validity of the experiment. It is
consistent with the large range of experiments which have shown this effect. This can be taken as
evidence that the present study is effectively tapping the processes that are nonnally involved in
object substitution. A critic might argue that all we are really seeing in this instance is that children
are able to match objects which look alike, not a very sophisticated achievement.
A second important point is that though evidence of functional decontextualization is limited,
where it exists it is at least consistent with what would be expected. It was hypothesised that
children would prefer the NFl prop to the CF prop, and the results are consistent with this
suggestion, if not unambiguously so. A final, third, point regarding decontextualization effects is
that very tentative evidence emerges to support the suggestion that older children are (relatively)
more subject to the effects of functionality. Though their CF scores are lower than younger
children, their NFl scores are proportionately lower still. This could be the result of a heightened
awareness of the functionality of the CF prop, albeit coupled with an increased ability to override
this functionality, or it could simply be a reflection of a clearer pattern of perfonnance across the
whole range of props. The experiment does not provide a means of separating these two
possibilities, and it would be wrong to infer too much from any of the trends of functional
decOOtextualization noted here.
The methodology employed appears therefore to have been generally successful in eliciting
appropriate physical and functional decontextualization amongst all groups of participants.
However, it might be argued that though the absence of Group differences seen here indicates that
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object functionality does not impair children with autism's ability to engage in object substitution,
this does not necessarily imply that executive deficits of this kind do not impinge on other areas of
such children's pretend play. Object substitution is after all, only one of three fundamental forms
of pretence identified by Leslie (1987), the other two being imagining absent objects and attributing
absent properties. Two points are of relevance here; firstly it is not easy to see how one might test
the effect of object function in the case of imagining absent objects. Secondly, and relatedly, it
must be remembered that this study provides a direct test of Harris' (1993) proposals. If it is the
case that inhibiting reference to salient functions is at the root of children with autism's difficulties
in pretence, one must predict an impairment in object substitution (in fact this is the most
appropriate testing ground for the theory).
The same point is sufficient to counter an alternative criticism, namely that it is not valid to
generalise the results of a highly structured test to the creative and flexible domain of spontaneous
pretend play. In other words it might be argued that this task does not really tap ability to engage in
.pretend play proper', especially as the experimenter provides the ideas for pretence and the child
simply has to choose an appropriate prop. This may be true to an extent, though, as noted above,
the patterns of decontextualization observed suggest that this study examines the processes that
have been investigated in other studies of object substitution. This aside, the more important point
is that Harris's suggestions still imply that children with autism should be impaired on this task.
A more sophisticated criticism would be that the use of a structured testing environment
removes the executive demands normally placed on a child in free play, and therefore alleviates
potential executive difficulties present in autism. The problem with this suggestion is it conflates a
number of potentially separable executive functions. This experiment has not shown that executive
dysfunction has no part to play in explaining children with autism's problems in pretence. simply
that a failure to inhibit salient reference does not seem to be important.
A final counter-argument might centre on the question of developmental suitability of the task
employed here. While the evidence of executive dysfunction in autism reviewed in subsection 2.33
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suggests that such deficits might persist in well-recovered adults, it could be argued that it is
unlikely that a spontaneous pretend play deficit would still be evident. In other words it only
makes sense to look for potential causes of a pretend play impairment amongst those participants
who could be expected to show such an impairment Some of the children with autism assessed in
this study were relatively able, and it is therefore possible that they might have little difficulty on
this task despite problems amongst less able members of the group.
A stronger rejoinder to this criticism comes from the analysis of developmental subgroups
presented above. Though the more able subgroups still contain a relatively broad spread of
abilities, the less able subgroups are much more coherent. A significant impainnent in the
spontaneous pretend play of the less able children with autism (whose VMAs range from 33 to 50
months) would surely be predicted, and therefore the absence of subgroup differences in CF scores
emerging from this analysis provides extremely strong evidence against Harris' claim.
Overall then, this experiment provides clear results which indicate that children with autism
are not specifically impaired in their ability to use counter-functional objects as substitutes in
pretence. This in turn suggests that if deficits in pretend play are of a performance kind, then they
are not due to problems with inhibiting reference to the salient functions of objects as Harris
proposes. It therefore remains to test the other two performance deficits which were put forward as
potential explanations of an absence of spontaneous pretence in autism, the Motivational and GARS
hypotheses. Experiment 5 attempted to decide between these two. accounts, and will now be
described.
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6.3 Experiment 5
6.31 Introduction
Having made an explicit test of the CEO hypothesis, and having found no suppon for it,
there remained two other hypotheses to address, the Motivational account (which in fact subsumes
a number of potential hypotheses) and the GARS hypothesis. Experiment 5 made a strong test of
the GARS account, and in doing so also made a test, albeit a weaker one, of Motivational
explanations.
The GARS hypothesis explains a lack of pretend play in autism by suggesting that children
with autism have difficulty in accessing retrieval strategies necessary for bringing pretend schemas
intO use. Implicit in this suggestion is the assumption that external cues have the potential to aid the
retrieval of these schemas, while the absence of suitable external cues is what typically hinders
children with autism's attempts to pretend. One way of testing this hypothesis is therefore to
examine the effect of available cues on children with autism's ability to generate pretend acts. The
present study attempted such a test, comparing ability to generate acts with props available to cue
pretence, with the hypothetically harder task of generating acts in the absence of any props. This
should provide a strong test of the GARS hypothesis, as children with autism should find
generating pretend acts especially difficult when there are no props available to them.
Intriguingly this point highlights a crucial difference between the CEO and GARS
hypotheses. The CEO account sets the locus of difficulty in the external world to an extent, and
predicts that pretend play in the absence of props should be unimpaired in autism, and must become
more difficult as functional props are added to the play situation. In contrast the thrust of the
GARS hypothesis is that the impairment in autism is more internal. Consequently pretend play
should be especially difficult in the absence of props according to this account, and should become
easier as props are introduced; as the presence of props provides crucial cues to facilitate the
retrieval of pretend schemes. These two accounts therefore make opposing predictions regarding
children with autism's ability to pretend in the absence of props. Consequently the proposed
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experiment makes a strong and concurrent test of these two explanations. As an aside, an
alternative way of viewing this asymmetry, is in terms of a distinction between activation and
inhibition. The CEO account centres on a failure to inhibit inappropriate responses, while the
OARS account would appear to be based on a failure to activate appropriate retrieval strategies.
This distinction will be returned to in the following, concluding chapter.
A simultaneous, but less stringent test of the Motivational hypothesis was provided by
ensuring that the children were motivated to perform in both conditions - 'With Props' and
'Without Props'. This ensured that all three accounts under consideration (setting aside the fact that
Experiment 4 provides strong support against the CEO hypothesis) made different predictions as to
children with autism's performance in the two experimental conditions (see table 6.9). In theory it
would have been possible to ensure that children were unmotivated to perform. However it had
been noticeable throughout the series of previous experiments that the children with autism had
enjoyed taking part in the studies, and therefore motivation levels would have had to have been
actively lowered. This would clearly have been unethical.
It was decided that a Without Props condition would have to precede a With Props condition.
There is clearly a danger of children 'carrying over' pretend acts performed in the first condition
into the second. Not only would this appear to be less likely if the easier, With Props condition
were second, but the crucial test of the GARS hypothesis is really provided by the Without Props
condition. It is therefore important that this condition comes first if the study is to be a valid test of
this hypothesis.
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Table 6.9. Predictions of relative impairment amongst children with autism made by the three
coaDpeting hypotheses
Condition
Hypothesis Without Props With Props
OARS Impaired Unimpaired
Motivational Unimpaired Unimpaired
CBI) Unimpaired T_
. _.
6.32 Method
participants
The children who participated in Experiment 5 were drawn from the groups that had been
assessed previously in Experiment 4 and in the retest of Experiment 3. Smaller groups were
employed however, as sufficient time had elapsed to invalidate a number of the BPVS scores used
to match participants. It was felt that the current matchinl of the poups was particularly accurate,
an interpretation backed up by the extent of similarities in performances in Experiment 4. Rather
than disrupt these groups by large scale retesting, smaller participant groups were therefore
adopted. One child with autism was not included in the study as it would not have been possible,
Jiven the policy of the school which they attended, to remove them to a separate room for testing.
Unlike the previous studies, in this case it was of vital importance that children were tested in a
secluded environment.
Given the similarity in the performances of the two groups of children with MLD over the
previous two experiments, it was also decided that there was little need for the MLD·APT matched
control group. Therefore only three groups were assessed in this study. children with autism, with
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MW and normal children. all matched individually on the BPVS. There were 15 children in each
poup. Full participant details are given in table 6.10.
The mean chronological age of the children with autism was not significantly different to that
of the group of children with MLD (P=O.46, t-test), but was significantly higher than that of the
aorma1 children (p<O.OI, Hest). The groups did not differ significantly in their mental ages.
Table 6.10. Details of participants in Experiment 5.
Group n CA BPVS Age
(months) (months)
Autism 15 mean 109.60 56.67
SD 29.81 22.85
range 60-156 33-94
MID 15 mean 116.73 56.60
SD 21.61 22.28
range 82-144 33-93
Normal 15 mean 62.53 56.60
SD 16.43 22.75
range 47-99 31-94
In certain cases large white sheets were used to cover up objects that could not be removed
from the room in which the child was being tested (see procedure). The only other apparatus
employed in the Without Props condition were four strips of card, 1 metre in length and 20 cm
thick which were used to mark out a square for the children to occupy. Bight props were used in
the With Props condition. Bxperiments 1 to 4 had all investigated pretence using relatively small or
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miniature props. In an attempt to move away from this level of toy-play. and to broaden the scope
of the research as a whole. it was decided that in this case larger props would be used. It was
hoped that this would lead to more self-oriented rather than toy-oriented behaviour. The particular
props employed were a candle. a football scarf, a plastic colander, a plastic serving spoon. a clear
plastic ruler, a blue plastic card index box, a small cylindrical metal tub and a large metal cake tin.
procedure
Children were tested in a separate room, in the presence of the experimenter alone. Care was
taken to ensure that anything that might prompt children. or provide suggestions for a pretend act
was removed from the room or hidden from sight Any pictures or posters were removed from the
walls of the room, and if necessary white sheets were draped over objects that could not be
removed or hidden. The only objects that were left visible were standard pieces of furniture such
as tables and chairs (these were in fact present in every room). The actual testing took place within
a square marked out by strips of card on the floor, to prevent the child from roaming around and
using furniture as props.
A number of measures were taken to ensure that children were motivated to perform. There
was a clear danger that during twelve minutes of a potentially difficult task, children might become
bored or frustrated. Before commencing, children were shown a selection of toys, and were told
that they would be able to choose a toy for themselves should they 'play the game well'. After the
first condition all children were allowed to select one of these toys, and told that they would then
have another chance to win one (all children were given this second choice after the second
session). Children were also told that ~.ey would have a limited time in which to produce as many
pretend acts as possible, and were given feedback on the number of acts they had produced as the
sessions progressed.
The Without Props condition was always presented first. followed by the With Props
condition. Both conditions lasted a maximum of six minutes, but were terminated earlier under
certain circumstances (see below). Each condition started with the experimenter modelling three
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pretend acts for the children. These acts were the same in both cases. and were: cleaning one's
teeth. washing the windows. and putting on a hat. In the With Props condition the experimenter
used one of the props in each case (the ruler, the scarf and the colander respectively).
When the child suggested a pretend act the experimenter encouraged them to act it out if they
did not do so spontaneously with the words "show me how you pretend to do that", In the without
props condition the experimenter joined in the acting out of the act once the child had first shown it
satisfactorily. This was done to reduce potential embarrassment that might arise form performing
pretend acts before a passive observer. The experimenter did not 'join in' in this way in the With
Props condition as this would have required them to take props away from the children, and by this
_ge children were quite comfortable with the experiment.
After the child successfully performed an act the experimenter would encourage them to
continue by saying "Good, that's X pretend things, what else can you pretend to do?", where X
was the number of acts produced up to that point, Not only did this serve to keep the experiment
flowing (pilot work showed that without this comment from the experimenter children would rush
on and produce a number of ill-formed acts very quickly before becoming bored). but it served to
further motivate children to perform. by providing a constant feedback of their score.
Typical pretend acts consisted of a verb and object pairing. for example pretending to kick the
balL It would clearly have been possible for children to produce a large number of acts simply by
varying one of these pairings. As it was felt that this would not be a fair reflection of true
pnerative ability, children were only allowed to use the same object or the same verb twice, Once
they had. for example, kicked a ball and thrown a ball they would be told "Now we 've done lots of
things with balls, let's have no more. What else can you pretend to do?", In the same way, after
Jdcking a ball and kicking a stone the experimenter would tell them "Now we've done lots of
ldcking, lets have no more. What else can you pretend to do?", In certain instances children
produced acts that were functional in nature, for example a child might suggest that they could
"pretend to jump up and down" while actually jumping. In these cases the experimenter would say
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-«Good, but that's not really pretending is it? You are actually jumping up and down. What else
can you pretend to do?".
If a child did nothing for 15 seconds, or said that they had run out of ideas, the experimenter
prompted them by modelling the pretend act of reading a book, then asked them what else they
could pretend to do. If this situation arose again a second prompt of shooting a gun was used.
Fmally if, for a third time the child refused to produce any further acts, the session was ended.
Tbese two modelled prompts were included to ensure that a fair reflection of children's generative
performance was obtained. It was felt that some children might need some time to get 'into the
swing' of the game, and that it would be incorrect to end a session the first time they stopped
generating ideas.
Rating Scheme
Each condition was videotaped for subsequent analysis. This involved rating each act that the
child produced, and noting the time at which it occurred. The length of sessions that ended before
six minutes had elapsed, because children refused to continue or produce more acts, was also
Doted.
Credit was given for each different pretend act, exact repetitions of an act (e.g. kicking a ball
twice) were not scored. Repetitions of the three initial model acts, or of any subsequent prompts
from the experimenter were not scored. Children were allowed to use a verb or an object twice
only (as described above), credit was not given for a third use of either a verb or an object. This
sometimes required careful interpretation of the nature of the child's suggestions. For example a
child might put on a shoe, put on a sock and put on the television. Clearly though the child has
used the same verb in each instance (to put on), they are really using two different verbs (to wear,
and to switch on). Often this strategy of replacing the child's verb with a synonymical one was
useful in determining whether they were repeating themselves or using a particular verb more than
twice. Acts were not classed as pretend acts if they were clearly functional in nature. Acts were
also only classed as pretend acts if the child adequately acted out their own suggestions, if it was
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felt that the action was not an appropriate one credit was not given. However for the most part acts
were clearly of a pretend nature, and scoring them was a relatively simple operation.
Three videotaped sessions, one of a child from each group, were chosen randomly and
scored by an independent rater to ensure the validity of the coding employed. The inter-rater
reliability was satisfactory (Cohen's Kappa=O.80).
6.33 Results
The mean time spent in each condition, by children from each group, are given in table 6.11.
Also shown are the number of children who stopped before six minutes had elapsed. The majority
of children did last for the full duration of the experiment. conditions were terminated early in only
18 out of 90 cases. The differences between lengths of time spent in each condition by children
with autism and by controls are not significant (Without Props: P=O.55, P=O.93; With Props
P=O.44, P=O.80, vs. children with MLD and normal children respectively; t-tests),
Table 6.11. Mean lengths of conditions (Plus number stopping before 6 minutes)
Condition
Group Without With.
Autism 335.5s (2) 340.2s (2)
MID 319.7s (4) 323.2s (5)
Nonnal 333.5s (3) 344.7s (2)
Though the lengths of time spent in each condition by the children with autism do not differ
significantly from the time spent by co~trols, there is clearly a danger in just comparing the total
number of acts produced by each group. Not only will this selectively advantage the groups who
do play for longer, albeit by a small amount that could perhaps be justifiably overlooked, but the
major problem is that one cannot be certain that children of the same developmental ability drop out
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from each group. For example, it is possible that the 2 children with autism who dropped out early
from the Without Props condition, were relatively high functioning children who might have been
expected to produce a relatively large number of acts had they continued. In contrast the children
dropping out from the control groups may have been low functioning individuals, who may not
have produced many more acts had they continued with the experiment
It is therefore clearly important to control for these factors in some way. This was done by
taking a measure of rate of act production, which was used to extrapolate the performance of the
children who did drop out early in order to estimate the number of acts they would have produced
had they continued. Firsdy a Simple Rate estimate was calculated (by dividing the acts produced
by the proportion of the 360 seconds used) However a Simple Rate clearly assumes that children
who stop would carry on at the same rate of production. This is unlikely as the very fact that these
children are stopping suggests that they are running out of ideas. Hence a Simple Rate is, if
anything, an over-estimate.
Therefore a Complex Rate was calculated in order to take into account cases where the rate of
act production slowed down over time. This was done as follows: In the cases of children who
did stop before six minutes, the number of acts which they produced was plotted as a cumulative
frequency graph. To take into account any length of time spent between the production of their
final act and their refusal to continue, a simple cumulative frequency was not used. Rather a child
was only credited with an act upon the production of the next one, or in the case of their final act,
upon termination of the session. For example a child might have produced a pretend act at 30, 60
and 120 seconds, and refused to continue at 180 seconds. Crediting this child with 3 acts in 120
seconds clearly over-estimates their performance, instead one would want to credit them with 3 acts
in 180 seconds.
Having plotted this form of corrected cumulative frequency for each child. regressions were
fitted to this data. Three were attempted, a simple linear regression and quadratic and cubic
polynomial regressions. Using the equations produced by these regressions the extrapolated
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Dumber of acts at 360 seconds was calculated (if necessary the turning point of the regression was
calculated by differentiation and used to provide a maximum value). In each case the value
predicted by the regression which accounted for most of the variance in the data (highest r) was
adopted, with the following provisos. Values were not accepted if the regression did not account
for at least 95% of the variance in the data (r2>O.95) or if they were less than the score actually
obtained by the subject at the point of termination (possible for the polynomial regressions) or if
they were greater than the value predicted by a Simple Rate calculation (again, possible for the
polynomial regressions). If none of the predicted values met these criteria then the Simple Rate
estimate was adopted.
These manipulations produced a 'Rate Corrected' estimate of perfonnance for each child,
though it should be remembered that the majority of children lasted for the duration of each
eoadition, and many of those who stopped early lasted for most of the time available. Means of the
corrected values for each group are shown below in table 6.12, and shown diagrammatically in
graph 6.S. A two factor Anova analysis was carried out with the Rate Corrected Acts data, the
factors being Group (repeated measures, 3 levels), and Condition (repeated measures, 2Ievels).
The main effect of Group approached significance (F=2.68, dfa2, P=O.OS)reflecting lower scores
for the children with autism than both sets of controls (P=O.06vs. children with MLD, P=O.OSvs.
normal children; paired t-tests). The main effect of Condition was not significant (FaO.54, df-l,
p.().48), and nor was the Group x Condition interaction (FaO.99, df-2, P=O.3S).
To check that the corrected rate analysis provided a reasonable assessment of the data, a
second analysis was performed on the uncorrected total number of acts. To control for the fact that
some children did not last for the full six minutes in each condition, these children were not
considered in this analysis. The three groups, made up therefore of only those children who lasted
tbe full duration of both conditions, consisted of 13 children with autism (mean VMA-S3.54
snonths, sd-22.S7), 10 children with MLD (mean VMA-S7.90 months, sd-21.93), and 12 nonnal
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children (mean VMA=62.08 months. sd=22.20). These groups were matched. though not
individually. for VMA (P=O.65. children with autism vs. children with MLD; P-O.3S, children
with autism vs. normal children; P=O.66,children with MLD vs. normal children; unpaired t-tests),
Mean total act scores for these reduced groups, in both conditions, are shown in table 6.12. A two
factor Anova analysis of the fonn used initially (though with independent Groups due to the
absence of individual matching in this case), revealed a significant main effect of Group (F=6.37,
df=2. P<O.OI). due to lower scores amongst the children with autism than amongst controls
(p<o.05 vs. normal children. P<O.OIvs. children with MLD; Tukey tests). As before the main
effect of condition was not significant (F=O.28. df=l, 1>=0.60), and nor was the Group x
Condition interaction (F=O.28,df=2, P=O.76).
Table 6.12. Means number of pretend acts by Group
Group Condition Rate Corrected Acts Total Acts (children lastinl
(all children) duration of both conditions)
Audsm Without Props 10.74 9.62·
With Props 10.95 10.00·
:MID Without Props 15.68 18.6()##
With Props 13.74 17.5'
Nonnal Without Props 14.21 16.67t
With Props 14.05 16.08t
*N=13, "'N=10, tN=12
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Graph 6.8. Mean number of pretend acts, Complex Rates
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For the children within each group, and for each condition, correlations were
calculated between number of Rate Corrected Acts produced and verbal mental age. Signifi ant
correlations were obtained for each group in the Without Props condition (Pear on's r=O.S ,
p<O.05, children with autism; r=O.64, P<O.OS children with MLD; r=O.80, P<O.Ol n rmal
children). In the case of the Without props condition, correlations were sigrtificant for th hildr n
with autism (r=O.S3, P<O.OS), but not for the children with MLD or the normal children (r= .20,
r=0.49 respectively). All correlations were positive, indicating greater rates f a l pr du ti n
amongst developmentally more able children.
To provide a final, further way of looking at the data, Group curnulativ r
plotted for each condition. Clearly this necessitates using the total numb r f act pr u d, rnth r
than rate corrected data, so it must be remembered that some of the hildren dr pur'
minutes. Nevertheless the frequencies (see graphs 6.9 and 6.10) h w h w th p rf rm ne Ih
group of children with autism is markedly inferior to that of contr Is a r th wh 1 r nge r \11 h
condition.
Graph 6.9. Group Cumulative Frequencies for Without Props (Total Acts)
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6.34 Discussion
The purpose of Experiment S was to provide a firm test of the validity of the GARS
hypothesis as an explanation for children with autism's problems in pretend play. An advantage of
the design employed was that it provided a further strong test of the CED hypothesis (though this
hypothesis received no support from Experiment 4) and a less stringent but nonetheless important
teSt of Motivational explanations of an absence of pretence. The actual pattern of predictions made
by these three hypotheses were outlined in table 6.9. The only possible pattern of performance
which would not fit one of these three accounts would be for children with autism to be impaired in
their production of pretend acts in both conditions. Ironically this is exactly the pattern of
petfonnance that emerged.
The analysis of rate corrected act production reveals that the children with autism generally
produce fewer acts than controls. Though the main effect of Group is not strictly significant there
is a clear trend for impaired performance amongst the children with autism. The absence of a
clearly significant Group effect is argueably the result of fatigue effects amongst controls in the
second, With Props condition. Table 6.12 and graph 6.8 show that the performance of the children
with autism remains constant across the conditions, while that of controls drops. That this might
reflect fatigue effects, rather than differential group responses to differences in condition difficulty,
is indicated by the correlational analysis described above. This revealed a significant correlation for
the children with autism in both conditions suggesting that these children perform at a level
commensurate with their ability in both cases In contrast the correlations for controls are only
significant in the initial, Without Props condition, and drop somewhat for the With Props
condition. This suggests that they are not performing as well as they might in the second
condition, where their performance is less representative of their ability as predicted by their VMA.
A t1nal way in which these fatigue effects can be shown is by overlapping the cumulative frequency
pphs for the two conditions (graphs 6.9, 6.10). Doing this reveals that children with autism's
number of acts rises at the same rate in both conditions. However in the With Props condition the
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children with MLD' s total rises at the same rate as in the Without Props condition for the first two
minutes. before increasing at a slower rate, while the normal children begin at the Without Props
rate, but slow down after only one minute. In the light of these points. and bearing in mind the
extent of the Group differences seen anyway. it would appear fair to suggest that the rate corrected
analysis provides evidence that children with autism are impaired in their generation of acts, relative
to controls.
This suggestion is strengthened by the second analysis which considered the total number of
acts produced by those children lasting for the duration of both conditions. This analysis is not as
tightly controlled as the first, as children are not individually matched across groups, and because it
cannot account for the fact that children of different abilities might drop out from different groups.
However the reduced groups employed in this case do not differ significantly in their verbal mental
aJes, and can therefore still be said to be matched, albeit more loosely. This analysis necessarily
uses an independent group design, which has less power to reveal a Group effect The fact that
such a clear difference is seen between the performance of the children with autism and of controls
is therefore striking.
An interesting point emerges from a comparison of the two types of act production measures
employed here. Table 6.12 clearly shows that while the children with autism produce a similar
number of total and rate corrected acts, both sets of controls show higher levels of performance
when total. rather than rate corrected acts are considered. This effect can also be seen be comparing
graph 6.8 with the final cumulative scores seen in graphs 6.9 and 6.10. This indicates that the
children who are dropping out from the control groups must be producing relatively few acts before
they stop playing. Consequently a rate correction results in a extrapolated figure which is still
relatively low compared to those of other members of the group. Including such a child therefore
suppresses average group performance. while omitting them increases mean levels of production.
Does this affect the proposed interpretation of a group difference advanced here? Not at all. If
anything it might be argued that these control children should be omitted from the analysis. as they
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are likely to be those children who performed poorly due to low levels of motivation, or because of
embarrassment.
Importantly, the absence of a significant Group x Condition interaction in both analyses
mdicates that the generativity impairment proposed here persists across conditions, contrary to the
predictions of the GARS hypothesis. There is no evidence to suggest that children with autism's
relative problems in generating acts is alleviated to any extent by the introduction of props in the
second condition.
One might readily accept that this experiment has shown impaired production of acts amongst
children with autism, but still argue that this does not imply that their generative abilities are
similarly impaired. This argument could be based on the assumption that condition lengths of six
minutes might disadvantage the children with autism, who might not be motivated to continue to
produce acts for this length of time. An examination of graphs 6.9 and 6.10 shows that the
children with autism's rate of act production does fall off with time, and hence it could be claimed
that they might be showing fatigue (within a condition). If one were to ,compare the groups after
only two minutes one would probably not find any impairment. However the control children
, show exactly the same pattern of 'within condition fatigue'; their rate of act production also drops.
It is not surprising that children's rate of act production slows as they produce more acts, and
presumably have to spend longer thinking of each new act. This situation is clearly one in which
there is a trade off between this task demand and the need to provide room for an impainnent to be
seen. That the children with autism are indeed impaired as regards their rate of production can be
seen by looking again at graph 6.9, for example, and drawing tangents on the plots to determine the
level of performance groups would achieve were they to continue at their initial rate for six minutes.
Doing this roughly by hand reveals that children with autism would produce a total of
approximately 150 acts, while controls would produce around 260!
A further possible argument against assuming impaired generative abilities in the children
with autism is that this group might, as a result of their characteristic perseverative behaviour, be
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hampered in their production of different acts by a preference for performing the same act
repeatedly. While this raises interesting questions about the relationship between generation and
perseveration, it can be dismissed as an argument. There was no evidence to suggest that children
with autism repeated acts more than controls. In fact the experiment was highly successful in
reducing repetitions of the same pretend verb-object pairing. When these repetitions did occur it
was at the end of a session when the child was beginning to forget what they had done at the start
of the test.
This study therefore provides good evidence to suggest that children with autism are
impaired. relative to controls, in their ability to generate pretend acts, both in the presence and in the
a,bsence of props. This finding hammers another nail into the coffin of the CEO hypothesis which
claims that children with autism's difficulties in pretence are due to the functionality of the objects
around them. By this account children with autism would find pretence in the absence of props
relatively easy, as there would be no salient functional action prompted by the environment for
them to have to strive to override. In this sense the findings of the present study are consistent with
those obtained from Experiment 4.
The results also cast some doubt on a Motivational account, which would predict unimpaired
performance in both conditions ifmotivation levels were high. It could of course be argued that the
observed impairment across both conditions is due to a lack of motivation amongst the children
with autism, and that the results therefore indicate only that the manipulations employed to raise
motivation in this group were unsuccessful. Two pieces of evidence counter this suggestion. The
first is that children with autism spent as long playing in each condition as did controls. The design
of the experiment allowed children to end the session if they wished to, but table 6.11 shows that
the children with autism did not drop out particularly often or particularly early. A further counter-
argument is that the results show that children with autism, unlike controls, retain their motivation
to perform in the second With Props condition. The correlation between their verbal mental ages
and the number of acts that they produce remain constant across both conditions, indicating that
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they perform at a level which reflects their developmental abilities in the second condition. This is
also seen in the rate of rise of their cumulative frequency plots, which is constant across conditions.
There is therefore no evidence to suggest that levels of motivation drop in the With Props
conditions. Though this could still be taken to suggest that the children with autism are not
motivated in either condition it seems likely that children who were not motivated in the first
condition would become even less motivated in the second. faced with another relatively long
period of testing.
The remaining hypothesis that the experiment set out to test, and the one that it principally
addressed. was the GARS hypothesis. This states that children with autism have particular
problems in generating the strategies required to access appropriate play schemes. This account
would suggest that children would find play without props especially difficult. as this situation
provides very few cues to aid their retrieval processes. Conversely play with props should be
easier as the props themselves should provide clues for pretence. The results from the current
study do not fit with these predictions either, as the children with autism showed no differential
effect of prop presence. The findings therefore count against this particular account. However a
generative ..hypothesis must not be dismissed too readily given the clear problems in generating
pretend acts shown by the children with autism. There is obviously some impaired generative
ability within this group, but it does not seem to be mediated by the presence or absence of external
cues, as initially suggested.
In summary this experiment succeeds in part in its aim to test the three hypotheses outlined
initially. Relatively clear findings emerged. suggesting that children with autism are impaired in
their ability to generate pretend acts both with and without props. However while the experiment
tests these accounts, by comparing their predictions with the actual results. it fails to provide
explicit support for one of them as they all fail to account for the observed pattern of performance in
the children with autism.
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6.4 Brief Conclusions
The purpose of this chapter was to describe the work that was undertaken in an attempt to
answer the question of why children with autism do not pretend, given the evidence from chapters
4 and S to suggest that they can pretend in certain circumstances. Three potential explanations of a
failure to pretend spontaneously were outlined in chapter 3. and these were addressed here.
Experiment 4 provided a stringent, and I believe well controlled test of the CEO hypothesis. The
results of this experiment failed to support this account, as children with autism had no difficulty in
employing counter-functional props in object substitution as would be predicted by this hypothesis.
Neither did the CED hypothesis receive support from Experiment 5. In this case children with
autism were clearly impaired in their ability to engage in pretend play without props, a finding at
odds with the predictions made by the CED account. The results of Experiment 5 also count
against a Motivational explanation of children with autism's difficulties in spontaneous pretend
play_ In this case children with autism were impaired despite clearly being motivated to engage in
pretence.
This leaves the GARS hypothesis, which again was not fully supported by the results of
Experiment 5. As formulated initially this account predicts unimpaired production of pretend play
in the With Props condition, but the findings indicated a generativity impairment which persisted
across both conditions. However, as noted above, it is clear that children with autism's difficulties
appear to lie in the generation of pretend acts. Therefore with appropriate modification, a
reformulation of the GARS hypothesis may provide an adequate explanation of the results of
Experiment 5, and hopefully of Experiments 1 to 4 also. A potential reformulation of this
hypothesis will be described and critically evaluated in the following chapter.
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Conclusions
7.1 Summary Of Findings
The final section of this final chapter (section 7.6), will describe the thesis, or theoretical
position reached as a consequence of this research. The penultimate section (section 7.S) will
outline areas for further research in this area that arise both from questions which have been
raised by the work described here, and from questions which it has left unanswered. Before
tying these threads together in this way, this initial section will draw together the findings
obtained from Experiments 1 to S. A summary of the major findings is also given at the end of
the section in table 7.1. This section will be brief, as these results have been discussed in detail
in the preceding chapters. However, it is important that the theoretical conclusions drawn later
in this chapter, regarding pretend play in autism (section 7.2), and also the more general areas
of pretend play, and of autism (sections 7.3 and 7.4 respectively) are based on a clear and
measured evaluation of all the empirical findings obtained in this research.
7.11 Experiments J And 2
Experiment 1
The main aim of Experiment 1 was to address two questions crucial to the issue of
whether pretend play deficits in autism result from a competence deficit, or global inability to
pretend. These were whether children with autism are impaired in their production of
spontaneous pretence, and secondly, whether they were similarly impaired in structured
(elicited and instructed) conditions. An additional question of interest concerned the extent to
which the ability to produce emotional and social pretence might be specifically impaired in
autism. However, given methodological failings inherent in the design, the analysis that was
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conducted was relevant only to the two main questions outlined above, and not to the issue of
particular emotional and social pretend play deficits.
Two separate analyses were performed on the results of Experiment 1. The first
examined percentage time spent in various forms of play in both spontaneous and elicited play
conditions, while the second investigated rates of production of various play acts in these two
conditions. The groups did not differ significantly in percentage time spent in spontaneous and
elicited symbolic play. However, there was a clear trend towards impainnent, and the fact that
a Oroup effect did emerge with the doll plus junk materials suggests that floor effects amongst
controls with the other toy set masked a true symbolic play deficit. In support of this
luagestion a significant impairment amongst the children with autism did emerge when
intermediate symbolic play was also included in the analysis. Exactly similar results were seen
in the rate of symbolic (and intermediate symbolic) act production analysis. No Group x
Condition interactions were found for either analysis of symbolic or of symbolic plus
intermediate symbolic play. In other words, there was no evidence to suggest that children
with autism were unimpaired in elicited conditions, relative to spontaneous conditions.
Children with autism showed higher levels of manipulative play, and of 'no play'. than
did controls. As suggested they also spent less of their time in functional play than did
controls. There was a trend for children with autism to produce functional acts at a slower rate
than controls, and in fact children with autism were impaired in their rate of total act production.
Experiment 2
Experiment 2 provided a test of children with autism's relative ability to engage in
instrUCted pretend play. It was carried out because there were a number of flaws present in the
initial test of instructed play employed in Experiment 1. As well as investigatinl children's
ability to produce pretence under these highly structured conditions, the question of specific
b:npairments in the production of emotional and social pretence was addressed in this study.
The results of Experiment 2 showed that children with autism were not impa.ired relative
to controls in their ability to carry out instructed pretence, whether by a conservative or by a
liberal analysis. There was also no differential effect of Instruction Type on the perfonnance of
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the children with autism; they performed similarly to controls on physical, social and emotional
instructions.
7.12 Experiment 3
The purpose of Experiment 3 was to investigate children with autism's ability to
understand pretend acts which were presented to them. The importance of this test being that it
removes any potential difficulties in production that children might otherwise experience. Two
versions of the same experiment were carried out, and both sets of analyses showed that
dilldren with autism were unimpaired in their ability to name the pretend Substance involved in
a play episode. There was a trend towards a significant Group x Mode interaction in the initial
analysis of the Substance question results, but this was not due to a differential effect of Group
iD the Pretend Mode, and did not persist in the second analysis.
Similar results were obtained from both analyses for the Outcome and Mode questions
also. In both these cases no Group effects or Group x Mode interactions were observed.
However as has been noted, this cannot be taken as evidence for unimpaired comprehension of
pretence in the group with autism, especially in regard to perfonnance on the Mode questions,
where all groups adopted an echolalic guessing strategy. The evidence for and against guessing
inresponse to the Outcome questions has been discussed (subsection 5.27), and as one cannot
be completely certain that children with autism are not (randomly) guessing their responses in
this case, these results can only be seen to indicate the absence of a deficit in this instance,
rather than implicating the presence of general unimpainnent.
7.13 Experiments 4 And 5
Experiment 4
Of all the studies described in this account, it is Experiment 4 that provides the most clear
cut results. This is partly because it tested a particular explanation of children with autism's
problems in pretence, the CED hypothesis, which made fmn and easily verifiable predictions.
The observed results clearly indicated that children with autism have no particular difficulties in
carrying out object substitution with counter-functional objects, contrary to the predictions of
the CED account. Specifically, children with autism showed no particular reluctance to adopt
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counter-functional props in substitution, relative to controls. They also showed exactly the
same, expected pattern of decontextualization in their choices of non-functional props.
Experiment 5
In common with Experiment 4, the prime aim of Experiment 5 was to make an explicit
test of a specific explanation of pretend play deficits in autism. In this case the GARS
hypothesis was investigated, but the design of the experiment also ensured that the CEO
hypothesis and Motivational accounts were tested simultaneously. Children with autism's
ability to generate pretend acts was examined, both in the absence of. and in the presence of
props. The results of the experiment suggested an impairment in this ability in autism in both
of these conditions. Though the effect of Group which emerged from the rate corrected Anova
analysis was not strictly significant. there was a clear trend for the children with autism to
produce fewer acts than controls. Further, it is argued that fatigue effects amongst controls,
which appear to lower their levels of performance in the With Props condition, may bemasking
a significant deficit
Strong support for a generativity impainnent comes from the analysis of total acts, which
shows that the children with autism produce significantly fewer total acts than controls.
Though the matching of individuals in this second analysis is not as stringent as it might be,
these groups are all of a similar level of verbal ability. The fact that neither analysis reveals a
significant Group x Condition interaction indicates that the extent of any generativity
impairment remains constant regardless of the presence, or absence, of props.
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Table 7.1. Summary of findings from Experiments 1 to 5.
Experiment Testing Conditions Relative Performance Of
Children With Autism
1 Spontaneous and Elicited Impaired in terms of % time spent in symbolic
Play play, and in rate of symbolic act production.
2 Instructed Play Unimpaired.
(Physical, Emotional, Social) (No differential effect of Instruction Type).
3 Comprehension of Pretence Unimpaired (though all groups perform poorly
(Substance, Outcome, Mode) on Outcome and Mode questions).
4 Use of Counter-Functional Unimpaired
Props inObject Substitution
S. Generating Pretend Acts: Impaired (not strictly significant for rate
With and Without Props corrected acts, clearly so for total acts).
7.2 Implications For Pretend Play In Autism
This particular section describes the implications of the findings summarised above as
regards our understanding of pretend play in autism. This will be done in two ways. which
mirror the themes which have run through this account. Firstly, the question of whether
children with autism can indeed pretend under certain circumstances will be addressed
(subsection 7.21), and secondly, specific explanations of children with autism's problems in
pretend play will be by considered (subsection 7.22).
7.21 Can Children With Autism Pretend?
In section 5.3 it was claimed that the results of Experiments 1 to 3 indicated that children. .
with autism's characteristic lack of spontaneous pretend play could not be ~ue to a competence
deficit in this domain. These results suggested that while children with autism were impaired in
their production of spontaneous pretend play, they were able to pretend under certain
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cUeumstances (when pretend play was instructed, or acted out before them). These findings
indicate that children with autism, rather than being globally unable to pretend, 'can but don't'
enpge in pretence.
Four arguments against this interpretation have already been outlined (see section S.3).
These were:
i) That the children assessed might not be representative of children with autism as a whole.
n) That the use of different children in Experiment 3 might invalidate a comparison with
Experiments 1 and 2.
iii) That the tasks employed may not actually assess pretend abilities as such.
iv) That matching for language comprehension may match away differences in pretend play
abilities, if pretend play and language are functionally related.
Both criticisms i) and iv) are countered by the fact that a characteristic deficit in time spent
in spontaneous pretend play was observed amongst the children with autism, and criticism ii) is
DOt a strong one as there is no real reason to suspect that a radically different subset of children
were added to the sample between the studies. The third criticism is more subtle, and while
arguments against it were advanced in section S.3, it will be returned to later.
The importance of the pattern of findings obtained up to and before the start of
Bxpcriment 4, was that they were generally at odds with the predictions made by the various
competence hypotheses outlined in section 3.2. In contrast, they were broadly consistent with
those made by the performance hypotheses fonnulated in section 3.3. However, Experiments
4 and 5, though not aimed at the question of competence or performance specifically, provide
further evidence which is potentially relevant to this question. It is therefore important to re-
evaluate this conclusion in the light of the findings of these later studies.
One thing that children with autism appear to be able to do, from the evidence of
Bxperiments 1 to 5, is to engage in object substitution in a structured play situation.
Experiment 2 showed that they are not impaired in their ability to carry out physical instructions
to pretend, which required them to select an appropriate junk prop. Similarly, while the design
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of Experiment 4 was such that children were forced to choose a prop for object substitution, the
pattern of choices shown by children with autism was strikingly 'nonnal'. Object substitution
is one of the three fundamental manifestations of pretence put forward by Leslie (see subsection
1.22), the other two being 'attribution of absent properties' and 'imagining absent objects'; is
there also evidence of these other two forms amongst the children with autism studied here?
In order to pass the social instructions used in Experiment 2 children would appear to
have to imagine an absent object, for example a ball that was thrown between the two figures,
as no junk props were included in these cases. In the case of the emotional instructions, a
correct response necessitated the ascription of an emotional state to the protagonist, and its
consequent enactment, which could be construed as attribution of absent properties. The
children with autism were not impaired relative to controls on these subsections of Experiment
2. However, it might be argued that the social, and perhaps even the emotional instructions
could be passed by carrying out an appropriate action such as 'throwing or 'crying'. While this
would appear to still be pretence of a sort, it is not clear where this type of play would fit into
Leslie's scheme.
A better place to look for evidence of the ability to attribute absent properties is the
analysis of responses tothe Outcome questionsposed in Experiment 3. Here children were
required to appreciate that an animal who had had pretend tea poured on them would be hot. As
,
described above, caution must be exercised in interpreting the absence of an impairment
amongst the children of autism on this question as evidence of true comprehension, but the
results are loosely consistent with the suggestion that the attribution of pretend properties is
something children with autism can perform and understand. Experiment 3 also indicates that
children with autism can imagine absent objects, as they are unimpaired on the Substance
questions used in this experiment, which required them to imagine an empty tea pot as
containing tea. The criticism that these questions could be answered by a process of associative
labelling has been addressed, but cannot be dismissed entirely. It is therefore clear that children
with autism can engage in object substitution, and it appears as if they can also imagine absent
objects and attribute absent properties.
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These points confmn that Experiments I to 5 have demonstrated that children with autism
are able to engage in pretend play in some instances, contrary to the predictions made by
competence deficit accounts. Does this imply that all the problems in pretend play seen autism
are the result of a performance deficit? Not necessarily . Firstly it should be noted that within
the framework for pretend play development outlined previously (subsection 1.25), what has
been demonstrated in autism is the ability to carry out. or understand. solitary symbolic play.
No attempts have been made to study potential impairments in social pretend play, and itmay
be that children with autism are globally unable to carry out or understand this type of pretence.
Inother words there may not be a competence deficit in solitary pretend play, but there may be
one in social pretend play. Reasons for suspecting that this might be the case will be discussed
in section 7.3.
A second caveat concerns the use of the term 'perfonnance deficit'. In subsection 3.16 it
was noted that a failure to perform in one domain may well be due to a lack of competence in
some other domain. A quintessential performance deficit implies intact ability to perform
coupled with a failure to perform which is not mediated by any other competence deficit. My
choosing not to speak French. despite being fluent in the language is a (hypothetical) example
of this. If the absence of spontaneous pretence seen in autism was the result of such a deficit.
one would predict that children with autism would have no difficulty in producing pretence
provided that they were sufficiently motivated to do so by the experimental conditions.
However. in the elicited play condition employed in Experiment 1 children with autism spent
less time in pretence than did controls. The methodology employed in Experiment 5 also
direCtly elicited pretence. In this case children with autism appeared to be motivated to perform,
yet their ability to produce pretend play was significantly impaired.
It does seem as if the locus of difficulty for children with autism lies at the level of
production of pretence. rather than at that of the psychological mechanisms involved in
pretence. However, it is clearly not the case that simply increasing the structure of a play
situation enables children with autism to produce pretence. The prediction that elicited pretend
play would be unimpaired in autism has clearly not been supported. In discussing Experiment
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1 it was noted that the difference in the degree of structure of the spontaneous and elicited play
conditions was not as great as it might have been. Even so, the performance hypotheses
outlined in section 3.3 were taken to predict that any increase in structure would result in a
corresponding decrease in the extent of children with autism's deficits. In Experiment 1 no
evidence of any differential improvements across conditions was observed. Children with
autism's failure to produce pretend play spontaneously is therefore not the result of a
'quintessential performance deficit'; in other words it is not the case that they can pretend but
simply choose not to do so. While they have the ability to produce pretend play under certain
highly structured conditions, they have problems in producing pretence in other conditions.
even when pretend play is clearly called for. Therefore, while it is fair to reject competence
deficit explanations of pretend play deficits, it is perhaps inappropriate to talk purely in terms of
performance deficits in the pretend play of children with autism. Rather than embracing this
potentially misleading distinction, the following subsection will discuss reasons why children
with autism do not pretend in all circumstances, given that they can pretend in some
circumstances.
A final point concerns whether this research has shown that children with autism can truly
engage in 'pretend play'. A critic might argue that what has really been demonstrated is that
children with autism are capable of selecting objects that resemble other target objects. that they
can then use them appropriately; and that they can name substances and outcomes that are
usually linked with actions (whether literal or pretend) that they will be familiar with. This, it
might be argued. is nothing like pretend play. which almost by definition is creative, flexible
and unpredictable.
As far as one defines pretend play in these terms. these criticisms hold. This work has
not shown evidence of very creative or particularly imaginative pretend play in children with
autism, but has shown that children with autism are capable of producing and understanding
pretend play. in that they are able to substitute one object for another and act as if absent objects
and properties are present. The claim is not that children with autism are normal pretenders, but
rather that the psychological mechanisms/on which the production of pretend play rests, appear
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to be intact. It might be fairer to say that children with autism can pretend, but may not be able
to pretend play.
7.22 Why Do Children With Autism Not Pretend?
Specific explanations of children with autism's deficits in pretence were outlined in
sections 3.2 and 3.3. The three competence hypotheses detailed in section 3.2 were the
metarepresentational theory of Leslie (subsection 3.21) and the social theories of Hobson and
of Rogers and Pennington (subsection 3.22). All three of these accounts are 'competence
deficits' because they explain an absence of spontaneous pretend play in autism by proposing
that the psychological mechanisms for engaging in pretence are not present or functional in
autism. As noted above, aspects of Experiments 2, 3 and 4 indicate that this explanation is
incOrrect; children with autism do appear to have intact the mechanisms for pretence (or at least
for solitary symbolic play).
Of the three performance deficits proposed in section 3.3, these being the CEO, the
Motivational, and the GARS hypotheses, it is the latter that received most support from
Experiments 4 and 5, which were aimed at separating these accounts. Experiment 4 provided
clear evidence against the CEO hypothesis, and in addition the results of Experiment 5 did not
fit the pattern predicted by this account. A final 'nail in the coffin' of this hypothesis is the
finding of impaired functional play in autism which emerged from Experiment 1 (see subsection
7.11 above). As formulated the CEO account would seem to predict that children with autism
would have no problems in using toys in a way appropriate to their function.
The Motivational hypothesis was not tested as stringently as the other two accounts, but
this is partly due to difficulties inherent in tying such an account down and making a direct test
of its predictions. However Experiment 5 was designed in such a way as to allow for a more
indirect test of this hypothesis, and provided evidence against it. Children with autism were
impaired in their ability to produce pretend play despite being motivated to do so. Children
with autism's performance did not decline in the second condition employed in this study. in
the way that the performance of controls did, and this could be indicative of high levels of
motivation. Further, this account struggles to explain why the elicited pretend play of children
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with autism was impaired inExperiment 1. While the nature of the elicitation employed in this
experiment has been previously criticised, the one thing it should have achieved would be to
increase levels of motivation in children. A final point is that it was my impression throughout
teSting, that motivation to perform was not a problem for children with autism. It did seem that
they often preferred other forms of play, as suggested by Harris (1989a) but this form of
motivational account cannot explain impaired performance without props in Experiment S. As
noted in the previous subsection, the pattern of results obtained in elicited play conditions
(Experiments 1 and 5) indicates that children with autism do not suffer from a 'quintessential
performance deficit'. It is not the case that they can pretend, but simply choose not to do so.
In contrast to the other two accounts the Generation of Access and Retrieval Strategies
hypothesis is able to explain why children with autism were impaired in elicited pretend play in
Experiment 1. The methodology employed in this condition did nothing to aid the accessing of
pretend acts, as it did not provide any cues to elicit the retrieval of pretend schemas. The
QARS account could also easily be interpreted to predict impaired functional play in autism, if it
is hypothesized that a failure to access play schemas applies to all creative play acts rather than
symbolic acts alone. However while Experiment 5 indicated a clear problem in generating ideas
for pretence, the GARS account did not receive total support from this experiment. It was
predicted that children with autism would be impaired in their ability to generate pretend acts
without props, but not with props. While the study provided reasonable evidence of impaired
ability to generate pretend acts in autism, it undoubtedly showed that the extent of any such
impairment was not affected by the presence of external cues.
The GARS hypothesis therefore needs to be reformulated if it is to be of use in explaininS
the set of results obtained in these experiments. The original account predicted that props
would cue the generation of appropriate retrieval strategies, but this does not appear to occur.
In fact if the presence of props did cue access of pretend schemas it would be difficult to
ex.plain the clear impairment seen in spontaneous pretend play in the presence of props
(Experiment 1). It therefore seems that the locus of children with autism's difficulties in
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generating pretend acts is very much an internal one. It cannot simply be that they fail to
perceive and utilise appropriate cues that are inherent in props, because if this were the only
cause of a With Props deficit, they would be unimpaired in generating acts in the Without Props
condition.
The suggestion of some form of internal generation deficit fits in well with the majority of
findings observed in this research. What separates the tasks in which children with autism
were tmimpaired from those which demonstrated an impairment is whether the idea for pretence
was given by the experimenter or not. In Experiments 2, 3 and 4 the pretend act was either
specified or demonstrated for the child. Children with autism (broadly speaking) were able to
act out a specified act, or comprehend a demonstrated act as well as controls. Conversely, in
Experiments 1 and 5 the child had to generate the idea for pretence themselve,s, and it is here
dlat the children with autism struggled. A benefit of viewing the tasks in mese terms is that it
explains the failure to find unimpaired elicited pretend play in Experiment 1. In this condition
children were encouraged to pretend, but no cues or suggestions of potential acts were
provided. The child was left to generate pretend acts themselves.
Further, strong support for this proposed deficit comes directly from the evidence of
impaired rates of symbolic act production seen in Experiment 1 (see subsections 7.11, 4.24).
These findings replicate those of Sigman and Ungerer (1984a), who specifically found that
children with autism produced significantly fewer symbolic acts than controls (see subsection
3.14). It therefore appears that children with autism fail to produce normal levels of pretence in
spontaneous play, not because they are unable to pretend, but because of an impaired ability to
generate pretend acts. This is not to say that they are totally unable to generate acts; they clearly
produce some pretence, even in spontaneous play conditions. Instead they appear to be unable
to produce pretend acts at the same rate as controls.
The hypothesis that children with autism are impaired at generating pretend acts is
important in that it provides a potential explanation of the results of all five experiments reported
here. It might be argued that this hypothesis amounts to little more than a description of what is
already well established, after all the starting point of this research was the claim that children
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with autism spontaneously produce less pretence than controls. This criticism is partly
countered by the fact that a deficit in pretend act generation fits well with other evidence of
impaired generativity in autism (described in subsection 3.33). However, it is still important to
ask why children with autism might struggle to generate pretend acts. Though firm conclusions
cannot be drawn without conducting further research to addresses this question directly, the
hypothesis needs to be fleshed-out somewhat.
Accepting that children with autism show a slower rate of pretend act generation than
controls implies one of two things. Either they prefer not to generate acts, or they find the
generation of acts somehow 'harder' than do controls. While a motivational explanation has the
power to explain a reduced rate of act production in spontaneous play, it is ruled out by the
findings of Experiment 5 which indicate that children with autism are still impaired in their
generation of pretence when motivated to produce pretence. It therefore appears that generating
pretend acts is something children with autism find intrinsically more difficult than do controls.
There appear to be at least three potential explanations for this difficulty. These will now be
;eutlined and discussed.
Failure To Habituate Hypothesis
It is possible that children with autism might not generate pretend acts because they fail to
habituate to the non-symbolic use of objects around them, or to the non-symbolic nature of the
current context. There is considerable evidence to suggest that children with autism are
abnormally slow to habituate to repetitive stimuli (see Dawson & Lewy, 1989a). This is not
only shown by studies which have found a reduced rate of autonomic habituation to the
presentation of repetitive auditory stimuli, but by evidence of an abnormal electrophysioiogical
response to the presentation of novel stimuli in autism. The presentation of novel stimuli
typically produces a characteristic peak in brain activity, or Event-Related Potential (ERP), as
measured by electrodes upon the skull. This particular section of the ERP, which is known as
the P3 component, has been found to be abnormally reduced in autism (Courchesne, Kilman,
Galambos & Lincoln, 1984; Courchesne, Lincoln, Kilman & Galambos, 1985; see also
Dawson & Lewy, 1989b; Lincoln, Courchesne, Harms & Allen, 1993). This suggests that
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children with autism do not respond to novelty as strongly as do other individuals, which in
turn may suggest that they do not habituate to familiarity as readily as others.
It is therefore possible that children with autism are not driven to change their behaviour,
or to generate new behaviour, in the way that other children appear to be. Children's play
seems to be characterised by a need to explore the possibilities provided by the environment,
and indeed by the imagination. Normal children when presented with an object might first
manipulate it, then move on to using it in functionally appropriate ways, before fmally using it
in pretence. In contrast children with autism might never habituate to the manipulative use of an
object; they may ne~er be driven to use it functionally or symbolically. Dawson and Lewy
(1989a) suggest that "Autistic children often become fascinated with certain objects
(presumably with the manipulation of those objects) - a fascination that can lead to overly
focused attention on the object, to the exclusion of the rest of the environment. It. It is therefore
possible that this abnormal attentional response, or the lack of the normal bias away from the
repetitive and familiar, prevents children with autism from generating pretend acts.
Having said this, there are a number of problems inherent in this acoount, At fIrStsight it
soans very reminiscent of the motivational hypotheses that were outlined in section 3.31,
notably Harris' (1989a) suggestion that children with autism mi.ght not engage in pretence
because of an active preference for manipulative play. As noted above, motivational accounts
are not sufficient to explain the range of fmdings observed in Experiments 1 to 5, and in
particular the evidence of impaired generation of pretence in Experiment S, where children were
motivated to perform. However the processes that are implicated by this 'Failure to Habituate'
hypothesiS would appear to be at a lower level than those referred to by Harris. They are
autonomic, automatic and presumably unconscious. and would therefore not be open to
iDfluence by motivational factors.
A more serious criticism of this hypothesis is that it is based on a selective sampling of
the wide literature on attentional deficits and sensory processing impairments i.nautism. The P3
component is only one aspect of the BRP, other parts of which have also been seen to be
abnormal in autism (see Dawson & Lewy, 1989b). In a sense focusing on these findings alone
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represents cutting one's cloth unfairly. A further key point is that the evidence of P3 deficits in
autism is not entirely conclusive. While there is good support for a reduced P3 component in
response to novel auditory stimuli, the evidence for a similar effect with visual stimuli is
equivocal (see Courchesne et al., 1985; Strandburg, Marsh, Brown, Asamow, Guthrie &,
Biga, 1993). The empirical support for this account is therefore not as stranl as it milht be,
but the important point is that there do appear to be definite deficits in habituation in autism,
which could conceivably explain a failure to generate pretend acts, and the fmdings obtained
bere.
Contextual Shi/ting Hypothesis
A second explanation of a generativity impainnent in pretence is that children with autism
have difficulties in switching from one behaviour to another. To borrow Sandson and Albert's
(1984) terminology (see subsection 2.31), children with autism may be 'stuck in set', and have
difficulty shifting from using an object in one context (manipulatively), to usinl it in another
(symbolically). Clearly there are parallels between this suggestion and the Failure to Habituate
hypothesis outlined above. A failure to habituate would lead to apparent difficulties in
switching, and impaired ability to switch attention would be reflected in delayed habituation to
stimuli. The evidence for abnormal habituation in autism described above could therefore be
taken as support for this account. Courchesne, Akshoomoff and Townsend (1990) argue that
..... BRP studies, plus recent neurobehavioural studies, stronlly sUllest that autistic children
have significant dysfunction in the neural mechanisms that underlie a human being's ability to
capture, maintain and shift attention".
Further support for this suggestion comes from direct evidence of impaired ability to shift
attention in autism. Wainwright-Sharp and Bryson (1993) have shown that high-functioning
adults with autism are impaired on Posner's (1978) visual orientina task. In this task
participants indicate whether a target stimulus appeared in the left or right of their visual field.
Before the target stimulus is presented a cue stimulus is shown indica tina which location the
tarlet will subsequently appear in. The cue may be valid or invalid, and normal participants
show delayed ability to respond to the target's location when the cue is invalid. A similar, but
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abnormally large effect was observed in the adults with autism. suggesting that they had
difficulty in shifting their attention to the target's location, when prompted to attend to another
location.
Of course the failure to switch attention could easily be linked to an executive dysfunction
account. Though Experiment 4 provided conclusive evidence that children with autism can
inhibit a salient response to an object, this was only one of four executive functions identified in
section 2.3. Of the others, a failure to generate self-initiated action could be seen as a potential
cause of impaired contextual switching. Children with autism might have difficulty in
consciously and actively guiding their behaviour, and fail to switch from one context to another
as a result. In these terms impaired generation of pretend acts would not be the result of an
executive failure to inhibit a salient response, but rather would result from a failure to activate a
novel response.
Interestingly, though Harris' executive dysfunction-based explanation of children with
autism's problems inpretence highlights problems in inhibition. it also includes this 'failure to
activate' aspect of contextual shifting (Harris, 1993; see subsection 3.32). Harris writes:
" •..the autistic child is more reliant on the schemas evoked by the current context, and has great
difficulty in guiding his or her behaviour ... according to an internally conceived plan that over-
rides these .. :· (my italics). However, the fact that Harris account includes. and perhaps
muddles, these two aspects of executive control raises the question of whether it is valid to
explain a failure to shift attention in terms of activation deficits alone. It may not be possible to
separate the activation of appropriate behaviour from the inhibition of inappropriate behaviour.
As Wainwright-Sharp and Bryson (1993) note, their results show only that individuals with
autism u... appear to have difficulty disengaging and/or shifting attention ...... Experiment 4
showed that children with autism can disengage from the salient aspects of objects. is it
possible that they have separate problems in shifting behaviour?
As a deficit in contextual switching has the potential to tie in with both a failure to
habituate and executive dysfunction, it is possible that habituation impairments are the direct
result of executive deficits. If this were the case then the support for an executive explanation
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of impaired generativity of the form outlined here would be greatly enhanced. However,
electrophysiological studies of patients with frontal lobe damage reveal a pattern of ERP
abnonnalities that differ from those seen in autism (Knight, 1991). It therefore seems unlikely
that frontal lobe dysfunction could lead to both executive impairments and abnormal habituation
responses in autism. A Contextual Shifting deficit could therefore arise from one of two
sources. It might be attentional, or executive in nature.
Social Paucity Hypothesis
A further potential explanation of impaired ability to generate pretend acts is that children
with autism might simply have less ideas for pretence than other children. Inparticular it might
be argued that the characteristic failure to interact socially with parents and peers seen in autism
might lead to a reduced pool of ideas from which to draw on. This suggestion mirrors that of
Rogers and Pennington (1991), who argued that children with autism's impaired imitation and
theory of mind abilities might lead to them having "too little knowledge of the social world to
act it out in play" (subsection 3.22). There is evidence to suggest that a child's level of
sociability is linked to their rate of social pretend play development (Connolly & Doyle, 1984~
Howes & Matheson, 1992), and to suggest that play partners can playa facilitatory role in
production of social pretence (Dale, 1989; Fiese, 1990). Whether these effects reflect greater
creativity and generativity, or relate to some other aspect of pretend playability is not clear.
However, Haight and Millar (1992) have found that 30% of a two-year-olds' utterances in
pretence are reproductions of their mothers previous 'pretend talk', suggesting that social
pretence may be a significant source of themes for pretend play.
A further problem for this form of account concerns the question of what it means to say
that a child lacks ideas for pretence. Children with autism's ability to carry out pretend play
instructions (Experiments 1 and 4), and to comprehend pretend acts (Ex.periment 3) suggests
that they do have some form of representation of these acts. These children know what it
means to 'wear a hat', to 'clean teeth with a toothbrush', and to 'pour tea from a tea pot'; hence
these schemas must be intact at some level. Their typical failure to produce these acts in
spontaneous pretence would appear to be due to impaired ability to access or select these
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schemas in a symbolic context (as implied by the previous two accounts). Having said this,
can we claim that children with autism do have ideas for pretence if they are not accessible?
Would one want to claim that knowledge of this kind might be implicit? These questions will
only be answered satisfactorily by more explicit defmitions and descriptions of the notions of
ideas, schemas and acts, and of the relations between them in the domain of pretend play.
Tentative Conclusions
Few finn conclusions can be made as to the relative merits of the three accounts outlined
above. The Failure to Habituate and Contextual Shifting hypotheses are supported by direct
evidence from studies of attentional deficits in autism, and the Contextual Shifting hypothesis
could also be tied in with the considerable evidence of executive dysfunction in autism. The
Social Paucity hypothesis is more vague, and in particular fails to address the question of why
children with autism don't produce pretend play acts despite having the knowledge of these
particular acts. Though there are problems associated with each account, all three would, in
principle, appear to lead to an impairment in the ability to generate pretence of the form
proposed here, and are therefore able to explain the results of Experiments I-S.
It is important to remember that these hypotheses have not been proposed in an anempt to
make definitive claims about the processes underlying an apparent generativity Impairment in
autism. Instead they have been advanced to show that a generativity hypothesis has the scope
to be expanded and fleshed out, and is much more than a description of what we already know
about pretend play in autism. The purpose of this research project was to provide a plausible
explanation for why children with autism do not pretend spontaneously. The generativity
hypothesis is just such an explanation. The question of why children with autism do not
generate pretend acts is a separate one, and one that must be properly addressed in further
research. Possible avenues for further research of this kind will be discussed in section 7.5.
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7.3 Implications For Pretend Play
A key question which emerged from the discussion of the development and definition of
pretend play in chapter 1 was whether pretend play could be considered to be
metarepresentational. Subsection 1.35proposed a distinction between individual pretend play,
which was thought not to be metarepresentational, and social pretend play, which was seen to
involve metarepresentational understanding. As noted in subsection 3.52, a study of children
with autism's ability to pretend provides a means of validating this hypothesis, for if children
with autism are shown to be able to engage in individual or social pretence then either that
behaviour cannot rest on metarepresentational processes, or children with autism must have
some form of metarepresentational understanding.
As discussed in subsection 7.21, the results of Experiments 2, 3 and 4 indicate that
children with autism can produce, or understand, individual pretence. This amounts to
empirical support for the proposed model of individual pretence. Children with autism would
not be able to produce or understand solitary pretend play if it were metarepresentational, given
their clear problems in the metarepresentational attribution of mental states to others (subsection
2.33). The fact that they can produce and understand this type of pretence supports the view
that it is non-metarepresentational.
Unfortunately children with autism's ability to engage in complex social pretend play has
not been investigated in any of the studies described here. Indeed, given children with autism's
characteristic aversion to social interaction with peers, it is difficult to see how social pretend
play might be studied in autism (see subsection 7.53 below). It might be argued that while
Experiment 3 did not strictly involve children in a social play situation. it required them to
understand pretence in another (Naughty Teddy), and therefore provides a test of ability to
compute an 'M-representation'. However. as discussed in subsection 1.35, there is no real
reason to suppose. that understanding this form of pretence necessitates this level of
understanding. The children are not asked whether Naughty Teddy is pretending, nor are they
asked questions which require an appreciation of Naughty Teddy as a 'pretender'. Instead all
they need to do is read off the pretend behaviour for themselves. Therefore Experiment 3 is
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almost certainly a test of ability to engage in individual pretence, and is clearly not a test of
ability to understand complex Social Pretend Play, at which point metarepresentational
understanding can confidently be inferred.
Therefore the only support for the proposal that (complex) social pretend play is
metarepresentational comes from theoretical considerations outlined previously and the fact that
Howes' work suggests that this behaviour appears in normal children at around the time at
which success on theory of mind tasks begins to emerge.
A final point is that accepting that individual pretend play is non-metarepresentational
somewhat undermines the 'singular' nature of pretence. Many would intuitively argue that
pretend play is qualitatively different from other forms of play behaviour, and that its 'as if
character separates it from other, non-symbolic behaviours. This distinction is implicit in a
metarepresentational theory of pretence, and rejecting this account raises the question of
whether pretence really is such a unique activity. Of the three hypothesis put forward to
account for a generativity impairment only the Contextual Shifting account has the power to
capture this notion of the 'singular nature of pretence'. In functional play available objects
provide cues which can guide behaviour directly. In symbolic play objects may provide cues
for pretence, but they cannot provide a direct behavioural prompt. For example, a pencil might
prompt 'writing', but it would not directly prompt 'cleaning teeth as if it were a toothbrush'.
To marry two of Harris' suggestions, pretence involves 'as-if counter-factual reasoning
(Harris, 1991; subsection 1.34), and also an active shift of context (Harris. 1993; subsection
3.32). Because the representations involved in the process of pretence are counter-factual, they
have no direct instantiation in the world, which might otherwise guide behaviour, and aid this
contextual shifting.
However it might be argued that this difference is only one of degree, as some objects
guide functional behaviour more explicitly than others, and that there is no need to posit a
fundamental distinction between functional and symbolic play. Two sets of evidence appear to
support this view. Firstly the analysis of the development of pretend play outlined in section
1.2 indicated that pretence does develop gradually, and that there is not a discrete boundary
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between non-symbolic and properly symbolic activities. Secondly the results of Experiment 1
confmned the suggestion inherent in previous studies. that children with autism may be equally
impaired in their production of spontaneous functional and symbolic play. In particular, though
children with autism spent significantly less time in functional play than controls, there was also
a trend for them to produce fewer functional acts. This ttend may have been more marked had
levels of functional play been higher in the experiment. If children with autism's problems in
pretence extend to both of these 'creative play' behaviours. then they would appear to be
directly related.
7.4 Implications For Autism
The larger part of chapter 2 focused on attempts to outline the fundamental cause of the
symptoms seen in autism (if indeed it is reasonable to search for a single underlying deficit, see
subsection 2.43). In particular two specific accounts were outlined, though others were
mentioned more briefly. As noted in the subsequent chapter (subsection 3.53), if a deftcit is to
be truly fundamental then it must necessarily impinge on pretend play in autism. The findings
obtained in Experiments 1 to 5 therefore have the potential to infotm about the relative merits of
these accounts. The implications of these results. and of the hypotheses proposed in the
subsections above, will now be considered in this light.
7.41 Reconciling The Findings With A Theory Of Mind Account
As noted in subsection 7.3 above, if children with autism are able to pretend. albeit only
when the ideas for pretence are provided for them, then they must either be able to process and
manipulate metarepresentations, or individual pretend play must not be metarepresentational.
To claim that children with autism have metarepresentational understanding flies in the face of
the large and consistent body of research which clearly indicates that they have severe
difficulties in imputing mental states, which also requires metarepresentational competencet,
lA simulation theorist would argue that the failure to pass theory of mind tasks seen in autism is not due
10 a failure to process metarepresentations. However. a simulationisl would also argue tbal individual pretend
play is non-metarepresentational (see subsection 1.34).
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However there are strong reasons for supposing that individual pretend play is not
metarepresentational, and it is therefore quite possible, and indeed quite parsimonious, to argue
that children with autism are both metarepresentationally impaired and able to pretend. Strong
support for this view would come from any investigation of complex social pretend play in
autism which found an impairment in this domain.
The results of the studies described here are therefore not inconsistent with the theory of
mind hypothesis of autism, though they are at odds with certain strong interpretations of it (e.g.
Leslie's). They do not provide any explicit support for the hypothesis as such; they might have
bad the production of emotional and of social pretend play been impaired in Experiment 2,
though this is not necessarily predicted by a theory of mind account (see subsection 4.34).
Further, it is not clear whether a metarepresentational account has anything to say as regards a
generativity impairment. It might be argued that a failure to engage in Contextual Shifting could
be mediated by a lack of metarepresentational competence, provided one accepted a reflexive
theory of consciousness which explains executive dysfunction, and hence impaired contextual
shifting, in terms of a failure to metarepresentationally reflect on ones own thinking (see
subsection 2.41). However, whether such a long-winded explanation is plausible is far from
clear. Essentially accepting that individual pretend play is not metarepresentational greatly
limits the relevance of this research to the question of the primacy of theory of mind deficits in
autism.
7.42 Reconciling The Findings With An Executive Dysfunction Account
In contrast, the studies conducted in this project are far more relevant to the proposal of
executive dysfunction in autism. Experiment 4 was a straight test of whether a lack of
executive control impinged directly on children with autism's ability to engage in object
substitution. The fact that children with autism had no problems in using counter-functional
props in pretend play, as the CED hypothesis predicted, appears at first sight to severely
undermine the notion of executive dysfunction as an explanation of pretend play deficits in
autism. However, what it really indicates is that children with autism were able to over-ride the
salience of the functionality of the CF props, and inhibit a response that would appropriate to
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their usual function rather than to the desired pretend function. As noted in subsection 7.22,
this is only one of (at least) four potential executive deficits, and a failure to generate self-
initiated action has the power to has explain a generativity impairment, especially within the
framework of a Contextual Shifting deficit.
Though an executive failure to activate novel behaviour, rather than a deficit in inhibiting
salient behaviour, has the power to explain the pattern of pretend play deficits seen in autism in
these studies, there are arguably reasons for rejecting an executive explanation. If executive
deficits are at the root of children with autism's problems with pretence, is one not forced to
predict a failure to inhibit salient responses in Experiment 41 Not necessarily; if executive
control can be fractionated into a number of separate functions, as was proposed in subsection
2.31, then it is theoretically possible for one of these functions to be selectively impaired.
However, the hypothesis of executive dysfunction in autism rests largely on evidence of a
failure to inhibit salient responses, so the criticism remains a strong one. Rather than posit
separate impairments to separate systems, it is more appropriate to think in tenns of a general
executive impairment, which might manifest in different ways depending upon the situation in
which it is being examined. For example, if children with autism have reduced executive
resources then one might see different impairments depending on what aspects of executive
control particular tasks were tapping. In the same way, a flat battery in a car will make it
difficult to start on a cold morning, and will be reflected by dim headlights at night. It is
therefore important to ask what it is about pretence that makes it 'executively difficult'. It may
be that pretend play itself is more about guiding behaviour with reference to counter-factual
representations (section 7.3) than it is about inhibiting pre-potent responses. To return to
Harris' terminology, providing the idea for pretence in Experiment 4 'shifts the contextual
frame' for the child, and so removes the normal executive demands associated with pretend
play.
A further criticism is that a Contextual Shifting hypothesis can also be explained by non-
executive attentional deficits. As noted in subsection 7.22, a deficit in shifting attention could
result from a failure to habituate, which in turn results from damage to areas other than the
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frontal lobes. While an executive account may therefore be a sufficient explanation of a
generativity impairment in autism, it is not necessarily the only valid explanation.
7.43 Reconciling The Findings With Other Accounts
Space has prevented detailed descriptions and criticisms of a number of worthwhile
hypotheses, most notably Hobson's socio-affective account, though this and other hypotheses
were discussed briefly in regard to their implications for pretend play in chapter 3 (sections 3.2,
3.3 and 3.4). It is important to consider the implications of these findings for these accounts.
Inparticular there seems to be room for a consideration of the possible implications of social
deficits in autism for the hypothesized deficit inpretend play outlined here. Both Hobson's and
Rogers and Pennington's accounts (see subsection 3.22) attempt to explain children with
autism's apparent inability to manipulate metarepresentations by emphasising the role of social
interaction in the development of this ability. The assumption that individual pretend play is not
metarepresentational means that these accounts have little to say as far as children with autism's
apparent ability to engage in the mechanics of pretence is concerned. However, they are
broadly consistent with the Social Paucity hypothesis advanced above, emphasising as they do
the fundamental nature of social deficits. Though it is not clear whether Hobson would want to
argue that a failure to interact socially leads directly to fewer ideas for pretence, this suggestion
is explicitly made by Rogers and Pennington.
Another hypothesis which was outlined in chapter 3, and which is clearly relevant to
these discussions, is Boucher and Lewis' suggestion of an impairment in generating flexible
retrieval strategies for accessing internal representations. The GARS hypothesis, which arose
directly from this suggestion has been tested explicitly in this research, and the results of this
test indicated that a generativity irnpainnent could not be overcome by the presence of external
cues, as this account predicts. Therefore, though these results are in line with Lewis and
Boucher's (1991) finding of reduced creativity in children with autism's drawings, they are not
fully consistent with the evidence of impaired 'free generation', but unimpaired 'cued
generation' in autism (Boucher, 1988; Boucher & Warrington, 1976; Tager-Flusberg, 1991).
However, the points made in section 7.3 about the 'special nature' of pretence, raise the
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intriguing question of whether objects can ever cue pretend play in the way that they are able to
cue other play behaviours. As pretend play is counter-factual, or non-literal, objects may fail to
cue pretend actions in the way that presenting a semantic category directly cues word recall. If
this is the case (though arguments against this suggestion were raised in section 7.3) then
perhaps Boucher and Lewis are correct in proposing impaired strategy generation, rather than
simply arguing for impaired generativity per se.
7.5 Areas For Further Research
Clearly any work of this kind leaves certain questions unanswered, and fails to answer
other questions satisfactorily. While the conclusions proposed in this chapter are based on
"
reasoned evaluation of the empirical findings obtained, there is bound to be a degree of
uncertainty in the interpretations made. This section will discuss ways in which the
hypothesized deficit of a failure to generate pretend acts could be supported, and will outline
ways of attending to the interesting questions which follow from this work and which have yet
to be addressed.
7.51 Strengthening The Support For The Generativity Hypothesis
The studies carried out in the period of this research could be improved and modified to
give more clear cut and easily interpretable results; the exception perhaps being Experiments 2
and 4 which did provide clear findings. A minor flaw in Experiment 1 was that a significant
deficit in children with autism's ability to engage in spontaneous symbolic play (alone) was not
observed in either the analysis of percentage time or of rate of act production. The absence of
group effects in these cases are easily explained in terms of floor effects amongst controls, and
this explanation could be confirmed by a subsequent investigation which employed only the
doll plus junk material toy set, or a similar set of materials.
Similarly Experiments 3 and 5 could both be improved upon. Despite a retest with
relatively able children, aspects of the results of Experiment 3 were inconclusive (though less
so than in the original run). The extent of the confusion in participants of this level was, .
.'
surprising, and was partly due to the inclusion of a counter-intuitive literal testing session
before the pretend session for half the children. Another attempt at tapping comprehension
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abilities could dispense with the literal condition, as there was no evidence of impaired ability to
describe these episodes amongst the children with autism. Whether this alone would make the
procedure understandable to the majority of children is debatable however, as even the children
who received the pretend episodes initially performed relatively poorly on this task. It may be
more profitable to devise alternative ways of testing comprehension. One way to approach this
would be to investigate children with autism's ability to carry on a pretend act - for example a
child might be shown how pretend toothpaste is squeezed onto a pencil, and then be asked to
show what they should do with the 'pencil'. Presumably they would pretend to brush their
teeth rather than tty to draw with it.
Finally while Experiment 5 provided reasonable evidence of impaired ability to generate
pretend acts amongst children with autism, group differences were not quite significant. This
may well have been due to fatigue effects amongst controls, and it would therefore be valuable
to attempt a test of generativity of pretence in which separate conditions were presented in
isolation.
There is certainly room to strengthen the support for the other side of the account, namely
that children with autism possess intact the mechanisms necessary for pretence. This could best
be done by specifically testing their ability to engage in instructed pretend play which required
imagining absent objects and absent properties, as well as object substitution. The studies
carried out here provide firm support for the ability to engage in object substitution, but more
tangential evidence in the other two cases.
7.52 Addressing Unanswered Questions
Why Is There A Failure To Generate Pretend Acts In Autism?
Three potential explanations of a generativity impairment have been advanced here, all of
which are tentative, and deserve further consideration. The Social Paucity hypothesis could
perhaps be most easily tested, by examining correlations between children with autism's
sociability and pretend play abilities. Clearly those children who interact more with parents and
peers should have more ideas for pretence. The Failure to Habituate hypothesis could
conceivably be tested in a similar way, by correlating rates of habituation with levels of pretend
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play. A problem with this suggestion though, is that the nature of the link between habituation
deficits and pretence is less clear in this case. The Contextual Shifting hypothesis is harder still
to test, partly because it is more vague. It is not obvious how one would obtain a pure and
relevant measure of ability to guide one's own behaviour.
An alternative approach would be to alter the pretend play situation to remove the
difficulties proposed by each account. For example the Social Paucity account would predict
that modelling play would facilitate pretence, and the Contextual Shifting hypothesis might be
seen to suggest that certain props would be better cues for pretence, or that certain experimental
cues might be differentially effective in shifting a child into pretend play. However it is not
clear how an experimental situation could be modified so as to prevent a child from habituating
to a particular object use, or to simply doing nothing, in order to test the Pailure to Habituate
hypothesiS in this way.
Understanding Social Pretend Play In Autism
Perhaps the most important question not tackled in this research is the question of
whether children with autism are impaired in their ability, not only to engage in, but also to
comprehend social pretend play. Given children WIth autism's characteristic failme to engage
in spontaneous individual pretend play, and their resistance to social interaction in general, it is
almost certain that their spontaneous production of social pretend play will be impaired. What
is less clear is whether the comprehension of social pretend play would be impaired, and this is
a crucially important question to address. If, as suggested above, the comprehension of
complex social pretend play necessarily requires metarepresentational understanding (while
understanding individual pretend play does not), one would predict an impairment in this area.
given the general support for a metarepresentational impairment in autism. In fact there can be
no doubt that if a child were able to understand Leslie's M-representation, and compute the
infonnational relation 'Mother Pretends of the banana that it is a telephone', that they must be
able to process and manipulate metarepresentations.
Therefore if the comprehension of social pretend play of this kind were found to be
impaired in autism, this would amount to strong evidence for the proposed analysis of pretence.
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Conversely unimpaired comprehension of complex social pretend play would weigh heavily
asainst the metarepresentational hypothesis of autism. Having said this, it is hard to imagine
what type of account would be able to explain an ability to understand social pretend play in
others, but not false beliefs. Harris' view that both of these abilities do not rely on
metarepresentational competence, but instead on the setting aside of default settin,s could be
invoked, if one could argue that the latter test requires a greater degree of 'simulation'.
What is also unclear is exactly how one might ,0 about testing this ability in young
cbi1dren. Harris and Kavanaugh's (1993) experiments mirror Experiment 3, in that they really
only test ability to comprehend individual pretend play. Lillard (1993a) has claimed to have
looked at social pretend play in young normal children, but the Validity of this claim is doubtful.
Her experiments (subsection 1.24) really only amount to a test of the ability to understand the
lanpage of pretence. In order to properly test comprehension of complex social pretend play
one would need to ensure that the child was required to compute Leslie's M-representation. In
other words they must understand that someone else pretends that something is something else,
and not be able to pass test questions by 'running their own pretend scheme'. This might best
be done be looking at the ability to ascribe two different pretend identities to an object in pretend
substitution. For example the child might be presented with character X who pretends that a
pencil is a toothbrush, and character Y who pretends that the same pencil is a telescope. A third
protagonist Z would then be introduced, and would ask one of the other characters, chosen at
random, what they were playing with. In order to succeed on this task children would have to
keep track of two different 'pretences t and respond appropriately dependini on which character
was questioned by Z. It would therefore (theoretically) be easy to determine whether a group
of children's responses were due to chance guessing.
7.6 The Thesis
Though there are necessarily loose ends which this research has left untied, and While
there is clearly room to strengthen the findings obtained, it is still possible to propose fairly finn
conclusions as a result of this work. The results of the studies earned out in this project
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suggest that children with autism do have intact the mechanisms necessary for carrying out
pretend play. They appear to be able to engage in object substitution, in imagining absent
objects and in imagining absent properties, provided the ideas for pretence are given to them.
In this sense the observed absence of symbolic play seen in spontaneous play conditions cannot
reflect a competence deficit, as children with autism are able topretend. However children with
autism appear to be impaired in their ability to generate pretend play acts.
This failure to generate may be the result of a failure to interact socially with others,
which leads to a reduced pool of ideas for pretence from which to draw on. Alternatively it
might reflect a deficit in habituation in autism, which results in a preponderance of non-
symbolic activity. A third possibility, which follows on from a failure to habituate, is that
children with autism might be impaired in their ability to shift the context of activity. Such a
failure to shift could also, though not simultaneously be explained in terms of executive
dysfunction in autism. Figure 7.1 outlines these proposals, highlighting the potential links
betWeen particular explanations.
At present it is not possible to decide between these three suggestions. I would
tentatively argue that the notion of a failure of Contextual Shifting, though vague and in need of
further description, fits best with the data presented here. This is because it has the power to
ex.plain why children with autism find generating pretend acts difficult even when objects are
present. while their ability to generate other behaviours appears to be susceptible to cueing. By
its very nature pretend play is non-literal, and therefore objects may well provide poor and
indirect cues for pretence. Objects may therefore do little to shift the child' s contextual frame,
in contrast to a direct prompt from an experimenter which has been seen to be effective in
shifting children with autism to pretence.
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Accepting that children with autism can pretend does not necessarily mean that they can
manipulate metarepresentations. Adopting Leslie's analysis of pretence would force such a
conclusion, but there appears to be no need to do this. It is both justifiable and parsimonious to
propose that the production and comprehension of individual pretend play is non-
metarepresentational in nature. These findings are therefore not inconsistent with the widely
held view that children with autism suffer from an impaired ability to manipulate
metarepresentations, and indeed I would predict that children with autism would be impaired in
their ability to comprehend pretend play in others, an ability which would require
metarepresentational understanding.
Neither do the fmdings contradict the view that autism reflects a failure to exercise
executive control. This account can conceivably explain why children with autism fail to
aenerate ideas for pretend play, via the Contextual Shifting Hypothesis. The fact that children
with autism have no difficulty in inhibiting salient responses to objects in pretence suggests that
executive dysfunction may not a globally pervasive problem in autism, but the particular
executive demands of pretence need to be determined before such a conclusion can be fully
accepted. It should also be noted that some would argue that executive dysfunction in autism is
the result of more fundamental metarepresentationaldeficits, and indeed that others would argue
the opposite.
In sum, children with autism do appear to be able to pretend under certain circumstances,
though it may be that they never produce flexible and creative pretence. It would seem that their
failure to produce spontaneous pretend play reflects impaired ability to generate pretend acts,
but it is not clear what the cause of such an impairment might be. Further research should aim
to elucidate the nature of this proposed deficit, and to determine whether children with autism
can engage in social pretend playas well as in individual pretence.
Epilogue
I would imagine that it is all too easy, when carrying out research with people who are
disadvantaged in whatever sense, to dehumanise the problems of these people by converting
them into numbers and statistics. I have been fortunate to work in an area in which all other
researchers I have met have had an honest and genuine concern for the children whom they
come into contact with. This only emphasises the need for me to do the same. By its very
nature this research has been more theoretical than practical, as my supervisors and I have been
primarily concerned with fmding out what is going wrong in autism, rather than attempting to
put it right. Having said this, I would argue that this is a necessary and prerequisite step to
des igning appropriate intervention programs or approaches which stand a chance of improving
the quality of life of children and adults with autism.
It is still possible to say a few words about the practical implications of the findings of
this research, as I interpret them. If I am correct in thinking that children with autism can
pretend under certain circumstances, then it is worthwhile encouraging these children to
pretend. All teachers I have met do this to some extent, and it is to be encouraged. If it is the
case that children with autism lack the ideas for pretence, then encouraging them to engage in
less sophisticated social play with peers, may well be of benefit to them, and lead on to
improved pretend play skills.
A final point is that a number of children with moderate learning difficulties also
participated in these studies. These experiments have nothing to say as regards practical steps
which might be taken with these children. This is an unfortunate consequence of the nature of
this research, and one that I acknowledge.
Appendix 1
Addenda To Experiment 1
i.l Lego Toy Set Results
Table i.I, Experiment 1: Percentage time spent in various play categories with Lego Toy Set
Group
Children with Autism Children with MID
Condition Condition
Play Type Spontaneous Elicited Spontaneous Elicited
Symbolic 5.8 19.1 9.0 16.9
Syt:l!_bolic plus Intermediate 51.7 50.7 61.2 65.2
Functional 16.6 13.7 9.9 8.9
Manipulative 27.0 30.7 15.9 15.8
No Play 4.7 4.9 13.0 10.1
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Table i2. Experiment 1:Means of rates of act production in various play categories with Lego
Toy Set (acts per minute)
Group
Childrenwith Autism Children with MLD
Condition Condition
Play Type Spontaneous Elicited Spontaneous Elicited
Total Play Acts 1.92 2.68 1.52 2.58
f
Symbolic 0.17 0.52 0.47 0.89
Symbolic plus Intermediate 0.49 1.41 0.71 2.25
Functional 0.44 0.47 0.35 0.47
Manipulative 0.99 1.39 0.47 0.81
No Play 0.40 0.72 0.35 0.77
i.2 Instructed Play Results
i.21 Analysis Across All Three Toy Sets
Details of the mean number of responses in each category for each material set are given
in table i.3. Two separate analyses were performed on the data, one of percentage pass
responses the other of percentage intermediate and pass responses. A two factor ANOVA
design was employed for each analysis, the factors being Group (children with autism or MLD;
repeated measures) and Toy Type (doll figures, lego or doll plus junk; repeated measures).
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Tobie 13 Means of percentage responses.
Groun
Response Type Material Children with Children with MLD
Autism
Doll Figures 55.9 71.1
Passes Lego 45.7 51.4
Doll + Junk 64.3 77.1
Doll Figures 72.6 86.2
Passes plus Lego 60.0 74.9
Intennediates Doll+ Jank 71.4 84.3
Percentage passes
The analysis of percentage of instructions passed with each set of materials showed a
significant main effect of Group, (F=3.40, df=l, P, 1 tailed=O.04), due to impaired
performance amongst the children with autism. There was also a significant main effect of Toy
Type (F=9.1S, df=2, P<O.Ol). Post-hoc tests revealed this to be due to there beinl more
passes with doll plus junk objects than with doll figures or with Lego (P<O.OS;Tukey tests).
The Group x Toy Type interaction was not significant (F=O.42,df=2, P=O.66).
Percentage passes and intermediate passes
Including intermediate pass responses in the analysis made little difference to the
observed pattern of results. The main effect of Group remained significant (F-3.39, df-t, P,
1 tailed=O.04). The main effect of Toy Type was not significant (Fa2.79. df=2, P=O.08) but
remained as a strong trend. In this case performance on the Lego instructions was relatively
poor. The Group x Toy Type interaction was again not significant (F=O.02,dfa2, P=O.98).
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i.22 Analysis of Doll Figure Instruction
As described in subsection 4.22 the doll figure instructions were divided into three types,
physical, social and emotional. Details of the mean number of responses in each category for
each instruction type are given in table i.4. This data was analysed using a two factor ANOVA
design, the factors being Group (children with autism or MLD; repeated measures) and
Instruction Type (physical, social or emotional; repeated measures). Again both passes and
passes plus intermediate pass responses were analysed separately.
Table i.4. Mean number of responses to Doll Figure instructions
Group
Response Type Instruction Type Olildren With ChildrenWith
Autism MID
Physical 3.14 3.57
Passes Social 2.57 3.29
Emotional 1.00 1.64
Physical 3.71 3.64
Passes plus Social 2.86 3.79
Intennediates Emotional 2.14 2.71
Numberof passes
The analysis of number of pass responses for each type of doll figure instruction yielded
a significant main effect of Group (F=4.77, df=I, P, 1 tailed=O.03), as the children with MLD
passed more instructions than the children with autism.. The main effect of Instruction Type
was significant (F=52.96, df=2 P<O.Ol);the emotional instructions were significantly harder to
pass than the physical or social ones (P<O.Ol; Tukey test). The Group x Instruction Type
interaction was not significant (F=O.29,df=2, P=O.75).
Appendix 1
Number 0/passes and intermediate passes
Including intermediate passes in the analysis did not affect the significant main effect of
Instruction Type (F=19.53, df=2, P<O.OI), again the emotional instructions were 'harder',
However the main effect of Group became slightly less marked (F=2.70, df=l, P, I
tailed=O.06). There was a significant Group x Instruction Type interaction (F=3.40, df=2,
p=O.05). This was found to be due to the fact that the children with MLD produced
significantly more pass and intermediate responses than the children with autism for the social
instructions (F=5.828, df=L, P, l-tailed=O.02), but not for the physical or emotional
instructions; see graph i.l.
Graphi.l. Passes plus intermediate passes to doll plus junk instructions: Group x Instruction
Type interaction
4
Mean No.
Passes + 3
Int. Passes
2
1
Physical Social Emotional
Instruction Type
Appendix 1 281
;.23 Brief Discussion
The children with autism were generally impaired in their ability to carry out the
instruCtions employed in Experiment 1. A significant deficit is observed both across the three
toy types. and amongst the doll figure instructions alone. and regardless of whether a liberal or
conservative analysis is used in each case. There is a suggestion that the children with autism
mi,ht be specifically impaired in their ability to answer social doll figure instructions, but graph
i.1 indicates that it may be ceiling effects on the physical instructions which are the main cause
of a sijDificant Group x Instruction Type interaction.
This pattern of impairment stands in contrast to the unimpaired performance of children
with autism seen in Experiment 2. It must be remembered that a number of the instructions
employed here, unlike those used in Experiment 2, are unlikely to require a 'symbolic'
response. The difficulties experienced by children with autism in this case are arguably due to
the fact that a large number of these instructions require a creative response (e.g. 'He's very
tired. what does he do', making objects with Lego). In particular the social and emotional
instrUctions employed in this instance did not provide such specific cues as those used in
Bxperiment 2, and may therefore not provide a clear idea for pretence (e.g. 'Show me how he
can be scared/frightened' vs. 'Show me how the boy can be scared of the dog'). It is therefore
possible that the difference in performance seen across the two sets of instructions reflects a
failure to generate appropriate behaviour in Experiment 1, in line with the hypothesized pretend
play deficit described in chapter 7.
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